

Transscalar Governance of Climate Change

An Engaged Scholarship Approach



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Prologue

In this dissertation I analyse, discuss, and critically reflect on the problem of how to understand new practices of transscalar¹ governance of climate change after COP15². In the introduction following this prologue, I will explain and formulate this problem as a research question. To answer the question I have written a dissertation with five papers, and although they are bound together by a common framework, it is a dissertation of many stories. The good thing is that this gives the dissertation a broad appeal. The bad thing is that not everything can be explained within the first few pages, which demands a bit more patience of the reader. This prologue is thus meant as a first introduction to present the dissertation's most important parts and frame the overall approach. First of all, I take an explicit Narrative approach³ combined with an Engaged Scholarship approach (Van de Ven 2007). I call the first chapter of this dissertation *Introducing the End* referring to the many meanings of the word *end* as well as to the basic structure of narrative. To fulfil another kind of end, to get to the end of the dissertation it has a *narrative* like any other dissertation, book, or paper; narrative in this sense meaning the way the story is told and structured (Cobley 2014).

Secondly, the dissertation tells an overall story of transscalar governance of climate change, and the five individual papers tell each their own empirically rich stories about United Nations climate negotiations and new green growth

¹ I have settled on the concept of *transscalar* following Scholte's (2014) critique of the concepts *global*, *transnational*, and *multi-level* in relation to governance. I explain this critique in chapter 2. The choice of using *transscalar* has come towards the end of my PhD research writing up the dissertation; thus other concepts are used in some of the papers.

² The Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The UNFCCC was agreed in 1992 at the Rio Earth Summit and entered into force in 1994 with the first COP held in 1995.

³ I use Big-N Narrative to denote my approach and analytical model based on Narrative theory. I use small-n narrative to denote the told (or untold) narratives that actors use to make sense of stories. I apply and partly develop a social science approach. I do not discuss and reference Narratology and Postclassical Narratology as such. For a discussion see Cobley 2014, chapter 9, 211-242.

networks. They are individual stories with self-contained narratives. To distinguish the dissertation, also in linguistic style, from the individual papers, I deliberately seek to write myself into the narrative, and as author come as close to the position of narrator as possible. The point is also to help the individual papers fit with the overall story I want to tell, to bring them in on equal footing as parts of the overall project. One of the main difficulties of writing a paper based dissertation is to reconcile in one manuscript many different and self-contained manuscripts as one.

Thirdly, if Narrative and Engaged Scholarship is one leg, then practice theory and the Bourdieusian research agenda in International Relations is the other. I partly apply the practice approach in analysis in the different papers, and I partly apply it to myself to reflect on research as practice. I write in this explicit meta-narrating style, because it is a way of making some arguments clear, in *practice*, about the academic field and the art of writing academically as well as being an engaged scholar in practice. Bourdieu, a key inspiration of this dissertation, did this in an often implicit but practical manner in his complex style, both mirroring and mocking the French academic elite style, constantly reminding (annoying) the reader of how this *field*, through its *doxa* and *illusio*, reproduces a distribution of power and positions of agents and their (dis)ability to understand a complex academic style, thereby inviting the reader to question the necessity of an overly complex and excluding writing style. At the same time, however, Bourdieu was also challenging the reader's comfort with familiar concepts (when academic and everyday language get too similar) by using non-ordinary and distinct words for concepts (partly) to illustrate that theoretical concepts are not the world they seek to explain and understand (Swartz 2012, 13), and partly to distinguish himself from other academics. In this sense, Bourdieu's writings are similar to Magritte's paintings. Doxa, in short, being the self-evident truths of the established order of knowledge upheld by the dominant actors in a given field and providing the background of what

constitutes actors' illusio; i.e. actors' interests and sense of what is at stake (cf. Bourdieu 1991, 127ff; 1998, 80; Pouliot and Mérand 2013, 32ff).

Another theoretical and morphological point, connecting theory and practice, is the deliberate choice of writing “Introducing the end” (and “Concluding the beginning”) in the active form of the verb introduc-*ing* – not introduction. It is a linguistic practice of making the active sense of practice explicit; a way of focusing on practice as a way of linguistically bridging the structure–agency divide. This is one of the guiding principles of the dissertation and the individual papers. Thus, when the papers deal with specific meanings, I usually begin with questions and analysis of “what meaning to whom, when, how and why”. When it comes to governance it is a bit different though, as I mostly use the term governance, and not govern-*ing*, because “global governance” is the overarching theoretical literature I am writing within and to, although I seek to decentre it as transscalar and narrated. I do take a very explicit practice approach to governance, so I ask questions about who is governing, how, what, when, where, and why. It should be clear that I understand these questions differently from e.g. Dahl's “Who Governs?” approach (1961). My practice and narrative approach means that these questions are understood in a context of multiple and contingent practices and also of academic narratives about what governance and governing mean. In a way, I'm beginning to sketch out a narrative approach to transscalar governance inspired by similar advances within national scale governance studies like Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes' *The State as Cultural Practice* (2010) and Wagenaar's *Meaning in Action* (2011).

Chapter one, *Introducing the End*, refers to theoretical, empirical, and practical insights. Practically, it is very often the case that the introduction of a dissertation, book, or paper is written in the end of the research and learning process. This introduction is no exception. Theoretically, a narrative *re*-presentation is a movement from a beginning to an end, but more importantly it

goes through a middle, where the reader has to get involved and do the most work. Narrative is best understood in its social relations, in this case firstly in the academic field and secondly in relations between me and anyone who reads this dissertation. Narrative also brings in, in its relational ontology, *spatial* and *temporal horizons*, and for these to work well, there should be a fit between the narrator's and the reader's horizons, unless the point is to challenge the reader and maybe even seek to change the reader's horizons. A competently performed⁴ academic introduction sets out to introduce the end, to tell the reader what to *anticipate* from the middle through to the end. The next part of the narrative, the middle, then invites a *focus* of the reader, which, however, might challenge what was promised in the beginning. And the end will then invite a *retrospection* of the reader and thus the narrative ends with the beginning in a new light (cf. Copley 2014; Hulme 2009).

At this point I want to address a critique about the epistemic validity of using Narrative theory, writing, and constructing narratives myself. Both critics and some proponents of interpretive research have raised the issue of narratives being “constructed in part by the imagination of the writer” thus failing to live up a certain standard of epistemic validity and legitimacy (Bevir 2005, 289). I could rightfully be accused of this when later in the dissertation I construct and represent what I call the dominant epistemological and ontological narratives. These narratives are partly constructed by my imagination. Bevir's answer to this critique deserves to be repeated in full:

”In fact, we can easily defend the epistemic legitimacy of narrative provided only that we reject naive positivism. The failings of naive positivism are recognized so widely now, that I hope I will be excused for taking for granted the assumption that we cannot have pure perceptions of given facts, but rather must always approach the world with a prior body of theories, concepts, or categories that help to

⁴ to paraphrase Adler and Pouliot 2011

construct the experiences we have. This rejection of naive positivism implies, first, that in all human knowledge – natural science as well as narrative – we imaginatively construct the world of our experiences. Thus we can accept that narratives are in part imaginative constructs and still defend their epistemic legitimacy, for their legitimacy cannot be undermined by the fact that they exhibit a characteristic that is common to all knowledge.” (2005, 289).

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“Nihil sine labore”

et

“Vir prudens non contra ventum mingit.”

When I was child my dad taught me these two Latin proverbs. I realise now that both have prepared me well for life outside and inside academia; it's all about a lot of work and positioning. Studying climate change I am often reminded of windmills as a symbol of a positioning, where standing up against the wind actually generates power. Unlike the wise man, the windmill always catches the winds of change, and gains the advantage of being able to speak truth *with* power. However, hard work is not possible without the support of family and friends who helped me more than I can ever thank. I would therefore like to thank the following for supporting and believing in me and my project:

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1. Introducing the End

This dissertation is about transscalar governance of anthropogenic climate change. Taking a Narrative approach to this topic is no easy task, because of the many stories and even more narratives about governance of anthropogenic climate change. It is one of the key drivers of the “end of times” (Žižek 2011), one of the nine “planetary boundaries” we’re transgressing (Rockström, Steffen, Noone *et al.* 2009a, 2009b, 2015) and thus why we find ourselves in a new geological period called “the Anthropocene” (Crutzen 2002; Crutzen and Stoermer 2000; Steffen *et al.* 2011), where “humankind has become a global geological force in its own right.” (Steffen *et al.* 2011, 843). And it results in “the collapse of Western civilization” (Oreskes and Conway 2014). Since the 1960s, environmental and climate concerns have been global and found various responses “from calls for the suspension of democracy and rigid state control in the neo-Hobbesian eco-authoritarian literature to anarchistic calls for the dissolution of the state and the deep ecological call for *metaphysical reconstruction* – a fundamental change in how “we” (human beings in the industrialized world) view the nonhuman natural world and, indeed, all matter.” (Humphrey 2010, 442, original emphasis). The dissertation has also made me reflect a lot on the end of many lives, communities, and species. Those lives that have already ended, those that are near the end, those destined to end – and the rest of us getting ever closer to the “end of times”. But we, some more than others (Humphrey 2010; Malm and Hornborg 2014), are causing this end to ourselves. The *end* understood as *goal* has for “Man” long been to work the land for different reasons other than survival; I would like to highlight three quotes from one of the canonical thinkers and providers of grand narratives of Western civilization; from John Locke’s “Second Treatise of Government”:

”God, when He gave the world in common to all mankind, commanded man also to labour, and the penury of his condition required it of him. God and his reason commanded him to subdue the earth—i.e., improve it for the benefit of life and therein lay out something upon it that was his own, his labour. He that, in obedience to this command of God, subdued, tilled, and sowed any part of it, thereby annexed to it something that was his property, which another had no title to, nor could without injury take from him.” (Chapter V. Of Property. Section 31).

”Before the appropriation of land, he who gathered as much of the wild fruit, killed, caught, or tamed as many of the beasts as he could— he that so employed his pains about any of the spontaneous products of Nature as any way to alter them from the state Nature put them in, by placing any of his labour on them, did thereby acquire a propriety in them; but if they perished in his possession without their due use—if the fruits rotted or the venison putrefied before he could spend it, he offended against the common law of Nature, and was liable to be punished: he invaded his neighbour’s share, for he had no right farther than his use called for any of them, and they might serve to afford him conveniencies of life.” (Chapter V. Of Property. Section 37).

”... land that is left wholly to nature, that hath no improvement of pasturage, tillage, or planting, is called, as indeed it is, waste; and we shall find the benefit of it amount to little more than nothing.” (Chapter V. Of Property. Section 42).

While we understand the physical and philosophical reasons behind anthropogenic climate change and that we now live in what increasingly many call the Anthropocene, old and new attempts at governing climate change have failed to make the necessary changes (IPCC 2013, 2014; Steffen *et al.* 2011,

856, UNEP 2013). Part of the explanation is of course that we disagree about climate change and about new concepts such as the Anthropocene (Hulme 2009; Malm and Hornborg 2014). It is difficult to depart from the negative legacy of Locke and the Enlightenment. Part of the explanation is also that different governance approaches (in theory and practice) dealing with the interrelated challenges of climate change and systems transformation are not providing the needed full-scale pathways to decarbonisation (Hoffmann 2011; 2013). Climate change is as political, contested, and bound up in power structures as any other scientific matter (cf. Bourdieu 1988a and 1988b; Hulme 2009; Latour 1993 and 2014).

1.1. Dissertation themes and research question

In search of what *necessary changes* mean and imply, in this dissertation I aim to understand and explain this situation from a transscalar governance perspective; *theoretically* by exploring transscalar governance from a Bourdieusian practice perspective; *empirically* by investigating different but relevant parts of the phenomenon, namely UN climate negotiations and the green growth policy field at different scales of analysis; and *practically*⁵ by bringing theoretical and empirical insights together by engaging policy, business, and society in dialogue to explore what practitioners understand as necessary changes. These three perspectives or narrative lines are used throughout the dissertation and are brought together through an approach known as engaged scholarship (Van de Ven 2007). Narrative line is a concept I have invented for this purpose. It is inspired by the concepts of storyline. I write concepts in plural as there are a social science version of the concept (Hajer 1995) and a narratology version as well (Gardner 2011). Hajer understands

⁵ I use the term “practically” in the Bourdieusian sense related to practice. *Practical* and *practically* is by no means meant as a trivial exercise, but as an exercise that is simultaneously reflexive and engaging (cf. Van de Ven 2007 explained further below).

storyline as a kind of shorthand for a condensed argument or even a discourse. In day-to-day practice, full stories are too long to retell, so actors resort to storylines. Storylines can be understood as recurring figures of speech that dominate public understanding and rationalise and naturalise the existing social order (e.g. dominant discourses and narratives) (1995, 268). Agents use certain storylines by drawing on specific discourse(s) to give meaning to physical or social phenomena, such as climate change and COP negotiations for that matter. I use narrative line as a tool in the dissertation; as shorthand for complete and condensed narrative.

In narratology, storyline is applied in relation to the drawn line in graphic novels. Some central aspects of this concept are, however, useful in my concept of narrative line. The first aspect is that Gardner brings back a focus on the creator, in my case, the scholar behind the writing. Scholarly text is more than the textual product; its narrative and narrative line get entangled with the scholar as both performance and text. And the narrative lines can become part of academic and policy discourses. Further, the storyline is also a feedback loop in the process of drawing and reading (Gardner 2011, 67), and in my case, the narrative line acts as a feedback loop in the process of writing and engaging the world with my writing. These aspects fit well with both Van de Ven's Engaged Scholarship approach and Bevir's argument about epistemic validity of academic narratives. Lines are also understood as the threads (or plot in narrative terms) running through and binding together the dissertation.

The narrative lines I use in this dissertation are the *theoretical*, *empirical*, and *practical* narratives (marked in italics). These three narrative lines are brought together in this framework and through the included five papers of which three papers deal with the theme of UNFCCC⁶ governance practices, and two papers deal with the theme of green growth governance practices.

⁶ United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change.

These papers collectively answer my research question:

How have transscalar climate governance practices changed since COP15?

My approach to governance and climate change in this framework is to understand the meanings and practices of governance, specifically transscalar governance of climate change, as they unfold in two fields; the UNFCCC and the green growth field. The body of governance theory is rich and full of stories and narratives. I initially follow Stripple and Stephan's (2013) understanding of governance, and explain later why I depart from it and develop a transscalar and Narrative approach to governance closer to Bevir and Rhodes (2010). They argue for a "narrative of 'decentred governance'" approach with which scholars should focus on "the social construction of a practice through the ability of individuals to create, and act on, meanings" where "governance is constructed differently by many actors working against the background of many traditions" (Bevir and Rhodes 2010, 82).

I also mention COP15⁷ in the research question. COP15 – as any historical event – is interpreted and reinterpreted in many different ways by practitioners and scholars alike. Nonetheless, COP15 generally stands as a benchmark in time symbolising a massive collective failure in the history of UNFCCC governance. Although some politicians and officials speak of COP15 as a great contribution, because of the Copenhagen Accord (Observations from COP17, COP18, COP19, and COP20), the dominant narrative is one of failure (cf. paper 1 and 3). I tend to view it as a failure, because it did not accomplish what was agreed it should have accomplished; COP15 did not decide upon a new globally binding climate agreement. And I argue that those actors who

⁷ The Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC.

argue that COP15 was not a failure do so because they seek to protect the legitimacy of the UNFCCC process and their own part in that process. COP21, taking place in Paris from 30 November to 11 December 2015, is the new COP15 but with less enthusiasm and lower expectations⁸ (Observations from COP20).

COP15 also constitutes a crisis – an external shock or critical juncture in an Institutional theory perspective. Critical juncture explanations are most often post hoc and in my view focus too much on the event itself instead of how different actors appropriate and use it in narratives (cf. paper 4). The more interesting questions, I argue, are how governance practices change after the event? How does the perceived COP15 failure, but also achievements (Lidegaard 2013), become part of new narratives with heroes and villains and suggested action of overcoming failure? How does the event as crisis still have different meanings to different actors? How is it constantly reinterpreted over the course of time? How do different actors draw on different traditions, which then shape the governance response? It is natural to expect a reaction within the UNFCCC field, where actors seek to create new narratives and perform new practices after the failure of the COP15 script to play out as written. However, the narrative of COP15 or even UNFCCC governance failure has also had profound influence in climate governance narratives outside of the UNFCCC field. This is where the theme of green growth governance enters the dissertation. The main green growth narrative, I have found, is related to COP15, the UNFCCC and other UN climate and environment practices, and in many ways it is a story of a bottom-up solution by (self-proclaimed) progressive international actors, where bottom-up is understood as opposite of the UN top-down practices and as more inclusive of non-state actors than the formal statist UNFCCC negotiations.

⁸ See also Climate Action Tracker. As of 25 June 2015 the assessment of Parties' mitigation contributions ranged from inadequate to medium. <http://climateactiontracker.org/indcs.html>

1.2. Dissertation structure

After this introduction, in chapter two, I contextualise the dissertation, firstly, by explaining my meta-theoretical approach of Engaged Scholarship, which guides the dissertation as a whole, and secondly, by situating it in the broader academic field of global climate governance. I do not present a traditional literature review. In line with my practice and narrative perspective I understand theories and literature reviews to be reflections of practices and narratives themselves (Cobley 2014, 219), and I thus seek to present some of the meta-narratives of global environmental governance, which the specific narratives in my dissertation necessarily relates to.

In chapter three, I explain the *engaged scholarship approach, research design, and methodology, sources, and methods*. Since each paper contains the more specific methodology and methods, in chapter three I elaborate on how my meta-theoretical approach of transscalar governance, practice, and narrative theory plays out in the papers and help me answer the research question. In the first section, I explain the engaged scholarship approach and how I have applied it. In the second section, I explain how my meta-theoretical approach has formed the research design. This has been a very iterative learning process influenced by practitioners along the way as well as a process of trying out and combining different theoretical elements applied at different scales (Van de Ven 2007, 24). As Van de Ven argues, “[c]ombined, complementary models provide richer insights and explanations of a phenomenon that would otherwise remain neglected.” (2007, 20). I use two figures to visualise the research design of writing “one dissertation with five papers”, and how the theoretical and empirical elements play out in relation to the five papers. In the third section, I explain my methodological approach and present an overview of sources and methods. Sources and methods are described in full in the individual papers, but here I present an overview of all sources illustrated in several tables.

In chapter four, I answer the research question. I present the overall findings of the dissertation's five papers in relation to the two themes of UNFCCC governance practices and green growth governance practices. I then reflect on the joint contributions from the papers in relation to theoretical, empirical, and practical stories. The main *theoretical* story that I draw from the papers is that *practices* and *narratives* shape how we respond to climate change, and that practices of transscalar governance of climate change evolve over time interdependently in social relations and processes (paper 1) through *narrative practices* (paper 2) *communities of practice* (paper 3), in *strategic action fields* (paper 4 and 5), and through specific *strategic action and strategic moves* (paper 5).

The main *empirical* story that I draw from the papers is that transscalar governance of climate change after COP15 has responded in many ways; and two of which I have explored are about a re-configuration of the UNFCCC field (papers 1-3) and the formation of a new field focused on green growth (papers 4-5). The first part of the story deals with how new collective actors in the UNFCCC negotiations position themselves supported by new narratives (paper 2). Some actors are also responding directly to the perceived threat of a demise of the UNFCCC and have sought to rebuild trust through community-building across old divisions (paper 3). The second part of the story deals with the emergence, spread, and organisation of green growth as an empirical governance phenomenon in the years 2005-2013 (paper 4). It furthermore deals with how one actor in particular, The Republic of Korea (henceforth South Korea or Korea), has been central in placing green growth on the global agenda, in global organisations, connected green growth with financial flows and policy planning in other countries and regions (paper 5). The formation of the green growth field is also supported by new narratives.

The main *practical* story that I draw, not just from the papers, but from the whole PhD research process, is that engaged scholarship is something more

than policy oriented research, sometimes also labelled as “research to the benefit of society”. It is a reflexive and transdisciplinary way of thinking and practicing research much closer to the dialogic approach of deliberative policy analysis (Wagenaar and Hajer 2003; Wagenaar 2011) and post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992, 1993). Engaged scholarship and the Bourdieusian notion of dissolving false dichotomies (Pouliot 2007 and 2008), especially between theory and practice as pointed out by Berling (2013), are quite similar: “Scholarship that engages both researchers and practitioners can provide an exceedingly productive and challenging environment; it not only fosters the creation of knowledge for science and practice, but it may dissolve the theory-practice gap.” (Van de Ven 2007, 35). In a Bourdieusian sense, the (practice of) theorising should include practical knowledge, and practice should include theoretical knowledge in a much more explicit and reflexive way. It not only demands more of the scholar but also of the participating practitioners. One part of the story is that I have observed how scholars are constantly involved in practical governance in both the UNFCCC and green growth field. Another part of the story is that I have become engaged in practical governance. I am continually engaging practitioners, and practitioners are increasingly engaging me. I take this as evidence that practitioners find my work usable, and I argue that my own work and knowledge has been strengthened by this engagement.

In chapter five I conclude the dissertation as a whole, and discuss some wider implications of my conclusions. So, introducing the end, as alluded to above has many meanings; the end being the many purposes of the dissertation, the end being about setting the expectations, and also being about the end of the world as we know it. Most importantly, I think, from the narrative and engaged scholarship perspective, the end is never simply the end, but an invitation for a new beginning and new dialogue.

2. Contextualising the dissertation

Research is a specific form of practice. How we view and make sense of research, the role as researcher, and the field under study can be expressed in what I call *research narratives*. In this chapter, I contextualise the dissertation in relation to the dominant research narrative of global⁹ governance of climate change. I then discuss how my narrative and practice approach fits with the dominant research narrative. Based on three dilemmas or ambiguities in relation to the dominant research narrative, I suggest that an alternative narrative is emerging. This dissertation is better expressed using this alternative research narrative, but should of course be contextualised in relation to the overall narrative structure of the field under study. I further develop this alternative research narrative in chapter 3, where I present my research design, and in chapter 4, where I present my findings from the papers. Furthermore, I see this dissertation as a continuation of an academic debate about the relationship between theory, reality, and practice (Berling 2013; Bevir 2005; Bevir and Rhodes 2010; Bourdieu 1988a and 1988b; Latour 1993; Toulmin 2001; Van de Ven 2007; Villumsen 2008; Waagenar 2011) which has demonstrated the value of a sociological approach and of adding *practice* to the lenses with which we see and analyse the world (in both epistemological and ontological terms). The inspiration should be clear in the individual papers and this framework, and I do not want to repeat what has already been written. In this framework chapter, I am more interested in what happens when *practice*, especially in combination with *narrative*, is added to the theoretical framework of global governance. It is not only about taking a step back to reflect, it is also about taking a step forward to engage in practice (reflexively).

⁹ I write “global” here to denote the dominant narrative’s use of global rather than the alternative concept of transscalar.

2.1. The dominant research narrative: global governance of climate change

In this section, I present what I have come to understand as the dominant research narrative of (what in this narrative is called) *global governance of climate change*. I will first explain how I have come to this understanding; how I have identified this dominant narrative. I give an example of a narrative analysis of the concept *global governance* (Stripple and Stephan 2013), which I discuss and depart from to present the dominant research narrative in more detail.

2.1.1. Identifying the dominant narrative

This section is not a traditional literature review¹⁰, usually the choice when contextualising a dissertation, but a Narrative approach to the academic literature. As explained further in the next chapter, this Narrative approach fits with the Engaged Scholarship approach (Van de Ven 2007) of seeking to include the perspectives of the key stakeholders¹¹ in the field. As mentioned in the Prologue I follow Bevir's argument for why it makes sense to approach theories as narratives and why such a narrative partly constructed by my imagination is still a legitimate and valid form of knowledge. I further argue following Cobley (2014) that the Narrative approach to a literature review has the benefit of distancing it from a reified status and the identity markers that some literature reviews tend to have. Cobley uses a critique of a grand narrative of the West, where "the narratives of ancient Greece has been incorporated into a 'Western tradition' which has frequently been held to be the 'first' and the

¹⁰ For this see e.g. Bulkeley and Newell 2010; Christoff and Eckersley 2013; Falkner 2013, Gupta 2014; Hulme 2009; Okoreke and Bulkeley 2007.

¹¹ Van de Ven uses the word "stakeholder" and although it has a business model ring to it, I have kept this term. I argue that it fits well with a Bourdieusian perspective of actors in a field being those with something at stake. In global (environmental) governance academics are clearly part of the field (cf. Adler and Haas 1991; Haas 1989; Hulme 2009; Young 2013).

‘best’” and which has “systematically ‘edited out’ the non-white elements of the Western past” (2014, 37). Narratives not only represent a story through inclusion, but also by writing something out.

My model for including the perspectives of key stakeholders and contextualising the dissertation in relation to these is to follow the three general narrative lines I have already introduced; a *theoretical* (epistemological), an *empirical* (ontological), and a *practical* narrative line. My model is to identify the narrative elements that other researchers and practitioners use in and of the field, and then to present these as the dominant and alternative narratives; these elements could be how the chronology, the problem and solution, proponents and opponents, character attributions, and values (specific or grand) connected to the stories are all framed. I have not identified the narrative elements through a rigorous content analysis of all these sources and field notes or repetitive testing, but rather through the process of *abductive reasoning* which follows from being engaged over a longer period of time, and through continuous dialogue with other scholars, practitioners, and sources (Van de Ven 2007, 20).

Abductive reasoning can be described as the process of conceiving of and reflecting on “the germ of an idea” as a creative response to experiencing anomalies, a process which ends “by selecting a plausible and coherent solution that might resolve the anomaly.” (Van de Ven 2007, 140). The anomalies I experienced were first of all the many different and even conflicting academic accounts of what global governance of climate change is and how to study it. Secondly, conducting fieldwork at four COPs, several green growth events, and taking part in public debate, also provided a rich material as stories and narratives. In the abductive reasoning process, conjectures are made and evaluated against each other. Engaged scholarship strengthens the plausibility of these conjectures, because engaging others bring other perspectives and assumptions into play. If my narratives are found to be recognisable and plausible by both scholars and practitioners, I have constructed them well (Van

de Ven 2007, 140-141). At this point in time it is difficult to evaluate, but if invitations to participate in new research groups, academic conferences, academic and policy panels, write analyses for media, and participate in working group meetings as expert, can be a good measure of the plausibility of my research findings, then my narratives have been well received. My continuous engagement with the two (overlapping) fields has made it possible to apply abductive reasoning. Going back to the COPs year after year with new eyes, new questions, new understandings, meeting and talking with the same people, with new people, observing the negotiations and everything around them, has been central in my approach. The same goes for observing and participating in the unfolding, in the making, of the green growth field.

The narratives I have constructed form a big part of how I have come to understand the field's academic doxa (the focus of this chapter). Presenting an academic debate is also a way of presenting an ontology of the academic field, bringing some arguments centre stage and omitting others altogether. However, a narrative is more than an academic debate. It is also a structuring element in the field, part of the general doxa of the field, and thus part of what even seems possible and imaginable at all to debate and how to debate it. What I have found is that the dominant research narrative follows a general theory/reality distinction (cf. Villumsen 2008). It follows a general research model that consists of two interdependent narratives about epistemology and ontology. This research narrative can be illustrated as in figure 2.1 below. I present the epistemological and ontological narratives separately for analytical reasons to be able to highlight different problems, to be able to reveal these narratives' contingent nature and how they are loaded with deeper sets of assumptions, and furthermore, to remind the reader of the mobilising effect of narratives. Furthermore, I point to their interrelations.

As a starting point, I first present Stripple and Stephan's (2013) analysis of the concept of *global governance* as an example of a narrative approach

relating to this key concept. Stripple and Stephan's text relates directly to the environment and climate as a chapter in *The Handbook of Global Climate and Environment Policy* (Falkner 2013). They write:

“Few concepts have as swiftly entered academic and policy discussions and become the organizing concept as ‘global governance.’ (...) The historical context for the concept of global governance was the fall of the Berlin Wall and the waning of the Cold War order. At this point in time, the demand was high for new concepts that could capture a rapidly changing world. (...) Probably because the concept seemed to make immediate sense for capturing and responding to a rapidly unfolding world politics, ‘global governance’ has, rather unfortunately, come to be understood both as a new empirical phenomenon and a theoretical term for analyzing it.” (2013, 146).

Stripple and Stephan also point to the way the concept of global governance is more than just an ontological truth as identified by Rosenau (1992). It is also an epistemological narrative which is changing researchers' models and focus from the state-based anarchical system of international politics to global society and “the rise of hybrid, non-hierarchical, and network-like modes of governing on the global stage.” (2013, 147). Stripple and Stephan's narrative presents a chronology of the concept, and they point to how global governance as concept is a solution to a theoretical problem caused by a perceived qualitative ontological change. However, this concept, because it is applied in practice denoting both a theoretical and empirical condition, also creates a problem of loss of distinction between theory and reality – and so the need for a new solution arises.


There is an ambiguity of language and meaning in the label global governance (can be applied by both researchers and non-researchers), which is somehow a general condition of concepts in the social sciences, and one reason

why Bourdieu preferred to invent his own theoretical language, however, even some of Bourdieu's concepts have spread to popular language. Some view this ambiguity as a problem others do not. Narrative supports both views since narrative can either write the ambiguity out of the story or can highlight the ambiguity and situate our own unease as the problem, so we might learn something and move on. I take the latter view of embracing ambiguity following Bevir and Rhodes (2010), Van de Ven (2007), and Wagenaar (2011). Ambiguity in this sense is not the same as imprecision. Precise concepts and language are important in the academic practices to know and convey what we are doing. How does this translate into an explanation of my choice of concepts for this dissertation, where I discard the concept of global but keep that of governance? I argue that there is a qualitative difference between *global* and *governance*. The latter is more inclusive of practices, whereas the former writes something important out as it presents an ontology of opposition between the global and the local implicitly understood as levels (cf. Scholte 2014).

In the following two sections, I depart from Stripple and Stephan's analysis to more explicitly explore the epistemological and ontological narratives. The two narratives are:

1. The epistemological narrative about the better theoretical approach to explain and understand global governance of climate change.
2. The ontological narrative about what global governance of climate change is.

Figure 2.1. Model of the dominant research narrative



2.1.2. The epistemological narrative

The epistemological narrative about the better theoretical approach to explain and understand global governance of climate change is a rich and complex story full of actors, events, and connections to other theoretical narratives; however, the dominant narrative in this field has written most of this ambiguity out. Global governance of climate change is a break-out field from global environmental governance, which has been around since at least the 1960s (Hulme 2009; Runnals 2011). When climate change became a global issue of governance in its own right separate from environmental issues, scholars responded to this new situation by constructing appropriate theories and research stories. Since 1988 when the UN decided to establish a global response to climate change, and as the worlds' leaders met in Rio de Janeiro at the 1992 Earth Summit and agreed on two United Nations' Conventions; one on biodiversity (environment) and one on climate change, the social sciences has been theorising *global governance of climate change* (Bulkeley *et al.* 2014, 8). In comparison, global environmental governance had already been theorised at least since the 1972 UN Environment Summit in Stockholm (Runnals 2011).

The story goes that the first approaches and theories collectively fall under the label *regime theory* often with Krasner's (1982) edited special issue on International Regimes as a reference point (Grubb *et al* 1999; Paterson 1996;

Rowlands 1995; Young 2013). Further, regime theory is framed as the dominant approach focusing on institutions, negotiations, and agreements (Jakobsen 1999; Okereke and Bulkeley 2007). In the 1990s and early 2000s there were calls for “other approaches” than regime theory. This led to global governance of climate change framed as a dichotomous choice between, on the one side, regime theory emphasising states and international negotiations between states, neo-liberal institutionalism, and specifically for climate politics and negotiations a focus on game theory (Jakobsen 1999, Dimitrov 2013), and on the other side, transnational, multi-level governance theory emphasising non-state actors, norms, experiments from below, and (epistemic) community approaches (Bulkeley and Newell 2010; Bulkeley *et al.* 2014; Hoffmann 2011). There are some examples of bridging or responding to criticism (e.g. Vogler 2003; Young 2012 and 2012; Zelli and van Asselt 2013), which suggests the literature has matured and stabilised with these two (and their combinations) approaches as the dominant ones. However, the past decade has seen a further diversification of approaches and more critical studies emphasising power structures, e.g. language, practice, and governmentality approaches (Bäckstrand and Lövbrand 2005; Jagers and Stripple 2003; Nielsen 2014; Okereke *et al.* 2009; Pettenger 2007; Stripple and Stephan 2013). It seems that the narrative of global governance of climate change now operates with three camps or research stories; regime theory, multi-level or transnational governance theory, and critical theory. These stories are sometimes combined e.g. when seeking to understand and explain regimes and institutions in a power perspective inclusive of both state and non-state actors (Young 2012).

2.1.3. The ontological narrative

The ontological narrative about what global governance of climate change is mirrors to a large extent the epistemological narrative in terms of chronology,

structure, and agency. The dominant narrative presents a story of *layers*, where an ontological layer has been added in tandem with the introduction of new theoretical approaches, sometimes the argument being, that because the real world is different from the existing theory, theory has to change, thereby changing the ontology. The first layer is an ontology that corresponds to (early) regime theory, where states are organised in an international, anarchical system of states that behave like rational actors with known interests. The story is well-known, and I will not retell it in its entirety here. The climate is understood as a global good and climate change thus as a collective action problem, where states are expected to free-ride, which creates the need for the negotiation and establishment of regulatory institutions. Within regime theory approaches, like within New Institutionalism (cf. Scott 2001), there will be different ontological elements available to include; rule, norms, identities (Young 2012), even policy discourses if following Schmidt (2008 and 2010). The combined setup of states and institutions is called the climate regime.

The second layer to this ontology corresponds to multi-level governance approaches, which add non-state actors and subnational and transnational levels. In many respects the structure-agency element of the ontology is still based on institutions (mostly regulative) and policy actors. The added layer expands the ontology to include other types of institutions as well as other types of outputs like experiments (Hoffmann 2011), other types of collective actors like climate clubs (Widerberg and Stenson 2013) and networks (Bulkeley *et al* 2014), operating at multiple levels. The third layer corresponds to critical power approaches and replaces or changes the institutional logics of states and non-state actors with the power logic of discourses and governmentality. The ontology becomes relational and focused on historically and culturally contingent processes at a deeper level than the game theoretical or path dependent ontology. However, the actors, the institutions, and the multiple levels they act in and across are largely left the same.

2.2. Reflecting on ambiguities in narratives and practices

The way I have chosen to incorporate narrative and practice in my research approach, to walk the talk, I view epistemology and ontology as narratives, and I add a *practical* narrative – or narrative as practice – to the two narratives presented above. This approach contrasts the dominant research narrative of what Villumsen calls a “ritualised distinction between fact and theorised knowledge [which] forms the basis of much of contemporary social sciences” (2008, 29). I do not suggest removing the analytical levels of epistemology and ontology, but simply including the analytical level of practice and understanding these three levels as interdependent perspectives or narratives each contributing to structure and practices of research narratives (of any given subject) at a given point in time and place. I have illustrated this in figure 2.2 below using the common narrative structure of dominant and alternative narratives¹². In section 2.2.1, I present my approach to identifying an alternative research narrative; making explicit the ambiguities and dilemmas found in research narratives and practices. In the following sections, I reflect upon dilemmas in the field not adequately accounted for in the dominant research narrative. I present three such dilemmas: 1) the dilemma of using either scale or level as analytical concept in relation to governance of climate change; 2) the dilemma of detaching *theories* of governance from the *empirical experience* of governance of climate change being in a state of crisis; and 3) the dilemma of detaching the social science scholars in their/our academic practices from the practical governance of climate change. I conclude that an alternative narrative is emerging, and I call it *transscalar governance of climate change* to distinguish it from the dominant one. This leads to the next chapter in which I present the dissertation’s research design based on the Engaged Scholarship approach.

¹² other constellations are also possible, but beyond the scope of this dissertation. For non-narratives see e.g. Roe (1994, 52ff).

2.2.1. Identifying an alternative research narrative

Following Bevir and Rhodes, I view the field under study “as a series of contingent and unstable cultural practices, which in turn consist of the political activity of specific human agents” and that these practices should be explained “by reference to the meanings embedded in them, where these meanings arise against the background of contingent historical traditions and dilemmas.” (2010, 1). In this understanding, historical traditions include theories (2010, 78), and dilemmas include the ambiguities that dominant theories try to write out (2010, 79). Bevir and Rhodes would agree with Stripple and Stephan’s (2013) analysis of the global governance meta-narrative and its transformation in waves from government to governance now dominantly understood as taking place in networks and fragmented institutional settings (Bevir and Rhodes 2010, 90). However, they take the analysis further to denounce the propensity to reify governance theory in comprehensive accounts:


“A comprehensive account of governance makes sense, even as a mere aspiration, only if it has some essence. We should seek a comprehensive account only if the way to define and explain network and metagovernance is to find a social logic or essential property that is at least common to all its manifestations and ideally even explains them. But why would we assume that network and metagovernance has one or more essential feature?”

The search for comprehensive accounts arises from a preoccupation with the natural sciences. However, even if appropriate in the natural sciences, it is counterproductive in the human sciences. Human practices are not governed by social logics or law-like regularities associated with their allegedly essential properties. They arise instead out of the contingent activity of individuals. Therefore, when we seek to explain particular cases of governance, we should do so by reference to the contingent activity of the relevant individuals, not

to a social logic or law-like regularity. *We should explain practices, including cases of governance, using narratives that unpack the contingent actions that embody beliefs informed by contested traditions and dilemmas.* The contingent nature of the links between traditions and their development undermines the possibility of a comprehensive account that could relate any one practice to a specific set of social conditions as opposed to a historical process. If we explore these possibilities, we will adopt a decentred approach that [recognises but] refutes the narratives of previous waves.” (Bevir and Rhodes 2010, 90. Italics added).

I argue that this way of approaching the construction of research narratives, as illustrated in figure 2.2, better captures the possibility of an alternative research narrative. This has enabled me to identify and explore three dilemmas or ambiguities that are written out of the dominant research narrative. I argue that these dilemmas help us pose other and more relevant research questions as they bring our attention to governance of climate change in practice and the roles of theories and scholars in that regard.

Figure 2.2. Model of alternative research narrative



2.2.2. The dilemma of scale or level

In some texts (e.g. Bulkeley and Newell 2010; Mitchell 2013b) and at conferences, I have noticed that scholars are interchangeably using the concepts of level and scale without giving much explanation to the differences and reasons behind the use of these concepts. Jan Aart Scholte, with whom I have discussed this matter at the Earth System Governance conference in Lund, Sweden, in 2012, has argued for the use of *scale* and not *level* as analytical concept to understand *where* global governance takes place (see also Scholte 2005 and 2014). Although Scholte has developed the *transscalar* approach in relation to globalisation and global democracy, it also applies to global

governance of climate change. Based on my conversation with Scholte I have replaced *democracy* with *governance of climate change* in the following quotes (Scholte 2014, 13-14):

“To begin with a first cornerstone, then, transscularity is a ‘postmodern’ way to imagine and enact political space. This principle rejects modern constructions whereby [governance of climate change] is pursued in respect of *discrete* spaces at one or the other *level*.”

“Taking a contrary approach, transscalar [governance of climate change] treats all such spheres as aspects of one social space and focuses on the interconnections among the various dimensions. Spaces are appreciated in a relational rather than an essentialized sense (Pries, 2010). There is no separation of the international and the domestic, or of the global and the local. Transscalar politics address the global, regional, national, local and immediate arenas simultaneously and in fluctuating combinations. From this perspective, [governance of climate change] is not achieved at one or the other geographical ‘level’, but through fluid mobilizations across scales.”

Scholte’s concept of transscalar governance points to other ways of imagining strategic action and legitimacy of action. First of all, this approach fits better with a Bourdieusian relational ontology. Secondly, in approaches where the concept of level is applied, there is an a priori tendency in the ontological narrative to connect the “global problem” of climate change with a “global solution”. Global solutions seem more legitimate and effective than local solutions, which risks alienating people and legitimising lack of political climate action within states. Or when realising that the global governance solution, the international climate negotiations under the UNFCCC, is failing to deliver needed political change, local solutions are highlighted as opposite to

UNFCCC governance. However, I argue, there is no reason why we should see “global” and “local” climate governance as opposites. Having observed four COPs, I can confidently state that these venues provide one social space, where actors from all so-called levels of climate change governance interact. This dilemma of level or scale in the alternative narrative suggests that we further explore climate change from a transscalar governance perspective to be more inclusive of where, how, and by whom climate action can legitimately take place.

2.2.3. The dilemma of governance theory detached from the empirical experiences of climate change governance

The second dilemma revolves around the recognition in both the academic and policy world that climate change governance is in crisis. However, it is the empirical experience of climate change governance that is in a state of crisis. Theory is kept safely detached from these empirical experiences and is not incriminated by the sense of crisis. In many ways this recognition and the dilemma mirrors the financial and economic crisis. As I write in chapter 1 above:

“While we understand the physical and philosophical reasons behind anthropogenic climate change and that we now live in the Anthropocene, old and new attempts at governing climate change have failed to make the necessary changes (IPCC 2013, 2014; Steffen et al. 2011, 856, UNEP 2013). Part of the explanation is of course that we disagree about climate change and new concepts such as the Anthropocene (Hulme 2009; Malm and Hornborg 2014). Part of the explanation is also that different governance approaches (in theory and practice) dealing with the interrelated challenges of climate change and

systems transformation are not providing the needed full-scale pathways to decarbonisation (Hoffmann 2011; 2013).”

The dilemma is that, although a crisis is empirically and practically recognised, the underlying theoretical framework – the traditions in Bevir and Rhodes’ terms – is detached from this recognition and has not applied the understanding of crisis upon itself. Even critical theory seeks on the one hand to uphold this detachment by pointing to the problem of how the concept of global governance is both theoretical and empirical (e.g. Strippel and Stephan 2013). On the other hand, Strippel and Stephan end their analysis by suggesting that both scholars and practitioners move beyond the dichotomous view of states versus non-state actors:

“In our opinion, instead of the endless waiting for – or imaginative design of – a ‘global climate deal,’ the cutting of the Gordian knot that will settle matters for years to come with a brief stroke of a pen, scholars and practitioners should try to grasp the emerging climate order in its entirety. The overall *global climate governance complex*, the state *and* the non-state in a single analytical framework, is not very well understood, although Keohane and Victor (2011) have made an inspiring start. Here awaits a potentially fruitful area of scholarship on the norms, rules, and practices it embodies and on the ways in which it is shaping the subjects of governance, such as states, communities, and individuals. To view environmental governance as a ‘governance complex’ might deliver a small seed of hope in times of despair.” (2013, 159).

The ritualised distinction between fact and theorised knowledge (cf. Villumsen 2008 above) is worth breaking, because our theories, models, and concepts do form an important part of framing the empirical experience of climate change

governance. As scholars *we* need to take a step back and evaluate the frameworks we and practitioners use to deal with the climate governance crisis. But we also need to take a step forward and recognise that we are part of governance in practice. This dilemma is strongly connected with the concept of the *Anthropocene*. The Anthropocene as coined by Crutzen and Stoermer in 2000 was meant as a juxtaposition to the current formally recognised geological epoch the Holocene. “The term Anthropocene suggests: (i) that the Earth is now moving out of its current geological epoch, called the Holocene and (ii) that human activity is largely responsible for this exit from the Holocene, that is, that humankind has become a global geological force in its own right.” (Steffen *et al.* 2011, 843). It is also clear that a significant driver of the Anthropocene is “the belief systems and assumptions of neo-classical economic thinking” (*ibid.*, 862).

Governance theory has been challenged by change in the ontological narrative before, as noted above, and made corresponding changes in the epistemological narrative. Mayntz explores such challenges to governance theory in relation to globalisation (cf. Stripple and Stephan 2013), and argues that *extensions of theory* have been the usual response, however, she concludes that “with globalisation, there may well have come the point where a further extension of the paradigm would be dysfunctional, and we may witness the emergence of an altogether new field.” (2003, 38). I argue that the same applies in regard to climate change governance, and that Bevir and Rhodes’ Narrative Governance approach would represent such a new field. In some of my papers, I deal with the choice of either staying within the traditional approaches or exploring a new field. In paper 4, The Emergence and Spread of Green Growth, I write:

“Asking about the emergence and spread of the new green growth organisations and actions could be analysed with the two traditional

climate governance approaches such as “regime theory” or “global governance theory” (Okereke and Bulkeley 2007).¹³ The choice of one over the other, however, might risk skewing the analysis as some theoretical-empirical problems are yet to be resolved and depend to a great degree on choice of theory (cf. Okereke and Bulkeley 2007; Bulkeley and Newell 2010).”

“One overarching debate concerns social change and continuity or how to approach the stages of emergence, spread, consolidation, disappearance and further change (Hall 1993, Woods 1995, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Bernstein 2001, Scott 2001, Campbell 2004, Bulkeley and Newell 2010, Padgett and Powell 2012, Young 2012, Jordan and Huitema 2014). Typical questions include: where does global regime change take place, are states or non-state actors the main drivers of change in global governance, are ideas or material interest the main drivers of policy change, and why does change take place in the form it does? (cf. Bulkeley and Newell 2010, p. 8-10, Young 2012). I argue that this debate, through these questions, is locked in a circular argumentation process, and that these questions are only relevant to the extent that they open our eyes to their irrelevance.”

What I mean by the irrelevance of these cited research problems is that they are trapped in an epistemological narrative reducing research to dichotomous abstract thinking rendering it difficult to see beyond the global versus local, states versus non-state actors, material interest versus ideas, and other concept-pairs “that haunt, like theoretic ghosts, the academic mind” (Bourdieu 1988a, 780). As already noted, the orthodoxy of the regime approach of the 1990s has been challenged by empirical developments and has been rearticulated as a response. However, the more deep rooted change, where governance in theory

¹³ Okereke and Bulkeley (2007) also discuss two non-traditional approaches; “neo-Gramscian” and “governmentality” approaches.

is associated with the governance crisis in practice, is not taking place. Theory is detached from the empirical problems in objectivist institutionalisation of academia and in subjectivist mental categories of the practicing researcher through “principles of vision, and division of the social world.” (Bourdieu 1988a, 778). Interestingly, there are scholars who recognise that theory’s legitimacy can be questioned in the face of the Anthropocene and the climate change crisis. Young (2012), among others, write that:

“it seems likely that we will find ourselves facing a challenging situation in which existing institutions are not well equipped to address the problems of the 21st century, especially if ways to restructure these institutions to improve their performance cannot be found. Consider the case of climate change in which conflicts of interest have prevented the Conference of the Parties of the UNFCCC from reaching agreement on the measures needed to strengthen the regime as a prominent example. To the extent that this is the case, understanding the roles that institutions play as determinants of the course of international affairs will be a necessary (though not sufficient) condition for coming up with solutions to our predicament.”

By recognising that *theory* is as implicated in the crisis of climate change governance as the *empirical other* is, a different kind of research narrative begins to form; a narrative that begs us to further explore the role of the scholar and other practitioners – the agency and interpretations behind institutions – and the people behind *theoretical* and *epistemological narratives*. I turn to this dilemma in the next section.

2.2.4. The dilemma of writing out the practices of engaged scholars and scholarly practitioners

The third dilemma goes a step further than the above focus on concepts and theory. This dilemma brings attention to the role and practices of researchers themselves. But it goes beyond academic practices and moves into how researchers take active part in shaping policy and governance in practice. However, this practice is written out of the dominant research narrative. The first two dilemmas I have presented above show that alternative research approaches of transscalar governance of climate change exist, are developing, and are challenging the orthodoxy of the dominant research narrative. Firstly, by discussing the fundamental concepts of global, level, and scale, and secondly by suggesting that we include practices to better understand the roles of theory in practice. And as Bourdieu writes, “there is no need to mourn the crumbling of an orthodoxy.” (1988a, 774). However, a different kind of orthodoxy still lingers on; a kind of ghostly habitus embodied in academic practices.

“But all these oppositions remain external to the core of scientific theory. I want to come now to the rock-bottom antinomy upon which all the divisions of the social scientific field are ultimately founded, namely, the opposition between objectivism and subjectivism. This basic dichotomy parallels a whole series of other oppositions such as materialism versus idealism, economism versus culturalism, mechanism versus finalism, causal explanation versus interpretive understanding. Just like a mythological system in which every opposition, high/low, male/female, wet/dry, is overdetermined and stands in homologous relations to all the others, so also these scientific oppositions contaminate and reinforce each other to shape the practice and products of social science. Their structuring power is the greatest whenever they stand in close affinity with the fundamental oppositions, such as individual versus society (or individualism versus socialism),

that organize the ordinary perception of the social and political world. Indeed, such paired concepts are so deeply ingrained in both lay and scientific common sense that only by an extraordinary and constant effort of epistemological vigilance can the sociologist hope to escape these false alternatives ... [And] the task of science then becomes one of producing a meta-discourse, an "account of the accounts," as Garfinkel puts it, given by social agents in the course of their everyday activities." (Bourdieu 1988a, 780-781).

The third dilemma centres on the scholars everyday activities. During the course of my research project, I have again and again observed how researchers not only take part in academic everyday activities, but also take part in policy work – in governance – relating to their own field of study. Termeer has noticed this development in governance in more general terms, and states that this *third generation governance* brings with it “a new arena, situated in between politics and science. Processes in this new arenas are characterised by tailor-made activities, trans-disciplinarity, intensive interactions between policymakers and scientists and continuous sense-making.” (2008, 3). From a Natural Sciences perspective Krogsgaard-Larsen, Thostrup, and Besenbacher (2011) call for integration of actors, not just the necessary transdisciplinary research, but also through academic leadership and social scientific responsibility through which “all parties stand to gain from a joint effort to meet the Grand Challenges of our time” (p. 10738). Beck *et al.* (2012) argue for new cosmopolitan communities to deal with global risks locally as well as globally. Not to be mistaken for elitist cosmopolitanism, but through cosmopolitisation.

“By cosmopolitan communities of climate risk, we understand new transnational constellations of social actors, arising from common experiences of mediated climatic threats, organized around pragmatic reasoning of causal relations and responsibilities, and thereby

potentially enabling collective action, cosmopolitical decision-making and international norm generation.” (Beck *et al.* 2012, 2).

Taking note of Scholte’s (2014) point about transscalarity and original critique of cosmopolitan democracy which still emphasises the *national*, it could be very useful to explore governance of climate change with a concept like *transscalar community*. In some of my papers, I have analysed governance of climate change from a community and field perspective, e.g. paper 3 about the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action analysed as a community of practice, and paper 4 and 5, about the green growth field and subfields, where green growth actors perform strategic action at different and sometimes multiple scales. In paper 3, Diplomatic Learning and Trust: How the Cartagena Dialogue brought UN Climate Negotiations Back on Track, I write:

“[E]mpirical observations challenge mainstream approaches and call for academic analyses of negotiations to be both theoretically informed and empirically rich.”

“The climate negotiations literature generally falls within rationalist, constructivist, and descriptive approaches.¹⁴ The first two are often theoretical. The latter is often policy-oriented. However, much of the literature is done from a distance.

‘Much published work offers recycled information that can be derived without negotiations actually having been observed. (...) The dynamics around the negotiation table often remain hidden. What is the verbal exchange? What are the offers and responses made during informal consultations? Relevant literature tends to avoid these questions and gravitate toward related topics such as theorizing

¹⁴ Dimitrov 2013, 340.

about the creation of institutions and their impact on state behaviour.”¹⁵

Likewise, a recent call for a change in theorizing diplomacy in International Relations argues that personal relationships in negotiations can increase cooperation, because “[f]ace-to-face meetings allow individuals to transmit information and empathize with each other, thereby reducing uncertainty, even when they have strong incentives to distrust the other.”¹⁶ Like other scholars I argue for a reorientation of academic analyses to be both theoretically informed and empirically strong, and thus to pay closer attention to the diplomats and governance practices.¹⁷

Bourdieu has already said it well,

“theory without empirical research is empty, empirical research without theory is blind. There would be no need reasserting such truisms if the division between theoreticist theory and empiricist methodology were not sustained by extraordinary social forces: it is in effect inscribed in the very structure of the academic system and, through it, in mental structures themselves. So that even the most innovative and fruitful attempts to break free from this dualism end up being crushed by the pincer of abstract typologies and testable hypotheses. (1988a, 774-775).

However, I do see an alternative narrative emerging that has the potential to avoid being crushed by the pincer of abstract typologies and testable hypotheses. If we move our attention to this alternative research narrative, there is recognition among some scholars that we need to include scientists as actors

¹⁵ Dimitrov 2013, 346-347.

¹⁶ Holmes 2013, 829.

¹⁷ See also Eckersley 2012; Audet 2013; Bauer 2013, 332; Dimitrov 2013, 346.

in the ontology. Not just the scholars, who are included in the dominant narrative as members of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, but especially the social science scholars who already advise governments, businesses, NGOs, etc. It is perhaps not a coincidence that a strong call for “joining analysis and praxis” comes from Oran Young (2013, 103), writing self-reflexively about his own contributions to global environmental governance in a special issue in his name taking stock of Young’s 50 years’ of contributions (Mitchell 2013a).

“The way forward is to foster productive interactions between practitioners who have both an intimate knowledge of the details of specific situations and an understanding of what is likely to be politically feasible and analysts who are able to look at the broader picture of governance systems that have proven successful in a range of cases and to think about innovative options to be considered in specific situations. This calls for a creative effort to engage in what is aptly characterized as a process of co-producing knowledge in which both practitioners and analysts have essential roles to play.” (Young 2013, 103).

“My own experience suggests that it is highly beneficial to have a foot in both the world of practice and the world of analysis in order to engage effectively in applied institutional analysis. I come from the analytic side of things; I make no claims to have achieved great success as a practitioner. Nonetheless, I have had the privilege of participating in one way or another in a number of settings devoted to the creation and operation of environmental and resource regimes. There is no question that the opportunity to move back and forth between analysis and praxis has played an important role in the development of my thinking in this field. I am convinced that this is the road to success for those of

us aspiring to populate Pasteur's Quadrant when it comes to solving major environmental problems (Stokes 1997)." (Young 2013, 103).

Despite the increasing recognition of scholars' own roles and influence, the inclusion of scholars in transscalar governance of climate change is not well captured by the dominant research narrative. I have observed several times at the COPs and at the green growth events that social scientists take active part in negotiations and formulate positions and policy together with the very actors and institutions they study and write about. The credibility of scholars and their work is (now?) entangled with the object of study. My overall argument in this dissertation is that this engagement and entanglement is both necessary and useful, however, we need to be much more reflexive about these everyday practices and avoid writing this part of the story out of our research narrative.

There are also examples of practitioners who write academic papers (e.g. Dimitrov 2013; Garibaldi 2013) and scholar-practitioners who work in both worlds; e.g. Farhana Yamin who has published extensively on UNFCCC governance and also been an advisor to several delegations, e.g. the Maldives and the EU; or Maarten Hajer who is both a Professor of Public Policy and Director of the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (www.maartenhajer.nl). The engaged scholar model (Van de Ven 2007) is observable in practice, but it is not included in either the dominant epistemological or ontological narrative of global governance of climate change. Recall that Van de Ven introduces the engaged scholar model by framing it in relation to a dysfunctional relationship between science and policy (including society); a knowledge problem that should be seen more as a knowledge production problem rather than a knowledge transfer problem (2007, 3-6). Something that both Young (above) and Hulme (2009) write about.

This theme of the science-policy relationship also emerges in relation to climate change, however, more so in other literatures that I am not covering

(e.g. the Science and Technology Studies and Communication Studies). I will include it here, though, because it is a theme central to the engaged scholarship approach. Hulme discusses three categories of the science-policy relationship. The first is a “decisionist model”, where politicians determine end goals of policy, then bureaucratic, technical and/or scientific experts deliberate, evaluate and recommend means available to achieve these end goals. But in the end, the policy-making rests with government. This is a situation when policy issues are simple and scientific knowledge uncomplicated. Responsibility lies firmly with government (2009, 100-102). However, simplicity is only on the surface. Problems, solutions, and the compartmentalization of the world might seem clear-cut and objective in nature, but are still subject to definitional acts of power, making both *government* and *applied science* great authorities in each their own field. As we see with climate change, this model is continually challenged by wicked problems, and global crises, and does not provide suitable strategies in world risk society (cf. Beck 2009).

The second is a “technocratic model”, where it becomes science-for-policy (science includes social sciences). Where science is also responsible and blamed for failure. However, “[t]his science-policy model, widely accepted today by the public, politicians and scientists, is founded on a classic view of discoverable and objective ‘facts’, which are socially and politically neutral, and the belief that all the relevant facts can be revealed by science.” And “[t]he scientist would speak, danger would be revealed, policy would follow.” (Hulme 2009, 103). However, one look at e.g. the crisis of climate change reveals that policy does not always follow from science, hence the crisis of governance. The third is a “co-production model”, where “both the goals of policy and the means of securing those goals emerge out of joint scientific and non-scientific (i.e. political or value-driven) considerations.” (Hulme 2009, 104). It requires open consultation across society, listening to public and local understandings of risk, having scientists assess and contribute with what is known and unknown, and

debating and negotiating all this in public before making policy-decisions or when adjusting decisions. This co-production model is a central element in the alternative narrative about transscalar governance of climate change.



I have now presented my understanding of the dominant research narrative of global governance of climate change, which is based on two distinct narratives of epistemology plus ontology (cf. figure 2.1 above). I have argued why this distinction and detachment of theory from fact write out relevant ambiguities or dilemmas. In doing so, I have presented the main elements of an alternative research narrative which I call transscalar governance of climate change. This alternative research narrative presents a story of engaged scholarship (theory) which I will turn to in more detail in the next chapter.

3. Research Design: One Dissertation – Five Papers

In this chapter, I will present my research design based on Van de Ven's (2007) Engaged Scholarship approach. I will then explain how the different papers fit together in the overall research design. Finally, I will present an overview of my sources and methods of collecting sources and methods of analysing sources. I begin with two quotes:

“That was quite a long and in-depth interview with very detailed questions about what we do in the Cartagena Dialogue. Don't get me wrong. I also learn something from these interviews reflecting on what we actually do.” (Comment after the formal interview with senior diplomat from developed country participant in the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action, COP20, Lima, Peru, December 2014).

“Past arguments for collaborative research have tended to be one-sided and focus on the relevance of academic research for practice. I focus more attention ... on the question of how scholarship that is engaged *with* (rather than *for*) practice can advance basic scientific knowledge? Engaged scholarship emphasizes that research is not a solitary exercise; instead it is a collective achievement. Engagement means that scholars step outside of themselves to obtain and be informed by the interpretations of others in performing each step of the research process: problem formulation, theory building, research design, and problem solving.” (Van de Ven 2007, 10).

The first quote is from a situation after an interview which illustrates the point highlighted in the second quote; that engaged scholarship is engaged *with* practice, where both research and practice advances – as well as research as practice I would add.

3.1. Engaged scholarship

“*Engaged Scholarship* is defined as a participative form of research for obtaining the different perspectives of key stakeholders (researchers, users, clients, sponsors, and practitioners) in studying complex problems. By involving others and leveraging their different kinds of knowledge, engaged scholarship can produce knowledge that is more penetrating and insightful than when scholars or practitioners work on the problem alone.” (Van de Ven 2007, 9).

I follow Van de Ven in the normative view of social research, that its research problems or research questions should be “grounded in reality”, should “entertain alternative models for representing reality”, and should be “informed by key stakeholders”, if it wants to be relevant and advance both science and practice. Too much research “contributes to widening the gap between science and practice.” (Van de Ven 2007, 5). As most scholars agree, climate change is a complex or wicked problem (Rittel and Webber 1973). It is even customary to refer to climate change as a super-wicked problem (Lazarus 2009; Levin et al 2012). Even though the science is quite clear about the physical problem of climate change, there are still many uncertainties about how climate change will actually take place in very specific locations at specific points in time, and how it will interact with other natural systems. And when it comes to the political, social, economic, and social science understandings of climate change, there is no doubt that this is a super-wicked problem which we are better off not framing in a simple problem-solution language (Hulme 2009, 340). It seems obvious then to apply an engaged scholarship approach to get around and include as many perspectives, points of view, or narratives as possible. Van de Ven suggests an *engaged scholarship research model* which consists of a research process in four steps and four modes engagement. I explain these in the following subsections.

3.1.1. Four steps in the research process

The research process' four steps or study activities are (Van de Ven 2007, 10-11):

1. *Problem formulation*. The engaged scholar seeks to “situate, ground, diagnose, and infer the research problem by determining who, what, where, when, why, and how the problems exists up close and afar.”
2. *Theory building*. The engaged scholar seeks to “create, elaborate, and justify a theory by abductive, deductive, and inductive reasoning.”
3. *Research design*. The engaged scholar seeks to “develop a variance or process model for empirically examining the alternative theories.”
4. *Problem solving*. The engaged scholar seeks to “communicate, interpret, and apply the empirical findings on which alternative models better answer the research question about the problem.”

These steps can be undertaken in any order and are usually returned to and adjusted in iterative learning processes as a result of engagement and dialogue with other scholars and practitioners. As mentioned, this dissertation consists of an overall framework and five individual papers. In terms of step one, *problem formulation*, I have an overall research question in this dissertation as well five individual research questions in each included paper. All these questions have begun somewhere else and through dialogue ended up, where they now stand. The dissertation's research question and also step two, *theory building*, are very much connected to step three, *research design*, and the individual papers, and I will explain these in more detail in the next section.

However, I should explain here that my research design is based on a process model – *process* understood in the meaning of a *narrative* explanation – not to be mistaken with the variance model’s view of process “where an outcome-driven explanation examines the degrees to which a set of independent variable statistically explain variations in some outcome criteria (dependent variables).” (Van de Ven 2007, 196). My process design is based on what Van de Ven defines as “explanation of the temporal order and sequence of change events based on a story or narrative.” (2007, 196). This kind of change has to do with a qualitative kind of change that is difficult to capture in formal variance models using variables and measurements of a “before” and an “after”. What I present in this dissertation, what the research questions relate to, are stories and narratives about transscalar governance of climate change after COP15¹⁸. Stories and narratives as they are experienced, told, identified, and shaped in practice. The final step in the research process, step four, *problem solving*, I will explain and discuss in the concluding chapter.

3.1.2. Four modes of engaged scholarship

Van de Ven has developed four modes of engagement. They depend on 1) research perspective: whether the scholar’s perspective is outside or inside the practical experience (as observer or participant), and 2) research purpose: whether the scholar’s research problem or question is directed towards basic research of description, explanation, and/or prediction or is directed towards applied research of designing, evaluating, and/or intervening in the problem under study (2007, 26ff and 268ff). These four modes are described in a two-dimensional table below:

¹⁸ Mostly after COP15. As I was studying the new green growth practices I traced the concept back to a World Bank report from 1989 (Colby 1989), but the concept as we know it today only began being implemented in 2005. See paper 4 and 5.

Figure 3.1: Four modes of engaged scholarship

		Research purpose	
		Describe/Explain	Design/Intervene
Research perspective	Outside	<p>Mode 1: Basic science with stakeholder advice</p>	<p>Mode 3: Policy/design science, evaluation research for professional practice</p>
	Inside	<p>Mode 2: Co-produce knowledge with collaborators</p>	<p>Mode 4: Action/Intervention research for/with a client</p>

Adopted from Van de Ven (2007, 27) figure 1.2. Alternative forms of engaged scholarship.

The four modes of engaged scholarship represent on the one hand a progression from mode 1 to mode 4 corresponding to the scholar’s research experience and network size (especially in longitudinal studies) (2007, 230), and on the other hand, the different modes can each be applied in the different steps of the research process, so that the mode of engagement changes depending on research process. Furthermore, modes can be applied in different degree or hybrid forms (2007, 283). In mode 1, also called *informed basic research*, the engaged scholar has an outside research perspective and seeks to answer basic questions about a problem. This mode resembles traditional social science research in its detachment, but differs in its reflexive engagement with key stakeholder and inside informants. This feedback from the inside is incorporated in each of the research process’ steps (2007, 271ff).

In mode 2, also called *collaborative research*, the engaged scholar has an inside research perspective and seeks to answer basic questions about a problem. This mode is typical for larger research projects also comprising outsiders. Projects are constructed to share knowledge and responsibilities

between collaborators depending on skills and interests (2007, 274ff). All my work can be categorised as mode 1 *informed basic research* and some of my work shares some traits with mode 2 *collaborative research*. In the next section on research design, I will further explain how the modes have been part of the research process. Since this dissertation's research purpose has not been to suggest policy design or intervene in the field of global environmental governance, I will not explain the last two modes of engagement, however, in my current postdoc position I have moved on to mode 3 and 4. As a direct result of my engagement with the global environmental field, I and a team of researchers have been commissioned by the Nordic Council of Ministers' working group on global climate negotiations (NOAK) to research and deliver reports on specific issues in the UNFCCC negotiations in 2014 and 2015.

3.2. Research design

In this section, I present the overall research design of the dissertation. Each paper's research design is only presented in the papers. I explain how the dissertation has moved from the topic of transscalar governance of climate change, to formulation of the research question, to theory building, and finally to the research design. In short, the dissertation's research design is to explore two examples of transscalar governance of climate change following the failure of COP15 in 2009. I do this with five papers exploring different scales with different concepts. In section 3.2.1, I will explain the process of problem formulation. In section 3.2.2, I will explain the process of theory building. In section 3.2.3, I will explain the process of research design as well as the design itself.

3.2.1. Problem formulation

“The engaged scholar seeks to ‘situate, ground, diagnose, and infer the research problem by determining who, what, where, when, why, and how the problems exists up close and afar.”

Van de Ven points to the importance of reflecting on the social construction of problems;

“problems do not exist objectively ‘out there;’ they are uniquely perceived and framed by different people. Knowing from whose perspective a problem is being addressed and engaging them in problem formulation is necessary to frame the focus, level, and scope of a research study.” (2007, 73).

Problem formulation has been a long process of getting to know the field, exploring practices through fieldwork and analyses, and identifying and formulating the main narratives in the field. The different papers have dealt with exactly answering the questions of who, what, where, when, and how, and to a lesser extent why. The overall problem formulation of the dissertation has come about in a combination of mode 1 and mode 2, where I have taken both the outsider’s and the insider’s perspectives of the research problem. Situating my problem, as I have explained in chapter 1, I have focused on the general perception by many scholars and practitioners, that the traditional approach to global governance of climate change, namely the UNFCCC negotiations, failed to deliver at COP15 which to some threatened to dismiss the UNFCCC process altogether. Green growth is by many practitioners framed in relation to this perceived problem of global governance failure. Thus, I have tried to situate my problem formulation in relation to this overall framing as recognised by practitioners and some scholars in the field.

In relation to my two examples of governance practices – new political groups under the UNFCCC (papers 2 and 3) and green growth governance (papers 4 and 5) – I have asked some of the same questions as I have heard practitioners ask; who are these new groups and what are their positions on central issues? What is green growth, and is it rhetoric or real policy? These are broad and general questions that many practitioners and some scholars would also ask. They are not tied to particular interests or perspectives, which also fits with a mode 1 and 2 purpose of basic science. I found that the field were (and perhaps still is) at a point in time, where not much empirical knowledge about the new political groups under the UNFCCC existed. The same goes for questions relating to the emergence and spread of green growth. Paper 1, which serves as a background paper presenting the history and status of UNFCCC negotiations, was a collaboration with colleague Jakob Skovgaard, Lund University, who also used his insights from his time as an official working with climate finance in the Ministry of Finance of Denmark and participating in COP15 in this capacity. The paper was also the introductory paper in a special issue of Danish journal of Politics (Politik) which I co-edited with two other people both working in the Danish government administration. The perspective of the special issue was a combined political science and practitioners' view. For the issue, I also interviewed then Minister of Climate, Energy and Building, Martin Lidegaard (2013).

My work with paper 3 (about the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action) and paper 4 (about the emergence and spread of green growth) has brought me even closer to the insider's perspective than the other papers and the dissertation framework. I would not have begun researching the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action were it not because of an insider (who was part of the process of setting up this dialogue) who presented it at a seminar and said that it would be good, if someone began researching this dialogue, because there is a lack of knowledge about it – both in academia but also in the UNFCCC

negotiations which has created a room for misconceptions and myths about this dialogue (Field notes, January 2012). This presentation and encouragement caught my attention and I began asking questions about it and collecting material. By also focusing on the diplomatic learning and building of trust that takes place in the Cartagena Dialogue of Progressive Action, I take part in formulating an answer to the question that many insiders are posing: what is that we do in this dialogue that is different from other activities (cf. quote in the beginning of this chapter by one of my informants). But I also take the perspective from the participants of this dialogue, and focus on the dialogue's ability to contribute to negotiations. I point to other and different views and difficulties in negotiations, but I do not take the perspective of e.g. sceptic Parties like Saudi Arabia, China or India. These perspectives were included in paper 2.

As one of few Danish scholars working on green growth, I soon found myself in a position, where practitioners invited me and asked me to explain what green growth is, how they could define and apply it. I realised that these practitioners were asking the same questions as I was; and that I had become an insider in these situations of dialogue. I do not categorise these situations as the typical mode 2 collaboration, because there was never a joint project of mutual participation, but the experience opened my eyes further to the perspectives and practices of these actors. I think they would still see me, and my presentations as the outsider's view and role of contributing with objective facts about green growth. A different type of implicit collaboration happened, when Danish media wanted me to explain what green growth "really is" and how the principles behind corresponded to certain actions of former Prime Minister of Denmark, Lars Løkke Rasmussen, who in his capacity of Chairman of the Global Green Growth Institute was (portrayed as being) caught using public funds to travel on Business Class and other above standard expenses. Journalists also presented me with documents about the green growth organisations they had secured

through extended document access that I as researcher had not been able to get. It was an interesting experience, where the journalist and I would often have a conversation before the actual interview in which we would collaborate on formulating the questions and my initial answers, in a way rehearsing the later live interview. As a scholar who has participated in the public debate (in Denmark) about green growth, its history and networks, it seems important that I reflect upon this role and how it also brings my attention to other perspectives in the process of formulating the research questions, but also how I begin to understand the field, the actors in it, the stakes and doxa. And how the green growth field suddenly overlapped with the Danish political field. This further involves the other processes of theory building and research design. In my two papers about green growth, Danish politics has not played a central part, but if were to write a paper about Denmark's green growth diplomacy, these experiences would play a larger role, and there would likely be a different kind of public interest in my findings.

3.2.2. Theory building

“The engaged scholar seeks to ‘create, elaborate, and justify a theory by abductive, deductive, and inductive reasoning.’”

According to Van de Ven, there are three steps in theory building practices each of which are connected with a type of academic reasoning. Theory creation uses abductive reasoning. Theory elaboration uses deductive reasoning. Theory justification uses inductive reasoning. Research projects do not necessarily have to involve all three steps (2007, 102). I have not for this research project created new theory from scratch, but I have combined different theoretical perspectives and concepts, both in this framework and in the individual papers. The starting point of my project was to apply a Bourdieusian IR framework to global

governance of climate change focusing on different practices not well captured by traditional approaches thereby contributing both theoretically and empirically to the field. This is more in line with step 2 and 3, although not theory testing as such. However, some anomalies, ambiguities, and dilemmas were disturbing the framework, all of which had a strong linguistic component: the social struggle over meaning through language.

“By definition, anomalies represent disconfirmations of our theories. Being human and subject to all kinds of biases, including the confirmation trap, we may choose to deny or ignore anomalies. As Carlile and Christiansen (2004) state, ‘If you set out to prove your theory, an anomaly is a failure. But if your purpose is to improve a theory, the anomaly is a victory.’ This form of openness ‘allows us to transcend our particular viewpoint and develop an expanded consciousness that takes the world in more fully’ (Nagel 1986: 5). Schon (1987) maintains that in situations of ambiguity or novelty, ‘our thought turns back on the surprising phenomenon, and at the same time, back on itself.’ This can be described as abductive reflection-in-action.” (Van de Ven 2007, 103).

Along the way, I included step 1, theory creation through abductive reasoning. This happened in relation to the inclusion of narrative theory, an idea that was likely matured by reading Bourdieu’s *Language and Symbolic Power* (1991) and teaching a course based on Mike Hulme’s *Why We Disagree About Climate Change* (2009). The initial sense was that narrative as practice and practices as narratives could capture and make use of ambiguities and dilemmas. I then began working on creating a narrative approach to transscalar governance, which brought me to the work on narrative in political science by Mark Bevir, *How Narratives Explain* (2005), and then the book about narrative governance by Mark Bevir and Rod Rhodes, *The State as Cultural Practice* (2010). I also

participated in a PhD course on Narrative Studies. The first application of narrative in practice was my collaboration with colleague Tobias Dan Nielsen from Lund University. We explored new political groups under the UNFCCC (paper 2) through these groups' narrative positions in the negotiations. Further developments of this approach has been in relation to this framework, and finally in relation to consultancy work (also with Tobias Dan Nielsen) for the Nordic Council of Ministers' working group on international climate negotiations (NOAK); a project that was based on modes 1–4 . It is beyond the scope of this dissertation to delve further into this.

Theory building has also been a process of trying out different varieties of practice and field theory using different concepts in the different papers. I have presented an overview of this in figure 3.2 below, and will explain it further as part of my overall research design. I have generally included insights and concepts from the Bourdieusian IR research agenda (REF), and more specifically focused on *field*, *narrative*, *community of practice*, *strategic action* and *strategic moves*.


3.2.3. Research design

“The engaged scholar seeks to ‘develop a variance or process model for empirically examining the alternative theories.’”

I have not built a research design based on testing of competing theories or hypotheses, which falls more naturally with the variance model (cf. distinction made in section 3.1.1 above), and since I have applied a process model, and sought to examine alternative theories – understood as alternative to the dominant research narrative – I have chosen to apply a range of theories and concepts within the same family. Thus, my papers, theories, and concepts are not competing but complementary. My dissertation as a whole is an alternative


to the dominant research narrative. In figure 3.2 below I illustrate the connections ranging from overall topic, research question, themes, papers, and the individual theoretical concepts.

Figure 3.2: Connection between research questions, themes, individual papers and theoretical elements in the dissertation.



As visualised in figure 3.2 above, my overall research design is to analyse two themes with similar concepts. In figure 3.3 below, I illustrate how I have applied this approach according to different analytical scales. This research design has allowed me to study the same general governance practices of UNFCCC negotiations and green growth at different scales and from different actor perspectives. I have gained and presented a broad and deep understanding of the two governance fields. This, I argue, has strengthened the basis of the dissertation and ability to adequately answer the research question.

Figure 3.3: Relationship between papers according to analytical scales and governance in practice (UNFCCC and green growth)



Paper 1: Global Climate Politics from Bali to Paris

In paper 1, Jakob Skovgaard and I analyse the UNFCCC negotiations at field scale. We use the tools or field dynamics of *negotiation content* and *process* to tell a story of how negotiations have developed from COP13 towards COP21.

We analyse the COPs as field sites of negotiations. At this scale, the field is also situated in context with other fields like the international economic field and international politics field. An earlier version of the paper also included a section on relations with the green growth field, but for pragmatic reasons this was omitted in the final version.

Paper 2: Mapping the narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC

In paper 2, Tobias Dan Nielsen and I analyse the UNFCCC negotiations at field and subfield scales. We focus specifically on the subfield of political groups and how new groups have positioned themselves narratively in relation to the main organising principles of the larger UNFCCC field. We develop the concept of narrative position which combines on the one hand the materiality of actors and their organisations in time and place and on the other the ideational content of groups' positions in narratives. We argue that the subfield scale of political groups is often overlooked in analyses of negotiations, especially policy analyses, which tend to focus on only a few (powerful) states. And, when the group scale is sometimes analysed it is because the powerful states are in these groups. This paper is the first analysis to our knowledge that has systematically analysed negotiations at this scale and explored all new groups since COP15.

Paper 3: Diplomatic Learning and Trust

In paper 3, I analyse the UNFCCC negotiations through the subfield of just one new political group, the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action. I apply the theory of Community of Practice (Wenger 1998; Wenger, McDermontt, and Snyder 2002) to analyse the inner workings of the Cartagena Dialogue. I focus on the concepts of community, domain, and practices. Although the paper is very focused on this subfield scale, I do argue that the Cartagena Dialogue can be seen as a governance innovation in the larger field of UNFCCC negotiations.

Paper 4: The Emergence and Spread of Green Growth

In paper 4, I analyse green growth governance at field and subfield scales. I visualise the green growth field, its emergence and spread in the years 2005–2013, where I focus on proponents of green growth, their networks and members of these networks, and I then visualise and analyse which actors are centrally and marginally positioned. I apply the theory of Strategic Action Fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012) and focus on the concepts of incumbents and internal governance units. Incumbents are the dominant actors in a field that create and gain from the field. They often create internal governance units or allocate authority to existing actors to take the role of day-to-day governance of the field or subfields thereby freeing incumbents of those tasks.

Paper 5: Korea as Green Middle Power

In paper 5, I zoom in on South Korea as the initiator of the green growth field. Three fields are included; Korea as field (and actor), the green growth field, and the larger global environmental governance field. The scale is a view of the strategic action field from a subfield scale perspective, where I identify and analyse Korea's strategic moves. I combine Strategic Action Theory with Middle Power Theory. I continue from paper 4 with strategic action fields, but focus in paper 5 on actors' strategic moves, which in the case of Korea fits with Middle Power Theory's recent focus on middle-powermanship. This includes studying how states strategically employ middle power diplomacy and network power.

3.3. Overview of sources and methods

In this section I present an overview of sources and methods. Each paper contains its own description. Here I provide the reader with a full picture of sources and which papers have used the same sources. I distinguish between

three general types of sources; observations, interviews, and other material.¹⁹ In table 3.1 below I present a general overview of these sources and the papers in which I have used them. I made observations at four COPs (17-20) and a range of green growth events. I further describe observations in tables 3.2 (UNFCCC) and 3.3 (green growth) below. I specifically conducted interviews directed at two areas of practice; the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action and green growth. I specifically collected other material in relation to new political groups under the UNFCCC and green growth. I have applied a range of methods in the collection and construction of sources, which fall under the approach of mixed methods. My overall methodology of the dissertation is based on an engagement with narratives and construction of narratives. Narrative is a way of knowing, and so narrative methodology is concerned with methods of collecting and constructing narratives and those elements that form part of these narratives. Following Bourdieu (1991), Bevir (2005), Bevir and Rhodes (2010), Toulmin (2001), Hulme (2009) and Wagenaar (2011), I base my methodology on an anti-foundational philosophy – the rejection of knowledge based in pure reason or pure experience (Bevir 2005; Bevir and Rhodes 2010, 43).

“We are suggesting that anti-foundational philosophy does not require or preclude particular methods or topics in political science. Anti-foundationalism itself should lead us to recognize that there is a conceptual gap between a social philosophy and an approach to political science ... data is not only saturated with ... prior theories, but it is also data about holistic and constructed webs of meaning to be explained by interpretations. Foundationalists might insist on particular techniques because some techniques produce pure fact while others do not. Anti-foundationalists, in contrast, should allow that all

¹⁹ Interviews and green growth database have been made available for the evaluation committee.

kinds of techniques produce theory-laden data that we can accept or challenge in narratives.” (Bevir and Rhodes 2010, 45).

Methodologically, taking practice theory seriously means engaging in empirical work and mixed methods. This entails moving beyond merely increasing internal and external validity; it is about understanding complexity and interdependence between history and situated practices. Only in combination of methods and the knowledge this produces do the different theoretical concepts applied in practice make sense (Pouliot 2013; Wagenaar 2011).

Table 3.1: Overview of sources used in papers

Type Paper	Observations					Interviews		Material	
	COP17	COP18	COP19	COP20	GG	CD	GG	Groups	GG
1	X	X			(X)	(X)	(X)		(X)
2	X	X	X		(X)	X		X	(X)
3	X	X	X	X	(X)	X	(X)	(X)	(X)
4	X	X	X	X	X		X		X
5	X	X	X		X		X		X

GG = Green Growth; CD = Cartagena Dialogue participants

X = Primary sources used in papers

(X) = Secondary sources used in papers for triangulation or as background knowledge

Getting direct access to observe and record the different UNFCCC and green growth practices has only been possible to some extent. The sheer multitude of the practices I have studied makes it impossible to get access to everything in the first place, and other practices are simply behind closed doors. As with other studies of diplomacy, practices need to be interpreted from and through other sources as well. “The rationale is that, even when practices cannot be ‘seen,’ they may be ‘talked about’ through interviews or ‘read’ thanks to textual analysis” (Pouliot 2013, 49). Whether observations, interviews, or other sources, the key principle for collecting and constructing narratives or reconstructing practices has been to see through the perspective of the

practitioners. Thus, as primary sources I have based my analysis largely on first-hand sources. In some cases relating to new political groups under the UNFCCC I have also relied on second-hand sources especially observations from experts writing for the Earth Negotiation Bulletin.

3.3.1. Participatory observations

To collect and construct the narratives and understanding of practices used in the papers I first of all participated in as many meetings and events as resources (time and money) and accessibility allowed. As Bryman describes, there are many definitions of participatory observations and it is an approach with several methods including interviewing and collection of material (2001, 290ff). I applied a range of methods during my participatory observations. Field notes or a written report is a typical product of participatory observation (Bryman 2001, 328). I would first of all describe the different meetings or events I participated in. Secondly, I would take note of who said and did what, and how others reacted. I would focus on actors' interpretations and presentations of problems and solutions, and I would focus on the many relational aspects of the field. Thirdly, I would also ask myself what I saw and in what ways I could interpret my observations, sometimes also how I felt or experienced the atmosphere and how others expressed emotions in different situations. For these observations I wrote field notes and also used photo documentation which together have been used as background knowledge and ways to further develop my research strategy to conduct interviews and collect material.

Table 3.2: UNFCCC observations

Name of event	Place of event	Time of event	Participation
The Durban Climate Change Conference. COP17/CMP7.	Durban, South Africa	28 November – 11 December 2011	29 November – 9 December 2011
The Doha Climate Change Conference. COP18/CMP8.	Doha, Qatar	26 November – 8 December 2012	30 November – 7 December 2012
The Warsaw Climate Change Conference. COP19/CMP9.	Warsaw, Poland	11 – 23 November 2013	13 – 21 November 2013
The Lima Climate Change Conference. COP20/CMP10.	Lima, Peru	1 – 14 December 2014	1 – 14 December 2014

Table 3.3: Green Growth observations

Name of event	Place of event	Time of event
Global Green Growth Forum 2011, Plenary debate I, II, III, and IV.	Copenhagen, Denmark	11-12 October 2011
Take Lead Conference, experts' workshop on communicating Green Growth.	Copenhagen, Denmark	12 October 2011
The Green race to Durban and Beyond: A debate on comparability, competitiveness and compatibility of climate actions around the world. Arranged by the Greens, European Free Alliance in the European Parliament.	European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium	9 November 2011
Asian Development Bank's Launch of Asian Development Outlook 2013.	Copenhagen, Denmark	19 April 2013
STRING green growth working group meeting.	City of Hamburg, Germany	23 April 2013
Global Green Growth Forum 2014.	Copenhagen, Denmark	20-21 October 2014

3.3.2. Interviews and conversations

I used interviews to gain access through the interviewees to their versions of practices and narratives (cf. Pouliot 2013). I further distinguish between interviews and conversations. Interviewing experts and especially diplomats is not a strict method and many approaches can be applied (Bryman 2001, 312ff). For all interviews, I have applied a semi-structured approach corresponding to my general research strategy. See tables 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 below for lists of

interviews and conversations. I used interview guides for most interviews when it was practically possible. When I could not bring a guide, or had time to email questions to the interviewee beforehand, I relied on memory of questions. To make that easier, the interview guides had different themes. Themes and questions were formulated in a process of working from theoretical concepts and questions to empirical themes and questions (Laudel 2008). It would not be very useful in an interview situation to use theoretical language, but I would still need answers that would correspond to the purposes of each paper. As I conducted interviews for specific papers and began identifying practices and structuring narratives, I altered the interview guides accordingly to focus on questions that stood unanswered or new themes and questions.

I applied different tactics to get access to interviewees. I used direct contact through email or personal contact at events and I also used my network to get introduced to potential interviewees. Some interviews were planned at a given time and place, others happened in a more coincidental manner, especially when doing fieldwork at a large conference spanning several days, opportunities for interviews can occur (as fast as they can disappear). I have found that the most difficult thing about interviewing diplomats is not whether or not information is 'true', but that they are often so busy that it is difficult to find time, and often interviews get cancelled at the last moment. More than half of the interviews were recorded, but it always depended on the situation; did the informant allow a recording? Was there even time to record at all? Was the place suitable for a recording? Many decisions were made on the spot, where getting an informant to talk was always a first priority. Later I would write up notes. The first interviews conducted were transcribed, but early on I abandoned a strict coding method and thus transcription. I did this in favour of re-listening and re-reading full interviews to better capture the context and the narratives in and of the interviews. I triangulated interviews with other interviews,

observations, and other sources in order to be more confident about my interpretations and constructions.

As mentioned above, I also gathered information from conversations. Conversations were unplanned interview opportunities where I managed to ask centrally positioned actors a few questions only (typically conversations lasted less than 5 minutes, where interviews lasted between 20 minutes and one hour and half). I introduced myself to all informants (interviews and conversations) and told them about my research and the purpose of the questions. Generally I experienced openness towards sharing information with me. Only two types of actors rejected my invitations. The first type of actor was developing country delegates from the Cartagena Dialogue. I can only guess as to why, but since the Cartagena Dialogue is an informal space, where outsiders are not allowed in (journalists and researchers) some participants do not want to risk breaking the trust of other participants by speaking to a researcher. The other type of actor was Danish politicians (or former politicians) who rejected participating in interviews about Denmark's role in setting up green growth networks and cooperation with Korea. It seems very likely that the political scandal and danger associated with green growth in Denmark since October 2013 (as mentioned above) is keeping some actors from speaking about their roles and shares in the years before.

Table 3.4: List of interviews with participants in the Cartagena Dialogue

Interviewee	Position	Date and place
Anonymous 1	Member of developing country delegation. Occasional participant in CD.	30 Nov 2012, COP18.
Anonymous 2	Senior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	3 Dec 2012, COP18.
Anonymous 3	Senior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	3 Dec 2012, COP18.
Anonymous 4	Member of developed country delegation. Participant in CD since 2011.	13 Dec 2012, Skype.
Anonymous 5	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	13 Dec 2012, Skype.
Anonymous 6	Member of developed country delegation. Participant in CD since 2011.	23 Jan 2013, Skype.
Anonymous 7	Minister-level politician from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	16 April 2013, Copenhagen.
Anonymous 8	Minister-level politician from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since COP17.	12 June 2013, Minister's office.
Anonymous 9	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	Nov 2013, Warsaw, Poland
Anonymous 10	Junior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since COP18	Nov 2013, Warsaw, Poland
Anonymous 11	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	Nov 2013, Warsaw, Poland
Anonymous 12	Junior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD in the first year.	Nov 2013, Warsaw, Poland
Anonymous 13	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	E-mail, December 2013
Anonymous 14	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Secretariat function in CD since establishment.	E-mail, February 2014

Anonymous 15	Senior observer and expert. Participant in CD from establishment until COP17.	E-mail, February 2014
Anonymous 16	Senior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	3 December 2014, COP20, Lima, interview – not recorded
Anonymous 17	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	6 December 2014, COP20, interview – not recorded
Anonymous 18	Senior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	6 December 2014, COP20, recorded interview
Anonymous 19	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	10 December 2014, COP20, recorded interview
Anonymous 20	Senior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	12 December 2014, COP20, conversation – not recorded

Table 3.5: Interviews relating to green growth

Name and position of interviewee(s)	Place of interview	Time of interview
<i>Kristian Ruby</i> , Assistant to the European Union Climate Commissioner, Connie Hedegaard.	European Commission, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Dan Jørgensen</i> , Member of the European Parliament (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), Vice-Chair ENVI, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety.	European Parliament, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Annika Ahtonen</i> , Policy Analyst, European Policy Centre.	European Policy Centre, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Lee Me Kyung</i> , Policy Advisor, Climate Change Office, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)	COP17, Durban, South Africa	7 December 2011
<i>Marie-Lousie Wegter</i> , Head of Office, Global Green Growth Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. <i>Erik Næraa-Nicolajsen</i> , Deputy Head of Office, Environment, Climate and Energy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. <i>Tomas Anker Christensen</i> , Head of Centre, Global Challenges, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen.	20 January 2012
<i>Park Chinjung</i> , Policy advisor, Korea's Presidential Committee on Green Growth.	COP18, Doha, Qatar	1 December 2012

<i>Yu Bok-hwan, Secretary General of Korea's Presidential Committee on Green Growth (Email interview, including powerpoint presentation from side event with notes).</i>	COP18, Doha, Qatar	5 December 2012
<i>Helen Mountford, Deputy Director, Environment Directorate OECD.</i>	COP18, Doha, Qatar	7 December 2012
<i>Hans Jakob Eriksen, Director, GGGI Copenhagen regional office.</i>	Phone interview	9 January 2013
<i>Lars Løkke Rasmussen, former Danish Prime Minister, Chairman of GGGI since May 2012. (E-mail interview for background only).</i>	Copenhagen, Denmark	29 April 2013
<i>Martin Lidegaard, Denmark's Minister for Climate, Energy and Building.</i>	Copenhagen, Denmark	12 June 2013
<i>Kim Joy, Programme Officer, Green Economy Initiative, Economics and Trade Branch, United Nations Environment Programme.</i>	Phone interview	19 December 2013

Table 3.6: Conversations relating to green growth

Name, position and event	Place of conversation	Time of conversation
<i>Eva Grambye, Head of Office, Global Green Growth Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Meeting with secretariat and political science students.</i>	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen.	1 November 2012
<i>Seungwon Lee, Director for Development Cooperation Division Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea. Side event organized by Korea. (Including copy of powerpoint presentation from side event).</i>	COP18, Doha, Qatar	1 December 2012
<i>Gino Van Begin, Secretary General, ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability. Following side event organized by Korea.</i>	COP18, Doha, Qatar	5 December 2012
<i>Yu Bok-hwan, Secretary General of Korea's Presidential Committee on Green Growth. Following side event organized by Korea.</i>	COP18, Doha, Qatar	5 December 2012
<i>Howard Bamsey, Director-General, GGGI. After "Interview from Warsaw UNFCCC Climate Studio TV" event.</i>	COP19, Warsaw, Poland	18 November 2013
<i>Mattia Romani, Deputy Director-General, Green Growth Planning & Implementation, GGGI. After "Interview from Warsaw UNFCCC Climate Studio TV" event.</i>	COP19, Warsaw, Poland	18 November 2013

3.3.3. Material

I have collected and analysed a range of other material or sources than observations and interviews. The vast majority of sources have been collected for my two papers about green growth. I do not include academic sources in this description, even though I have also analysed academic sources as material in which I could identify narratives and practices (of researchers). In relation to paper 2 about new political groups under the UNFCCC, we used 93 sources. They were all in digital form and found through official UNFCCC websites and websites of Parties and political groups. Sources were 86 Party submissions, statements, and press releases; two UNFCCC webpages explaining “groups”, and five UNFCCC COP reports since COP15. See also appendix in paper 2.

For paper 4 and 5, I developed a green growth database. The material I collected and analysed to create this database consists of a large sample (more than 800 sources) of digital material like reports, concept notes, posters, press releases, meeting invitations, meeting agendas, meeting minutes, summit declarations, conference invitations, conference material, photos and videos, news articles, figures and tables, calendars and timelines, websites and specific website pages (copied to pdf), and academic articles and blogposts. In addition I have obtained more than 200 units of physical material at events. This material consists of reports, papers, meeting invitations, meeting packages, merchandise, and own photo documentation. From these sources I first created a historical timeline of events with dates, place, organisers, and main content/purpose. From this list I have created a database in excel which lists actors (and years of appearance), green growth networks, actors connections and actor memberships in networks. See papers for further details.



I have now presented my research design based on Van de Ven's (2007) Engaged Scholarship approach explaining the four steps in the research process and the four modes of engaged scholarship. I further explained how the other applied theoretical approaches translate into methodology and methods. These are: the Bourdieusian research methodology developed in relation to studies of diplomacy and security, the transscalar governance approach, and the Narrative methodology developed in relation to a decentred governance approach. I have explained how the different papers fit together in the overall research design, how they incorporate different concepts from the family of theories, and how they are examples of analyses at different scales of governance. Finally, I have presented an overview of my sources and methods.

4. Findings from the five papers

In this chapter, I first present the overall findings of each of the dissertation's five papers in relation to the two themes of UNFCCC governance practices and green growth governance practices. I then reflect on the joint contributions from the papers in relation to the main theoretical, empirical, and practical stories. This chapter answers the research question:

How have transscalar climate governance practices changed since COP15?

4.1. Paper 1: Global climate politics: From Bali to Paris

In this paper, Jakob Skovgaard and I analyse the international climate negotiations with a focus on central issues and tendencies. We move from the so-called 2007 Bali Roadmap over the 2009 breakdown in negotiations at the UN climate summit COP15 to the following COP meetings. We have structured the analysis by applying the concepts of *content* and *process* as empirical and heuristic tools. On the basis of these insights, we then analyse the road to Paris, where COP21 will be held in 2015 with the stated goal of reaching a global agreement corresponding to the previous goal of COP15, only now covering the period from 2020 onwards. We reach the conclusion that the recent COPs can be characterised by three overlapping discussions: How parties interpret and seek to implement the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, the principle of equity, as well as the question of real effects of actions to mitigate climate change.

The road to Paris is different from the road to Copenhagen in several aspects: 1) several Parties across the North–South divide are seeking out compromises together which marks a significant shift in UNFCCC governance. 2) Both content and process are important elements of governance and are often

interdependent making negotiations a complex and contingent matter. 3) The question of process contains a dilemma between letting the UNFCCC process run its own course and seeking to govern it through e.g. meetings in smaller groups or by presenting negotiation text reducing the possible number of options available for a new agreement. 4) In relation to content several interpretations of the principle of common but differentiated responsibility exist. Whether or not one interpretation will dominate will have significant influence on the outcome of Paris. Furthermore, there looms large a question of whether or not the UN system can deliver the needed governance solution to climate change or if other fora will be found more suitable.

4.2. Paper 2: Narrative Positions of New Political Groups under the UNFCCC

In this paper, Tobias Dan Nielsen and I argue that since 2009, the UNFCCC has seen the emergence of several new political groups, and we ask how the new political groups are positioning themselves in relation to the key UNFCCC principles (the North–South divide and ‘common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities’, CBDR/RC). Drawing on original data, including official statements and submissions, observations at COP 17, COP 18, COP 19, and interviews with delegates, we analyse the following six out of seven identified new political groups: the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action (CD), the Durban Alliance (DA), the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), and the Association of Independent Latin American and Caribbean States (AILAC). Modelled after Hendrik Wagenaar’s approach to narrative policy analysis, we draw a map of narrative positions based on the North–South and new CBDR/RC divisions. This

framework reveals the embeddedness of narratives in practice as they unfold in the formation of new political groups.

In addition to the organizing principle of Annex I/non-Annex I, also referred to as the North–South divide, UNFCCC negotiation positions are now also organized according to a narrative dimension of ‘bridge-building’ or ‘upholding the North–South divide’ in relation to the common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities (CBDR/RC) principle. We identified the narratives and narrative positions of the new political groups and then plotted all of the groups on a new narrative-organizational map, where the CVF, CD, DA, and AILAC narrative positions align through a similar understandings of problems and solutions, the latter with a focus on ‘shared responsibility across the North–South divide’. The BASIC and LMDC narrative positions align through similar understandings of problems and solutions, the latter focusing on ‘differentiated responsibility upholding the North–South divide’. This leads to some broader implications.

The conceptual implication is that practices and narratives shape how actors respond to climate change, which can be set up against mainstream analyses of climate negotiations based on (fixed) interests and power. In this article, we demonstrate that negotiations and responses to the changing circumstances for negotiations are not given from the beginning; they evolve through shared practices, as in the new political groups. One of these shared practices is the distinct manner in which groups ‘narrativise’ their roles and positions in negotiations as well as problems and solutions. Thus, analysts of climate negotiations must re-evaluate our analyses of negotiations, interests, and positions in light of changing narratives based on shared practices and how narratives shape the potential action space for negotiations. We argue that narrative policy analysis brings forward key aspects for understanding certain aspects of the UNFCCC negotiations. We suggest that future analyses of UNFCCC negotiations pay greater attention to this new organisational narrative

landscape and the increasing fragmentation amongst developing countries, especially with respect to understanding CBDR/RC. We have also demonstrated how a narrative approach can be used to understand recent organisational changes in the UNFCCC negotiations and suggest further research to be carried out on the narratives of these new political groups with respect to other climate governance issues, including equity or loss-and-damage, and how they act upon these issues.

4.3. Paper 3: Diplomatic Learning and Trust: How the Cartagena Dialogue brought UN Climate Negotiations Back on Track

In this paper, I ask the research question: How did the UN climate negotiations get back on track and advance after the COP15 breakdown in December 2009? The Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action (Cartagena), a new type of political group under the UNFCCC, is acknowledged by many observers as instrumental in this change, but has received little academic recognition. I argue this rests with two reasons: One, Cartagena operates under the radar, and two, the negotiations literature tends to focus on theoretical, principal, and/or future scenarios, and thus risks overlooking informal and incremental governance practices and innovations. Based on own observations at COP17, COP18, COP19, and COP20 (2011-2014), interviews with 20 Cartagena participants, and available official sources, in this paper, I analyse Cartagena from an international practices approach combining macro- and micro-sociological insights.

I find that Cartagena has been instrumental in getting UN climate negotiations back on track by building trust and creating a learning space across the North–South divide through a range of practices and that this has led to real compromises moving formal negotiations forward. Cartagena is a significant

governance innovation in UNFCCC negotiations. Personal ties and strong commitments from Parties made Cartagena able to not only bring trust back into the UNFCCC negotiations at a critical moment in history, this community of practice was also able to deliver specific suggestions on key issues about how to reach needed compromises to move negotiations forward. Cartagena is a community that thrives on boundary spanning as a defining practice whereby necessary face-to-face dialogue between North and South and between political groups actually takes place; necessary because it creates the basis for trust, learning and new ideas, which contribute to negotiations moving forward. Both the Mexican and South African COP Presidencies were able to use Cartagena as a sounding board for difficult issues. After the failure of COP15, where especially the EU, AOSIS, and LDC experienced being left out of influence, Cartagena has become that community of practice, where Parties supporting an action-oriented approach can engage with each other and develop compromises based on in-depth knowledge of other Parties' positions and reasoning. Such compromises have the potential to be strong and long-lasting.

In this paper, I have shed light on how Cartagena as a community of practice contributes to moving the negotiations forward. I argue that it is time to re-evaluate UNFCCC successes and failures in light of communities of practice. Through this paper I have illustrated and argued that it is not only possible to be both theoretically and empirically grounded, it is also very important to combine theory and practice if we truly want to understand the nature and dynamics of UNFCCC negotiations.

4.4. Paper 4: The Emergence and Spread of Green Growth: A New Global Governance Field

In this paper I ask the research question: How can we explain the emergence and spread of green growth as a global environmental governance phenomenon?

Although green growth is a noticeable policy concept and practice, and there are at least five academic approaches to green growth, no analysis of the emergence and spread of green growth exist. I first argue that dominant theoretical approaches to the study of global environmental governance, regime theory and multi-level governance theory, are misleading in their preoccupation with false dichotomies. Secondly, I argue that a sociological approach would be more adequate. I then develop such an approach based on field theory and recent insights from the practice turn in IR. I apply concepts from Fligstein and McAdam's (2012) field theory, highlighting a field as a meso-level social order consisting of incumbents, challengers and what they term Internal Governance Units (IGUs). This theoretical model informs my empirically-driven analysis based on a database approach and the method of display; a qualitative approach to the study and visual organisation of a large quantity of sources.

I first construct a database summarising more than 1,000 sources, from which I identify 379 green growth actors and their connections with each other and memberships in 19 networks in the years 2005–2013. My displays and analysis highlight the following concerning emergence and spread of green growth. It began as a distinct Asian policy project in 2005–2008 as a collaboration driven by primarily Korea and UNESCAP within the social fit of specific Asian discourses about social, environmental, and economic problems. From 2008 onwards, newly elect President Lee of Korea further spread green growth more globally through agenda-setting practices in relation to G8, G20, OECD, UNEP, and World Bank and drawing on the financial crisis as opportunity to get Western actors on board. At this point, green growth became seen as a solution to lack of growth (in Western societies). From 2010, Korea was joined by several other actors like Denmark and Mexico and increasingly also the business, research, and development communities. Green growth was further interpreted in relation to the failure of UNFCCC governance (COP15) to deliver a global agreement, but also of the UNFCCC's regime inability to

incorporate non-state actors and bridge the North–South divide. I demonstrate that green growth in the centrally positioned subfields can be characterised as being an example of transscalar, multi-actor, and multi-issue governance even though states dominate the field in numbers and positions.

I argue that green growth should be seen as mirroring two general governance trends; firstly a further development of what Bernstein calls the compromise of liberal environmentalism (2001). My analysis demonstrates that green growth is driven by state practices which then empower non-state actors, especially those who become IGUs. I would, however, go further than Bernstein following Fligstein and McAdam and argue that different actors in the same field have different interpretations of green growth (and liberal environmentalism) and that we should study these interpretations through practices. With states dominating the green growth field, we should perhaps re-evaluate the different meanings of liberalism or neoliberalism. Green growth is then closer to neoliberalism's intellectual roots in the German Freiberg School and ordoliberalism as a moderate economic philosophy (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009). The second trend in climate governance that green growth governance mirrors is 'the concurrent demise of effective megamultilateral treaty-making and the rapid emergence, but uncertain effectiveness, of new initiatives' (Hoffmann 2011, p. 10). The financial crisis and other crises are in this view parts of, but not direct causes of, the attraction and further spread of green growth, and so each subfield develops according to own social fit and actor interpretations.

4.5. Paper 5: Korea as Green Middle Power: Green Growth Strategic Action in the Field of Global Environmental Governance

In this paper, I ask the research question: How has Korea become a primary actor in global environmental governance? I ask this question as a follow-up to paper 4, where I found that Korea since 2005 has been the initiator and central node in a majority of international networks and organisations promoting *green growth*. Based on new theoretical approaches and empirical analysis, in this article, I then highlight the significance of Korea's middle power diplomacy in relation to *green growth governance*, establishing Korea as a "Green Middle Power." Middle power analyses of Korea usually portray it as a regionally constrained and secondary actor in global governance. I supplement middle power theory's behavioral approach with a *strategic action* approach inspired by Bourdieu's practice theory. I argue that Korea has become a primary actor in global environmental governance by demonstrating how Korea has established a sub-field of green growth governance through a wide range of strategic moves.

Supported by many international actors, the field of green growth governance has become increasingly institutionalised in the larger field of global environmental governance. Korea has initiated many of the new networks and as paper 4 shows it is the most connected actor in this green growth field. In short, Korea has "put into practice the creative diplomacy and behaviour that is potentially the theoretical hallmark of middle power behavior" (Beeson and Higgott, 2014: 233). However, middle power theory has not explained this empirical phenomenon, nor how Korea is establishing itself as *global* middle power. I develop a new theoretical model, which enable a categorisation of middle powers' strategic action as *conditioning, timing, communicating, networking, financing, and policy planning*. This theoretical

innovation opened for the empirical analysis of the strategic action and the specific strategic moves undertaken by Korea in its efforts to establish green growth as a sub-field within the field of global environmental governance.

The key contributions of this paper are as follows: I explain, firstly, through what specific strategic moves Korea has become a primary actor in global environmental governance, a *Green Middle Power*. Secondly, I demonstrate the usefulness of combining middle power theory's behavioural approach with strategic action theory, which enables a better understanding of the issue areas and collective actors under study as strategic action fields. This combined *middle power strategic action* approach integrates both material and ideational content, and it is founded on strong empirical analyses of specific strategic moves. I argue that this theoretical innovation should be applicable to many other cases in IR and it would help nuance our understanding of global governance and the primary role middle powers can play. It allows for a deepening of the explanatory ambitions of middle power theory, and enhances the capacity of middle power theory to inspire strategic policy development.

4.6. The theoretical, empirical, and practical stories of the dissertation

In this section, I will reflect on the joint contributions from the papers in relation to the main theoretical, empirical, and practical stories. The main *theoretical* story that I draw from the papers is that *practices* and *narratives* shape how we respond to climate change, and that practices of transscalar governance of climate change evolve over time interdependently in social relations and processes (paper 1) through *narrative practices* (paper 2) *communities of practice* (paper 3), in *strategic action fields* (paper 4 and 5), and through specific *strategic action and strategic moves* (paper 5). Focus on strategic action places less focus on a Bourdieusian understanding of habitus,

which makes this field theory more suitable for an IR analysis. Usually, field and habitus are inseparable concepts (cf. Bigo 2011, p. 238). In transscalar governance, collective actors like states, IOs, think tanks, businesses, INGOs, etc, are the main characters, and a concept like habitus developed for analysis of individuals is difficult to apply fruitfully in IR unless one is particularly interested in the micro-level analysis of transnational individuals e.g. the EU bureaucrats or diplomats (Adler-Nissen 2011; 2013). Because of a multiplicity of collective actors and instances relating to both UNFCCC governance and green growth governance it is impossible to make full use of a concept like habitus. However, analysis of strategic action fields implicitly assumes action to always be strategic in a more or less planned way and should be supplemented by deeper analyses of specific collective actors or instances with attention to collective habitus, thus making it clear that strategic action is also less planned and based on a more habitual feel of the game (cf. Bigo 2011; Mérand and Forget 2013). Developing a better understanding of the concept of collective habitus must be one of the next tasks of the Bourdieusian IR research agenda.

The main *empirical* story that I draw from the papers is that transscalar governance of climate change after COP15 has responded in many ways; and two of which I have explored are about a re-configuration of the UNFCCC field (papers 1-3) and the formation of a new field focused on green growth (papers 4-5). The first part of the story deals with how new collective actors in the UNFCCC negotiations position themselves supported by new narratives (paper 2). Some actors are also responding directly to the perceived threat of a demise of the UNFCCC and have sought to rebuild trust through community-building across old divisions (paper 3). The second part of the story deals with the emergence, spread, and organisation of green growth as an empirical governance phenomenon in the years 2005-2013 (paper 4). It furthermore deals with how one actor in particular – Korea – has been central in placing green growth on the global agenda, in global organisations, connected green growth

with financial flows and policy planning in other countries and regions (paper 5). The formation of the green growth field is also supported by new narratives.

An interesting empirical story that I have not been able to follow or develop a narrative for, is the story about the connections and overlaps between the two fields of UNFCCC climate negotiations and green growth governance. It is interesting because on the one hand there is an affinity between the self-proclaimed progressive Parties under the UNFCCC, e.g. the Cartagena participants, and the green growth states. I have also observed the same individuals from companies and other centrally positioned green growth actors participate actively in UNFCCC governance, e.g. by meeting with delegates and co-organising side events. On the other hand, a country like China that is finding it difficult to be as progressive in the UNFCCC as domestic climate policies actually warrant, is much more engaged in green growth governance, e.g. as participant in the Green Growth Alliance with Korea, Denmark, Mexico, Kenya, Qatar, and Ethiopia. Again, this points to new research questions.

The main *practical* story that I draw, not just from the papers, but from the whole PhD research process, is that engaged scholarship is something more than policy oriented research, sometimes also labelled as “research to the benefit of society” (Van de Ven 2007). It is a reflexive and transdisciplinary way of thinking and practicing research much closer to the dialogic approach of deliberative policy analysis (Hajer and Wagenaar 2003; Wagenaar 2011) and post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1992, 1993). Engaged scholarship and the Bourdieusian notion of dissolving false dichotomies (Bourdieu 1988a; Pouliot 2007 and 2008), especially between theory and practice as pointed out by Berling (2013), are quite similar: “Scholarship that engages both researchers and practitioners can provide an exceedingly productive and challenging environment; it not only fosters the creation of knowledge for science and practice, but it may dissolve the theory-practice gap.” (Van de Ven 2007, 35). In a Bourdieusian sense, the (practice of) theorising should include practical

knowledge, and practice should include theoretical knowledge in a much more explicit and reflexive way. It not only demands more of the scholar but also of the participating practitioners. One part of the story is that I have observed how scholars are constantly involved in practical governance in both the UNFCCC and green growth field. These scholars move seemingly with great ease between the worlds of science and policy. I want to return to the Van de Ven's fourth step in the research process; problem solving. The engaged scholar seeks to "communicate, interpret, and apply the empirical findings on which alternative models better answer the research question about the problem." (2007, 11). First of all, we should reflect upon the way engaged scholars communicate, interpret, and apply empirical – and theoretical I would add – findings. I also argue that it raises further questions about how they have come to be in these positions. How have these practices developed? What does it do to the way these scholars practice research, formulate theories, and participate in practical governance? I argue that our theories of governance need to develop further to take the role of scholars and these questions into account. A Bourdieusian, Engaged Scholarship approach with a focus on narratives would be a fruitful point of departure.

Another part of the story is that I have also become engaged in practical governance. I am now continually engaging practitioners, and practitioners are increasingly engaging me. I take this as evidence that practitioners find my work usable, and I argue that my own work and knowledge has been strengthened by this engagement. One of the aspects highlighted by a Bourdieusian approach is the power plays and conflicts always existing in fields. This, I have also encountered personally, when I after speaking critically about Denmark's oil policy was approached by a lobbyist from DONG Energy²⁰

²⁰ "DONG Energy is one of the leading energy groups in Northern Europe. We are headquartered in Denmark. Around 6,500 employees explore for and produce oil and natural gas, generate electricity and heat from our offshore wind farms and our power stations, and

who was responsible for stakeholder relations (oil and gas). I agreed to meet with him for a coffee, and he then told me directly that they had heard my analysis on the radio, and that they were interested in my research and approach. They would be more than happy if they could provide me with information about Denmark's oil and gas policies.



I have now presented the findings of each of my papers as well as the joint contributions of the papers in relation to the *theoretical*, *empirical*, and *practical* stories of the dissertation. This leads naturally to the last chapter in which I conclude, answer the research question, and point to a new beginning.

supply energy to residential and business customers every single day.”
(<http://www.dongenergy.com/en/about-us/dong-energy-in-brief>)

5. Epilogue: A New Beginning

In this final chapter, the epilogue, I briefly conclude the dissertation and point to a new beginning. To answer the research question, I first contextualised the dissertation in relation to the dominant research narrative in global climate governance. I found this to be based on a model of epistemological and ontological iterations. Through my chosen Narrative approach, I explored ambiguities and dilemmas in this research narrative, from which I then developed an alternative research narrative still using the epistemological and ontological narratives, but also inclusive of practice or a practical narrative. I argued that the Engaged Scholarship approach would be an excellent framework to develop such an alternative research narrative within. I then presented my research design based on the Engaged Scholarship approach and explained how the main theoretical elements would fit within it, and then how the five papers would fit both theoretically with a range of concepts from the same family of theories, and empirically with the two themes of UNFCCC governance (paper 1-3) and green growth governance (paper 4-5). Thirdly, I gave an overview of my common methodology, sources and methods. On the basis of this, I presented the findings from each of the five papers. These papers have answered the research question individually and collectively.

I want to point to the way in which a narrative when ending refers back to the beginning and invites a retrospection of the reader. Thus, the narrative ends with seeing the beginning in a new light; maybe even seeing a new beginning? I have already highlighted several ways throughout the dissertation that there is indeed a new beginning in the horizon.

Theoretically, empirically, and practically.

6. Papers

This dissertation includes five papers. They can be read in their full length with appendices in the following pages. Some papers have already been published, and they are included here in the pre-print version. As of writing this is the status of the papers:

Paper 1: Global climate politics: From Bali to Paris

Originally published as:

Skovgaard, Jakob and Lau Blaxekjær (2013). Global klimapolitik: Fra Bali til Paris. *Politik*. 16 (3):7-16.

Paper 2: Narrative Positions of New Political Groups under the UNFCCC

Originally published as:

Blaxekjær, Lau Øfjord and Tobias Dan Nielsen (2014) Narrative Positions of New Political Groups under the UNFCCC. *Climate Policy*. Published online 17 October 2014.

Paper 3: Diplomatic Learning and Trust: How the Cartagena Dialogue brought UN Climate Negotiations Back on Track

Paper 3 has been accepted for publication in *Global Environmental Politics*. The version included here is the first submission with first review decision: “revise and resubmit with minor changes”.

Paper 4: The Emergence and Spread of Green Growth: A New Global Governance Field

Paper 4 has been accepted for publication in *Environmental Politics*. The version included here is a resubmission for second review after first review decision: “revise and resubmit with major changes”.

Paper 5: Korea as Green Middle Power: Green Growth Strategic Action in the Field of Global Environmental Governance

Paper 5 has been accepted for publication in *International Relations of the Asia-Pacific*. The version included here is the final submission expected to be published Autumn 2015.

Paper 1: Global Climate Politics – From Bali to Paris

Jakob Skovgaard^a and Lau Blaxekjær^b

Abstract

This paper analyses the international climate negotiations from the so-called 2007 Bali Roadmap over the 2009 breakdown in negotiations at the UN climate summit COP15 to the following COP meetings with a focus on central issues and tendencies. The analysis is structured by applying the concepts of content and process as empirical and heuristic tools. This is used as the point of departure to analyse the road to Paris, where COP21 will be held in 2015 with the stated goal of reaching a global agreement corresponding to the previous goal of COP15, only now covering the period from 2020 onwards. The paper concludes that the recent COPs can be characterised by three overlapping discussions: How parties interpret and seek to implement the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, the principle of equity, as well as the question of real effects of actions to mitigate climate change.

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Manchet

Hopenhagen blev til Brokenhagen, da COP15 ikke leverede den forventede globale klimaafgørelse. Men hvor står den globale klimapolitik egentlig i dag? Hvor langt er man nået i FN-forhandlingerne – og hvilke muligheder og barrierer er der for at nå frem til en global løsning på de globale problemer, som klimaforandringerne udsætter os for? I denne artikel undersøger vi netop disse spørgsmål.

Introduktion

FN-klimatopmødet COP15 i 2009 blev aldrig den store succes, som hypen og antallet af verdensledere lagde op til. Tværtimod. „Hopenhagen“ blev til „Brokenhagen“, og det politiske spil om at frame skurke, helte og ofre for resultatet foregår stadig. Denne artikel er en empirisk funderet analyse af, hvordan FN's klimaforhandlinger har udviklet sig fra COP15 og frem. Fokus er på de årlige klimatopmøder, de såkaldte COP'er,¹ og de store linjer i klimaforhandlingerne. Der er forskellige politiske fortællinger om klimaet. En går på, at FN-systemet er både vigtigt og nødvendigt, hvis det skal lykkes os at reducere de globale udledninger af drivhusgasser, som videnskaben har fastslået er nødvendigt. Og at FN samtidig er med til at sikre åbenhed og inddragelse i processen, så også de små og mindre udviklede lande oplever, at de høres. En anden går på, at FN-systemet har spillet fallit, fordi det går for langsomt med at nå til enighed om konkrete løsninger. Nogle analyser peger på, at de store udledere ikke vil binde sig og derfor forhælder processen (IISD 2011 og 2012). Andre analyser (og egne observationer) peger på, at trægheden skyldes strukturelle problemer – konsensus tager tid (Grubb 2011). Og FN-systemet skal blive bedre til at inddrage virksomheder og andre aktører end stater (IISD 2011 og 2012), hvilket er nødvendigt, hvis der skal findes tilstrækkelig finansiering samt udvikles og implementeres nye innovative løsninger (UNFCCC 2013a).

I de følgende afsnit præsenterer vi først konteksten for klimaforhandlingerne for at forstå forhandlingssituationen ved COP15's påbegyndelse. Dernæst analyserer vi COP15, COP16, COP17 og COP18 med fokus på, hvad der var de centrale problemstillinger og tendenser. Vores analyse er struktureret omkring begreberne *indhold* og *proces* med den forståelse, at de er to gensidigt afhængige størrelser, der er nyttige at anvende som heuristiske redskaber til at forstå FN-klimaforhandlingerne. Proces henviser til diskussioner om, hvorledes man skal forhandle, herunder hvem der skal være med i forhandlingerne, og i hvor høj grad formandskabslandet for klimakonferencen eller andre skal styre forhandlingerne. Indhold henviser til de konkrete emner, der forhandles om og landenes positioner i forhold til disse emner.² Naturligvis er der en sammenhæng mellem proces og indhold. Lande ønsker i høj grad en bestemt proces for bedre at sætte et fingeraftryk på indholdet. Men proces kan ikke reduceres til et spørgsmål om indhold. Proces er vigtigt i sig selv for aktørerne, bl.a. fordi det kan danne præcedens for forhandlinger og global governance ud over klimaområdet, og fordi det vedrører spørgsmål om legitimitet (Eckersley 2012). Vi opsummerer dernæst analysen af udviklingen på de seneste COP'er som afsæt for at analysere vejen mod Paris, hvor COP21 skal holdes i 2015 med det formål at nå frem til en global aftale svarende til det oprindelige mål for COP15, bare dækkende perioden efter 2020. Slutteligt konkluderer vi, at proces og indhold hænger tæt sammen, at spørgsmålet om **proces** indeholder et tilsyneladende dilemma mellem at overlade de internationale klimaforhandlinger til sig selv eller at forsøge at drive den fremad gennem møder i mindre grupper eller ved fremlæggelse af formandskabstekst, og at der mht. **indhold** er forskellige fortolkninger af det såkaldte princip om *falles men differentieret ansvar*, som har afgørende betydning for en kommende byrdefordeling af reduktionsforpligtelser. De centrale problemstillinger og tendenser, vi redegør for, er udviklingen i forhandlingerne, herunder hvordan de forskellige aktører har argumenteret og ageret. Vores kildemateriale består af

egne observationer gennem deltagelse på COP'erne og i andre fora, samtaler og egne interviews indsamlet siden COP14 samt litteraturstudier og andet offentligt tilgængeligt materiale, fx politiske taler og analyser. Eget datamateriale bruges som generel baggrundsviden og refereres derfor kun, hvor relevant.

Konteksten: Bali-køreplanen frem mod COP15

Allerede i midten af nullerne begyndte klimaforandringernes akutte natur at stå klart for såvel offentlighed som policymakers og andre indflydelsesrige aktører. Al Gore's film „En ubekvem sandhed“ vandt en Oscar i 2007, og den såkaldte Stern-rapport fra 2006 samt FN's klimapanel's rapport fra 2007 understregede omfanget af de menneskelige og økonomiske omkostninger ved klimaforandringer. Samtidig begyndte de internationale klimaforhandlinger om, hvad der skulle ske, når Kyotoprotokollens³ første forpligtelsesperiode udløb i 2012. Udviklingen har siden 1990'erne overhalet Kyotoprotokollen i en grad, så den konkrete reduktionseffekt af Kyotoprotokollen bliver stadigt mindre. Dette skyldes, at kun de industrialiserede lande⁴ (herefter ilande) er forpligtet til at mindske udledningen af drivhusgasser. USA, der er verdens næststørste udleder, er ikke med, og EU, som er med, tegner sig for en stadigt mindre andel af de totale globale udledninger. Og helt afgørende, så tegner Kina og andre store udviklingsøkonomier sig for en stadigt større andel af nuværende og estimerede fremtidige udledninger. Ifølge forskellige scenarier kommer udviklingslandene (herefter ulande) til at udlede omtrent 70 procent af globale drivhusgasser i 2030, dels fordi stadigt mere produktion foregår i disse lande, dels fordi befolkningerne bliver rigere og har eller får en livsstil sammenlignelig med vestlige forbrugsmønstre (Harvey 2012).

I 2007 – 10 år efter Kyotoprotokollens vedtagelse i 1997 – var det samlede globale udslip øget. Samtidig begyndte spørgsmålet om tilpasning til de klimaforandringer, der uundgåeligt vil komme, at få en mere fremtrædende placering i forhandlingerne uafhængigt af spørgsmålet om, hvem der skulle

reducere hvor meget (Biermann & Boas 2010). Det var på denne baggrund, at man på COP13 i december 2007 i Bali forhandlede en køreplan for forløbet frem mod COP15 på plads. Et af de vigtigste emner var spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt man skulle forhandle udledningsreduktioner inden for rammerne af Kyotoprotokollen eller inden for et nyt spor, der omfattede alle lande. Kompromisset i Bali blev, at man fortsatte med at forhandle reduktionsmål inden for Kyotoprotokollen, imens alle andre emner, herunder også reduktioner for både i- og ulande, blev forhandlet i det såkaldte Konventionsspor.⁵ Uenigheden handlede på den ene side om, hvorvidt det kun skulle være ilandene, der forpligtede sig til reduktionsmål, som flere toneangivende ulande ønskede, eller om vækstøkonomierne også skulle forpligte sig, som ilandene ønskede. På den anden side handlede uenigheden om, hvorvidt forpligtelserne skulle være juridisk bindende og fastsat under FN's klimakonvention (UNFCCC), som ulandene og EU ønskede, eller baseret på mindre bindende mål fastsat af landene selv, men udsat for et ensartet *review* af de andre lande, som USA og enkelte andre ilande ønskede. Derudover forhandlede man i Konventionssporet bl.a. om, hvordan man skulle måle, registrere og verificere, at landene levede op til deres reduktionsmål (såkaldt MRV),⁶ ilandenes finansiering af klimatiltag (både reduktion af udledninger og tilpasning til klimaforandringer) i ulandene, samt også tilpasning og teknologiudvikling og -overførsel (UNFCCC 2007).

COP15: Københavner-akkorden

På trods af Balikøreplanens mange forhandlingsmøder, herunder COP14, der var et skridt på vejen til COP15, var forhandlingerne ved starten på COP15 langt fra kommet så langt som forventet i Bali. Uden for forhandlingerne var der mere aktivitet. NGO'er og presse havde et hidtil uset fokus på klimaforhandlingerne, og forventningerne var høje. Mange i- og ulande havde vedtaget nationale klimaplaner eller love som EU's klima- og energipakke, hvis

formål er at reducere EU's udslip med 20 procent i 2020 i forhold til 1990-niveauet. Dog var det ikke lykkedes at få den amerikanske kongres til at vedtage en klimalov, der kunne fungere som indspil i forhandlingerne. Den økonomiske krise var samtidig begyndt at påvirke diskussionerne om klimapolitikken i mange lande. Med hensyn til **indhold** var der skarpt optrukne positioner. Ud over de ovennævnte positioner søgte USA at gøre egne forpligtelser afhængige af vækstøkonomiernes forpligtelser, særligt Kinas, og lagde stor vægt på verificering af disse forpligtelser. Kina og nogle af de mange ulande, der er organiseret i G77-gruppen,⁷ især Indien og venstreradikale latinamerikanske lande, lagde vægt på ilandenes historiske ansvar for klimaforandringerne og det såkaldte princip om *fælles, men differentieret ansvar*, som betød, at ilandene skulle gå forrest også mht. at finansiere de nødvendige klimatiltag i ulandene. *Fælles, men differentieret ansvar* er et princip nedfældet i FN's klimakonventions artikel 3.1 og andre internationale miljøaftaler, og som betyder, at ansvaret for at løse et miljøproblem tilhører alle, men at ansvaret samtidigt skal differentieres mellem landene således, at de rige og mest forurenende lande påtager sig mest. Princippet kobles både i Konventionen og i forhandlingerne til retfærdighedsprincippet (*equity*).⁸ Hvorvidt dette betyder, at ulande ikke skal forpligte sig eller blot skal påtage sig lavere forpligtelser, har været genstand for diskussion i forhandlingerne. Imellem USA og de ulande, der argumenterede for historisk ansvar, stod bl.a. EU, som søgte at udøve lederskab ved at påtage sig betydelige forpligtelser (Skovgaard 2013), og lande som Sydkorea, Mexico og forskellige østater, der alle lagde mere vægt på en effektiv klimaafale end ilandenes ansvar. Således var G77 internt splittet, men opretholdt en samlet position i hvert fald udadtil.

Selvom de nævnte emner dominerede diskussionerne om indhold, kom andre væsentlige, **proces**orienterede spørgsmål reelt til at dominere COP15. Et centralt spørgsmål var, om den endelige aftale skulle forhandles i de traditionelle FN-forhandlingsgrupper eller i mindre, lukkede grupper med

deltagelse af få udvalgte lande. Et andet centralt spørgsmål var, om det danske formandskab kunne lægge en ny forhandlingstekst på bordet for at drive forhandlingerne fremad. Desuden var der tvivl om, om det var de almindelige forhandlere eller repræsentanterne for de stats- og regeringschefer, der ville ankomme i uge to, der skulle forhandle aftalen på plads (Lidegaard 2012).⁹ Da den såkaldte „danske tekst“, et dokument brugt af formandskabet i konsultationerne med de væsentligste lande (de største udledere samt repræsentanter for landegrupper som den sudanske talsmand for den Afrikanske Union Lumumba Di-Aping), blev lækket på COP'ens anden dag, blev teksten af en række ulanderepræsentanter (særligt Lumumba) udlagt som et forsøg på at kuppe forhandlingerne med en tekst, der lå tættere på ilandenes positioner end ulandenes. I løbet af den efterfølgende uge blev forsøg på at lægge en dansk tekst på bordet eller at overgå til mindre grupper reelt skudt ned. Det var først en af de sidste dage, at en mindre gruppe af stats- og regeringschefer besluttede at forhandle i et lukket forum. Gruppen omfattede de mest forurenende lande samt repræsentanter for de mest udsatte lande som „Least Developed Countries“ (LDC) og „Alliance of Small Island States“ (AOSIS). Det var denne gruppe, der forhandlede den såkaldte København-akkord på plads. Efterfølgende modstand fra seks lande¹⁰ førte dog til, at man ikke kunne vedtage København-akkorden, men måtte nøjes med at tage den til efterretning som uofficielt dokument. Procesdiskussionerne var dog ikke uafhængige af indholdsdiskussionerne. Meget af modviljen mod Akkorden og forslagene om at forhandle i mindre grupper skyldtes, at modstanderne mente, at deres synspunkter ikke var blevet eller ville blive hørt. Ikke desto mindre anvendte de samme modstandere også argumenter, der gik længere end spørgsmålet om indhold, særligt at det var nødvendigt at bevare FN-systemet som et demokratisk system, hvor alle lande tæller lige meget (IISD 2009).

Hvorvidt København-akkorden var en succes eller fiasko, er omdiskuteret, om end alle er enige om, at den ikke levede op til de høje

forventninger forud for COP15 (se fx Lidegaard 2012; Meilstrup 2010; Lynas 2009). På den positive side tæller, at hovedparten af verdens lande for første gang forpligtede sig på målsætningen om, at den globale opvarmning ikke måtte overstige to grader, at de største udledere forpligtede sig på reduktionstiltag (der blev meldt ind i januar 2010), hvordan disse forpligtelser skulle verificeres, og om mål for finansiering fra ilandene til ulandene for perioden 2010-12 og fra 2020 og frem. På den anden side tæller, at de indmeldte reduktionsforpligtelser langt fra er tilstrækkelige til at bringe verden på kurs mod tograders-målet (UNEP 2010), at Akkorden ikke er juridisk bindende for landene, at man ikke kunne blive enige om at halvere det globale udslip i 2050, og at finansieringsforpligtelserne er ukonkrete, særligt angående perioden efter 2012. Derudover indeholdt Akkorden ikke noget svar på Kyotoprotokollens fremtid. På mange måder afspejler Akkorden USAs og Kinas meget lidt klimaprogressive positioner, hvorimod mere ambitiøse aktører som EU og de mest udsatte ulande trods deltagelse ikke fik sat væsentlige fingeraftryk (Christoff 2010). USA undgik den juridisk bindende aftale, der ville være tæt på umulig at få ratificeret i et Senat, der ikke kunne vedtage en klimalovgivning i 2009. Kina undgik globale mål, der kunne indebære forpligtelser til at reducere deres udslip. Kina havde dog givet sig i forhold til deres modvilje imod international måling af forpligtelser, men kunne ikke undgå at blive fremet som en af hovedskurkerne bag COP15-skuffelsen (Lynas 2009), især af ilandene. Omvendt blev Danmark og USA af mange ulande fremet som skurkene (Christoff 2010: 639-640).¹¹

COP16: Fra risiko for kollaps til Cancún-aftalen

Skuffelsen efter COP15 dominerede det mexicanske COP16-formandskab. Hvad angår **indhold** var de vigtigste emner på dagsordenen at få de fremskridt, der var Københavner-akkorden forankret i UNFCCC-regi, at få konkretiseret og operationaliseret disse elementer (særligt spørgsmål om verificering,

finansiering samt afskovning i ulandene), samt hvis muligt at få løftet ambitionsniveauet for udledningsreduktioner for at kunne nå tograders-målet og få afklaret Kyotoprotokollens fremtid. Derudover var der fortsat spørgsmålet om en aftales juridiske karakter. Blandt mange af ulandenes forhandlere var der modvilje imod Københavner-akkorden, som man syntes i for høj grad afspejlede ilandenes, særligt USAs, positioner. Derfor var der forsøg på at få en del elementer af Akkorden genforhandlet og rykket balancen mellem i- og ulandenes præferencer. En række ulande, herunder Kina, fremhævede under forhandlingsmøder mellem de to COP'er, at de ikke følte sig bundet af Akkorden, da den ikke var blevet vedtaget på COP15 (IISD 2010a). Dog havde de fleste lande valgt at tilslutte sig Akkorden efter COP15, og de væsentligste udledere havde indmeldt de reduktionstiltag, de ville gennemføre. Inden for forhandlingsgruppen G77 øgedes uenigheden. En række ulande, særligt de mere pro-USA latinamerikanske lande som Columbia og Chile og små østater, havde sammen med flere EU-lande og bl.a. Australien startet den såkaldte Cartagena-Dialog¹² på baggrund af følelsen af at være uden indflydelse under COP15. Internt i G77 stod Cartagena-landene, der lagde vægt på en effektiv aftale, således over for bl.a. de største udviklingsøkonomier¹³ og de venstreradikale, latinamerikanske lande,¹⁴ der lagde mere vægt på at differentiere ansvaret mellem i- og ulande.

Blandt ilandene var der uenighed mellem på den ene side EU og på den anden side især USA, Rusland og Canada, med Australien og Japan i forskellige alliancer afhængigt af, hvilket emne der diskuteredes. Ilandene stod dog alle stærkt på den balance, der var opnået i Akkorden. Hvad angår **proces**, var optimismen for det første blevet afløst af generel udmatning i forhold til klimaspørgsmålet samtidigt med, at finanskrisen indtog en altdominerende rolle på den politiske agenda. Der var lille mulighed for at samle stats- og regeringschefer som i København. For det andet gjorde kritikken af det danske formandskab, at forsøg på at topstyre processen gennem formandskabstekster

eller lukkede møder for udvalgte lande risikerede en reaktion i stil med den ydmygelse, som Lars Løkke Rasmussen oplevede den sidste nat på COP15. Selvom det mexicanske formandskab havde fordel af at tilhøre ulandsgruppen (hvilket mindskede risikoen for G77-kritik, fordi kritik kunne underminere fortællingen om G77-sammenhold og Nord-Syd-konflikt) og samtidigt have et tæt forhold til USA, stod det i det samme dilemma som det danske formandskab: Hvordan kunne man aktivt drive de træge UNFCCC-forhandlinger fremad uden at fremprovokere et tilbageslag? Og i hvor høj grad skulle det ske i de mange forskellige UNFCCC-arbejdsgrupper, og i hvor høj grad i mindre grupper og/eller på baggrund af tekst fra formandskabet? Man å dog også, at Cartagena-landene havde tætte personlige bånd til både UNFCCC-embedsværket og formandskabet og kunne udnytte disse. Tidligere medlem af Costa Ricas delegation (siden 1995) og aktivt involveret i skabelsen af Cartagena-Dialogen, Christiana Figueres, blev i 2010 valgt som den nye generalsekretær for UNFCCC. Mexico er et af medlemslandene i Cartagena-Dialogen og deltog i dialogmøderne i løbet af 2010 som forberedelse til COP16. Hermed fik Cartagena-landene direkte adgang til UNFCCC og formandskabet – og blev også brugt af Figueres og formandskabet til at teste kompromisser. Dette var vigtigt for processen, da der for alvor var sat markant spørgsmålstegn ved FN-forhandlingernes eksistensberettigelse og evne til at levere. De modstridende positioner gjorde, at forhandlingerne i de forskellige UNFCCC-arbejdsgrupper også i Cancún gik langsomt fremad, selvom der skete fremskridt inden for afskovning og finansiering. Det mexicanske formandskab intervenserede først på COP'ens sidste dag ved at fremlægge en forhandlingstekst. Denne forhandlingstekst var i høj grad baseret på de tekster, man havde forhandlet i UNFCCC-arbejdsgrupperne, men formandskabet havde fjernet en række af de forskellige optioner i disse tekster og på denne måde forsøgt at skabe to tekster (en i Kyotosporet og en i Konventionssporet), der samlet set i lige høj grad tilgodeså både i-og ulandenes positioner. Man havde

også fra mexicansk side konsulteret med de væsentligste aktører for at sikre sig deres accept. De mexicanske tekster blev da også modtaget med klapsalver fra langt de fleste forhandlere, der frygtede, at UNFCCC-forhandlingerne ville miste al betydning efter endnu et kollaps (IISD 2010b). Det var uvist, om den globale indsats reelt ville flytte til et andet forum (så som G20) eller gå i stå, hvis man ikke blev enige. Dog var Bolivia stærkt imod de mexicanske tekster, som ansås for både processuelt at udgøre et kup imod UNFCCC-processen og indholdsmæssigt for at reflektere amerikanske interesser, særligt med hensyn til *falles men differentieret ansvar*, snarere end de fattige landes. Det mexicanske formandskab kunne dog „hamre“ en aftale igennem på trods af de bolivianske protester.¹⁵

De to tekster, som samlet er kendt som „Cancúnaftalen“, formåede at få indholdet i Københavner-akkorden vedtaget i UNFCCC-regi og få konkretiseret store dele af dette indhold (Grubb 2011). På **indholdssiden** fik man for det første forankret de indmeldte reduktionstiltag i UNFCCC-regi, hvilket reelt betød, at USA fik opfyldt sit ønske om den samme type forpligtelser for i- og ulande, dog med undtagelse af de mindst udviklede lande. Dermed blev der ikke differentieret mellem den juridiske karakter af i- og ulandenes forpligtelser (ingen af parterne var juridisk forpligtede, på den måde ilandene var i Kyotoprotokollen), selvom ilandene skulle reducere deres udslip, hvor ulandene blot skulle begrænse stigningen i deres forventede fremtidige udslip. For det andet blev man enige om en række modaliteter for, hvordan klimafinansieringen fremover skulle styres, herunder oprettelsen af Den Grønne Klimafond. For det tredje blev man enige om rammer for at adressere tilpasning, teknologioverførsel og afskovning i ulandene. Særligt betydningsfuldt var rammerne for, hvordan man kan adressere afskovning, da det muliggjorde en stærkere international indsats imod afskovning, herunder støtte fra ilande til ulande. På den anden side fik man ikke forhøjet de nationale reduktionsmål og -indsatser, og man fik ikke afklaret Kyotoprotokollens fremtid. Overordnet set

fik man dog genskabt noget af troen på, at FN-processen kunne levere resultater.

COP17: Durban Platformen

I Durban, Sydafrika, fortsatte skismaet med at sikre FN-processen delvist på bekostning af substantielle indholdsmæssige fremskridt (Boyle 2011: 1), hvilket var tydeligt i forhandlingerne om Kyotoprotokollens fremtid på den ene side og det langsigtede Konventionsspør på den anden. De store indholdsmæssige knaster fra COP15 var stadig uløste. Kina og Indien ønskede at løse forhandlingerne om Kyotoprotokollen først, mens lande med USA i spidsen havde gjort det klart, at de ikke ville deltage i Kyotoprotokollens anden periode, og derfor kun ville forhandle i Konventionssporet. EU foreslog fra starten at indgå dels en aftale om Kyotoprotokollen, dels en aftale om en køreplan frem mod 2020 og efter 2020. Et af de dominerende mantraer fælles for ulandene og NGO'erne på COP17 var, at Kyotoprotokollen ikke måtte dø på afrikansk jord. Der var nærmest tale om en frygt for at miste noget af det eneste konkrete og juridiske, der holder den vestlige verden ansvarlig for klimaforandringerne. Dette fastlåste forhandlingerne i en sådan grad, at landene beskyldte hinanden for at tage enten Kyotoprotokollen eller Konventionssporet som gidsel. Først ret sent kom forhandlingerne i gang grundet dels et gennembrud på finansieringsspørgsmålet, dels en ny officiel alliance mellem EU og de mest udsatte ulande, der sammen med NGO'ernes pres fik samlet nok opbakning til en mellemposition, hvor begge forhandlingerne kunne komme i gang, fordi EU utvetydigt viste sig parat til at forpligte sig til en ny forpligtelsesperiode under Kyotoprotokollen. Dette proces- og indholdsmæssige dobbeltproblem i forhandlingerne kom klarest til udtryk i diskussionerne om det *fælles, men differentierede ansvar*, hvor de to yderpositioner fra COP15 stadig stod skarpt trukket op. Dog begyndte USA på den ene side og bl.a. Indien og Kina på den anden at få et stærkere modspil fra den nævnte alliance af EU og midtersøgende

ulande. Stærkere, fordi det kom fra egne rækker i hhv. i- og ulandegrupperne, og fordi det var en alternativ tilgang, der byggede bro over Nord-Syd-konflikten. En brobygning, der havde modnet siden COP15 gennem Cartagena-Dialogen. Cartagena-Dialogen kendetegnes ved at arbejde under radaren, hvor lande mere frit kan udveksle ideer og diskutere uoverensstemmelser samt finde frem til gangbare kompromisser, hvilket kan være meget svært at gøre i åbne forhandlinger. Særligt er det en udfordring for små ulande åbent at udstille uenigheden i G77 eller for lande med økonomisk samarbejde med Kina at gå åbent imod Kinas position. Dette ekstra pres var stærkt medvirkende til aftalen om Durban Platformen og mange andre beslutninger. Særligt er presset internt i G77 vigtigt, da det svækker de venstreradikale latinamerikanske lande samt Indien og Kinas argumenter baseret på, at ulandene står samlet i et opgør mod den rige verdens udnyttelse af ressourcerne med globale klimaforandringer til følge. Det sydafrikanske formandskab arbejdede tæt sammen med Cartagena-Dialogen for at finde de konkrete tekstformuleringer, der kunne accepteres af både i- og ulande. Og det blev fx officielt støttet af fælles pressemeddelelse fra de midtersøgende lande (EU, LDC and AOSIS 2011). Desuden blev Sydafrika også presset af den afrikanske gruppe til at drive processen til reelle resultater. Formandskabets medlemskab af BASIC fik i den henseende mindre betydning, da et formandskab forventes at være mere neutralt, hvilket betød, at Kina og især Indien kom til at tegne BASIC udadtil.

På **indholdssiden** lykkedes det at holde liv i Kyotoprotokollen, og EU med få andre lande bandt sig til en ny forpligtelsesperiode begyndende fra januar 2013, men uden beslutning, om den skulle slutte i 2017 eller 2020.¹⁶ Canada, Japan og Rusland havde for længst besluttet ikke at være med. Den reelle reduktionseffekt af anden periode bliver dog meget lille, da landene har en nuværende udledning på under 15 procent (og nedadgående) af globale udledninger og kun har reduktionsforpligtelser på gennemsnitligt 18 procent (Boyle 2012: 3). Men den juridiske og symbolske betydning var, at man

forpligtede sig frem mod 2020 og fik fastholdt forhandlingerne om en aftale, hvor alle lande forpligter sig at reducere. Her blev man enige om en række ting, bl.a. at fortsætte Konventionssporet for at kunne lukke det på COP18 (hvilket sikrede, at en lang række emner overhovedet kunne komme på den kommende dagsorden), at begynde et nyt forhandlingsspor kaldet Durban Platformen frem mod en beslutning om en global aftale i 2015 på COP21, hvor alle lande forpligter sig fra 2020 (i en eller anden grad), og at disse forhandlinger skal inkorporere konklusionerne fra både det internationale klimapanelts femte rapport og et review af det langsigtede mål om under to graders temperaturstigning, der er forankret i FN-forhandlingerne. Forventningerne er, at det vil stå meget klart, at der er en stor kløft mellem faktiske og nødvendige reduktioner og tiltag. Og at målsætningen måske endda skal ændres fra to til halvanden graders temperaturstigning. Selvom det altså lykkedes at få en aftale, der både sikrede Kyotoprotokollen og Konventionssporet samt fik gang i den nye forhandlingsproces, hvor alle lande er med, så var der flere negative forhold. Aftalen kom først i stand efter over et døgn ekstra forhandlinger, dels grundet processuelle vanskeligheder i relation til tillidsbruddet fra COP15 og dels grundet svære kompromisser mellem yderpositionerne. Forsinkelser af denne art er dels udtryk for den generelle tillidskrise, dels mindsker de processens legitimitet, da nogle ulandes delegationer ikke uden videre kan lave rejseplaner om og derfor ikke er med til sidst. Durban Platformen er meget kortfattet og udskyder de svære forhandlinger til COP18 og videre. Diskussionerne om det *fælles, men differentierede ansvar* blev af ulandene, særligt med Indien i spidsen, koblet til Konventionens retfærdighedsprincip (*equity*). Det gør man for at sikre, at lighed ikke bliver det afgørende princip at fordele forpligtelser efter i en kommende aftale, men at spørgsmålet i stedet bliver, hvad den retfærdige fordeling skal være, hvilket er mere relativt og lægger op til fortsat at placere hovedansvaret på ilandene. Dog nævner Durban Platformen hverken *fælles, men differentieret ansvar* eller

retfærdighedsprincippet, hvilket er nyt. Det tolker mange som en sejr for USA og nederlag for de venstreradikale latinamerikanske lande samt Indien og Kina. Til gengæld har Indien m.fl. senere hen udlagt deres forståelse af Durban Platformen som implicit refererende til principperne, fordi Konventionen nævnes. Indien blev fremet som (en af) skurkene på COP17, snarere end Kina der valgte at holde lidt lavere profil, og det var i en sidste kort forhandling, at EU og Indien nåede frem til et tekstkompromis om Durban Platformen. Kompromisset beskriver, at processen skal lede frem mod “a protocol, another legal instrument or an agreed outcome with legal force under the Convention applicable to all parties” (UNFCCC 2011). Især tredje mulighed tolkes af mange som en juridisk ladeport, mens fortalere peger på, at man nu i det mindste har forpligtet alle til at indgå en aftale. Det bemærkes, at EU ved at tage lederskab i forhold til Kyotoprotokollen formåede at være den part fra ilandenes side, der blev toneangivende i forhandlingerne om Konventionssporet og det nye forhandlingsspor, Durban Platformen.

COP18: Doha Gateway – En proces-COP uden indhold?

COP18 i Doha, Qatar, var en afslutning og en begyndelse, hvorfor denne COP også er blevet kaldt en proces-COP uden indhold. Her skulle man færdiggøre Bali-køreplanens to spor (Kyotoprotokollen og Konventionssporet) samt begynde Durban Platformens nye forhandlingsperiode frem mod COP21 i 2015. Man forhandlede om, hvad der skulle flyttes fra Konventionssporet over i Durban Platformen. Selvom COP18 kaldes en **proces-COP**, var den ikke meget anderledes end de foregående i relation til, hvor meget formandskabet kunne drive processen, og hvor meget der var lagt op til en ladedrevet proces, men der viste sig at være begrænsninger på, hvor meget processer under radaren kunne drive forhandlingerne. Formandskabet var nok lidt mere svagt og lagde op til en ladedrevet proces. Landene fra Cartagena-Dialogen tilbød at hjælpe formandsskabet med at finde kompromistekster og komme videre, men fik ikke

rigtig lov til at spille den samme rolle som på COP16 og COP17. Under COP16 og COP17 viste det sig som en af Cartagena-Dialogens styrker, at den netop er et uformelt forum, der arbejder under radaren og derfor ikke formelt kan blande sig eller blive kritiseret. Det viste sig imidlertid på COP18 at være en svaghed. Cartagena-Dialogen har altså brug for et samarbejdende formandskab. Til gengæld trådte de midtsøgende latinamerikanske lande frem som en formel forhandlingsgruppe, AILAC,¹⁷ med budskaber om, at de er villige til at påtage sig reduktionsforpligtelser og gå forrest i en transition til en grøn økonomi, i det omfang deres nationale forhold tillader det. Herudover lagde Peru billet ind på COP20-formandskabet.¹⁸ Dette svækkede G77 yderligere.

I løbet af 2012 blev det i en arbejdsgruppe fastlagt, at Durban Platformen indeholder to dele, som delegationerne på COP18 begyndte forhandlinger om **indholdet** af. For det første skal Durban Platformen indeholde en global aftale, der skal færdiggøres i 2015 og træde i kraft i 2020. For det andet skal den indeholde forhandlinger om klimaaktiviteter i den mellemliggende periode frem til 2020. I forhold til 2020-delen ville G77 først have Bali-køreplanen afsluttet under visse betingelser. Konkret ville de sikre, at indhold fra Konventionssporet, der især fokuserer på ilandenes forpligtelser, blev ført med over i Durban Platformen. Her spillede principperne om *fælles, men differentieret ansvar* og *retfærdighed* igen en stor rolle. COP18 viste igen, at disse principper og fortolkningen af dem udgør en væsentlig tvist mellem særligt USA, Canada og Japan på den ene side over for særligt de venstreradikale latinamerikanske lande samt Indien og Kina på den anden side. Og da Durban Platformen ikke nævner principperne, brugte visse ulande enhver given lejlighed til at inddrage disse principper i det videre arbejde. Dette var til stor irritation for mange midtsøgende lande, da det blev anset som forsøg på at afspore mere konkrete forhandlinger og fokus på effektive udledningsreduktioner. De midtsøgende lande lægger mere vægt på, at sådanne principper skal tolkes relativt til, hvordan verden ser ud i dag og i fremtiden og

ikke i 1990'erne. USA kan være med på den tolkning, men ser egentlig helst principperne afskaffet. Derfor var forhandlingerne om indhold forholdsvis ukonkrete, og landene med yderpositioner fik længe lov til at diskutere principper af et svagt formandskab. Det endte med, at man blev enige om at afslutte Konventionssporet, men diskussionerne blev blot flyttet over i enten Durban Platformen eller andre COP-grupper frem for at blive afsluttet. For eksempel i relation til reduktionsforpligtelser er sproget blevet udvandet, hvilket har ført til frygt for, at lukkede forhandlinger kan genåbnes og forringes (Boyle 2012, 4).

I forhold til perioden 2013-2020 var **indholdsdiskussionerne** mere af **processuel** karakter forstået på den måde, at de progressive lande ønskede en fast tidslinje og med konkrete reduktionseffekter som mål, så 2013 kunne blive et såkaldt arbejdsår og reduktionskløften frem mod 2020 kan mindskes. Yderpositionerne ville også her hellere diskutere principper, og det blev aldrig rigtig klart, hvad der skal ske, da Doha-teksten er vag angående 2013. Man enedes dog om, at COP21-forhandlingsteksten skal ligge klar inden COP21. Derudover annoncerede FN's generalsekretær, at han vil invitere statsledere til et topmøde i 2014. EU lovede, at klimafinansieringen ville fortsætte, også efter at den såkaldte opstartsfinansiering ophørte efter 2012, og vigtige medlemslande (Tyskland, England, Frankrig, Sverige og Danmark) forpligtede sig til i 2013 og de følgende år at levere finansieringen på et samlet set højere niveau end deres opstartsfinansiering (Morgan 2012). Kyotoprotokollens anden forpligtelsesperiode blev fastsat til at gå til 2020. Det var et tab for ulandene og NGO'erne, der mener, at en kortere periode ville være bedre, da man så ville have mulighed for at forhandle yderligere konkrete reduktionsmål for 2018-2020 på plads, hvorimod EU mener, at nogle år uden forpligtelser vil forringe overgangen til 2020-aftalen og skabe usikkerhed på markedet.

Opsummering: Bali-Køreplanen er afsluttet og Durban Platformen er på skinner

Bali-Køreplanen er officielt afsluttet og Durban Platformen som forhandlingsproces er gået i gang. Det betyder, at UNFCCC-processen nu arbejder imod en global juridisk aftale bindende for alle lande under Konventionen, samtidigt med at flere og flere midtsøgende lande finder sammen på tværs af Nord-Syd-skellet. Dog er der fortsat store tvister som nævnt mellem de store udledere fra både Nord og Syd. På **indhold**ssiden har vi set, at COP'erne de seneste år kan karakteriseres ved tre diskussioner, og at de skal ses i relation til hinanden: nemlig *fælles men differentierede ansvar* princippet, *retfærdigheds*princippet samt spørgsmålet om *reelle effekter* af reduktionstiltag. I forhold til **proces** har vi på den ene side set, at COP'erne har bevæget sig fra åbenlys minilateralisme (COP15) til i højere grad af brug af forhandlinger, der i hvert fald på overfladen involverer samtlige lande. På den anden side har vi set, at processer under radaren kan have stor betydning for fremdriften af forhandlingerne, hvis formandskabet samarbejder og gør brug af de muligheder, det giver.

COP 21: Mål i Paris

Ligesom i Tour de France kommer Paris til at udgøre målbyen. I denne sammenhæng målbyen for arbejdet med at finde en ny global klimaaftale. I modsætning til Tour de France, hvor resultatet typisk ligger fast inden den sidste etape, kan man i FN-forhandlingerne forvente, at man først kender resultatet efter en hidsig slutspurt i selve Paris. På den måde minder COP21 på mange måder om sidste gang, man skulle forhandle en klimaaftale på plads, nemlig COP15. Ligesom ved COP15 er formandskabet begrænset af at være et iland, og der er også mange af de samme problematikker, der gør sig gældende med både proces og indhold, herunder risikoen for et dramatisk massestyrt. Med hensyn til **proces** kommer det franske formandskab til at stå i dilemmaet

mellem at satse på en lantedrevet proces, at drive processen fremad gennem minilateralisme eller at lægge formandskabstekst på bordet. Det er værd at lægge mærke til, at Frankrig også er medlem af Cartagena-Dialogen, og at EU's lederskab er styrket gennem de seneste år. Angående **indhold**, er det i høj grad stadig spørgsmålene om effektivitet af udledningsreduktioner og differentiering af ansvar, der trænger sig på. Når det drejer sig om effektivitet, vil den globale indsats mod klimaforandringer i 2015 fortsat være utilstrækkelig i forhold til tograders-målet, jf. afsnittet om COP17 ovenfor. Angående differentiering af ansvar er det fortsat spørgsmålene om, hvilken juridisk form reduktionsforpligtelserne skal have, hvem der skal omfattes af dem, om der skal være forskellige typer af forpligtelser, og hvor meget de forskellige lande og grupper af lande skal reducere med.

Spørgsmålene er, om den skarpe differentiering mellem i- og ulande står for skud, og hvilke principper der kommer til at gælde for byrdefordelingen. Det står ret klart, at retfærdighedsprincippet bliver omdrejningspunkt for mange diskussioner, fordi det især er her, ulandene enten fi nder sammen i den store G77-gruppe (usandsynligt) eller fortsætter fragmenteringen i andre grupper (sandsynligt). Der er imidlertid flere ubekendte, der kan afgøre slutresultatet i Paris. Hvor de meget generelle ubekendte, som den økonomiske krise og forholdet mellem stormagterne, er vanskelige at forudse, er de specifikke forhold angående klimaforhandlingerne lettere at udtale sig om på baggrund af de sidste års udvikling. Det bliver interessant at se, om det opbrud og nye alliancedannelser, der har præget tiden efter COP15, fortsat gør sig gældende, herunder om G77 sprænges, og om Cartagena-landene formår at træde i karakter som en egentlig gruppering? På landeplan bliver det væsentligt, om Obama-administrationen formår at implementere sit reduktionsmål fra København og Cancún, og i hvilken grad lande som Kina og Indien implementerer ambitiøse nationale klimapolitikker med reelle reduktionseffekter.

Konklusion

På baggrund af forløbet siden COP15 er det muligt at drage en række konklusioner. For det første kan det konstateres, at målet med FN-klimaforhandlingerne er, at der skal indgås en global juridisk aftale bindende for alle lande under FN's klimakonvention på COP21 i Paris i 2015. *Samtidig har flere og flere midtsøgende lande fundet sammen på tværs af Nord-Syd-skellet, hvilket markerer et nybrud ift. tiden før og under COP15.* Dog er der fortsat store tvister vedrørende indholdet af en ny aftale. For det andet er både proces og indhold betydningsfulde, og hænger ofte tæt sammen. For det tredje indeholder spørgsmålet om **proces** et tilsyneladende dilemma mellem at overlade UNFCCC-processen til sig selv eller at forsøge at drive den fremad gennem møder i mindre grupper eller ved at fremlægge tekst, der mindsker antallet af mulige optioner. For det fjerde er der med hensyn til **indhold** forskellige fortolkninger af *fælles, men differentieret ansvar*. Hvilken fortolkning der i sidste ende dominerer, har stor påvirkning på spørgsmål som forpligtelsers juridiske karakter, hvor meget forskellige typer af lande skal reducere, og graden af verificering af sådanne forpligtelser, men også i forhold til spørgsmålet om retfærdighed. På indholdssiden har det også betydning, hvordan ønsket om en retfærdig aftale (der også indeholder en differentiering af ansvaret) forholder sig til ønsket om en effektiv aftale, der gør noget ved klimaforandringerne. Dette er et spørgsmål, der særligt har skilt vandene blandt ulandene, hvor nogle har prioriteret principper som retfærdighed og fælles men differentieret ansvar over effekt, særligt de venstreradikale latinamerikanske lande samt Indien og Kina. Omvendt har andre, særligt de mest udsatte lande og midtsøgende latinamerikanske lande, bedre kunnet leve med aftaler, der ikke levede op til deres forestillinger om (historisk) retfærdighed, men gjorde noget mere effektivt ved klimaforandringerne. Overordnet set er der også spørgsmålet om, hvor meget FN-forhandlingerne indtil videre har gjort noget ved

klimaforandringerne, og om de kan gøre noget ved dem på sigt, eller om andre
fora og tiltag reelt kommer til at gøre en større forskel.

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Noter

1. Forkortelsen står for Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Samtidig med COP'en holdes også Conference of the Parties serving as the Meeting of the Parties (CMP) to the Kyoto Protocol. Vi bruger konsekvent forkortelsen COP til at dække alle møder i relation til Klimakonventionen (UNFCCC).
2. Se fx de forskellige COP-referater fra International Institute of Sustainable Development mere dybdegående behandling af de forskellige forhandlingsemner.
3. Kyotoprotokollen blev vedtaget i Kyoto i 1997. Første forpligtelsesperiode løb fra 2008 til og med 2012. Se også www.unfccc.int.
4. Ilande bruges i denne artikel til at dække over Annex 1 lande, som omfatter de lande, der i 1992 var medlemmer af OECD samt lande i økonomisk transition (post-sovjetiske lande). Ulande og andre ikkeilande, de såkaldte Non-Annex 1 lande, omfatter resten af verden og i udgangspunktet udviklingslandene, men kan ikke uden videre reduceres til udviklingslande, da fx Mexico, Sydkorea og visse lande fra Centralasien og Kaukasus ikke anser sig selv for at være udviklingslande (se også UNFCCC 2013b og 2013c).
5. Det kaldes Konventionssporet, da Klimakonventionen samler alle landene.
6. Fremover benævner vi MRV som verificering, da dette punkt er det mest konfliktfyldte.
7. Denne forhandlingsgruppe har siden 1964 samlet udviklingslandene i FN-regi. Der er i dag mere end 130 medlemmer.
8. Retfærdighed kan ikke defineres entydigt, og princippet er i sig selv genstand for til tider ophedet debat. Konventionen (art. 3.1.) anvender fx princippet både i forhold til en retfærdig fordeling af reduktioner mellem lande baseret på deres historiske ansvar og baseret på deres (økonomiske) formåen. Det anvendes også i forhold til retfærdig handling i relation til fremtidige generationer.

9. COP'erne løber typisk over to ugers tid, hvor embedsmænd forbereder de politiske aftaler, som i løbet af den sidste uge af forhandlingerne skal vedtages på politisk niveau. COP15 adskilte sig fra andre COP'er ved at have politisk deltagelse på stats- og regeringschefsniveau frem for på klima- eller miljøministerniveau, som er normal praksis.

10. Sudan, Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela, Nicaragua og Tuvalu (IISD 2009)

11. Det er værd at bemærke, hvordan man på baggrund af skuffelsen på COP15 i politiske og akademiske kredse begyndte at diskutere, hvorledes mellemstatslige institutioner, bilaterale samarbejder samt sammenslutninger af byer kan supplere eller erstatte UNFCCC (Keohane & Victor 2011; Zelli 2011). Uden at gå i dybden med alternativer eller supplementer til UNFCCC kan vi påpege, at de i stigende grad også tegner global klimapolitik. Disse alternativer inkluderer G20, Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate Change (MEF), Verdensbanken, WTO, og C40 (sammenslutning af 40 storbyer). Bilateralt er det nogle gange muligt at finde løsninger, der ikke kan nås i UNFCCC-regi. I juni 2013 forpligtede præsidenterne Obama og Xi både USA og Kina til at arbejde for en udfasning af de meget potente HFC-drivhusgasser (Det Hvide Hus 2013). Et andet eksempel er, hvordan Danmark og Sydkorea som brobyggere mellem i- og ulande har formået at sætte grøn vækst på den internationale dagsorden gennem bl.a. OECD, Verdensbanken og UNEP samt egne organisationer, henholdsvis Global Green Growth Forum og Global Green Growth Institute. Formålet er at skabe internationale projekter gennem offentlig-private partnerskaber, der både reducerer udledninger og bidrager til økonomisk vækst, særligt i ulandene (Blaxekjær under udgivelse). Overordnet set handler ikke-UNFCCC tilgange ikke om at lave den store forkromede klimaafale, men om at ændre praksis gennem læreprocesser, engagement af væsentlige aktører og „bløde“ forpligtelser til handling, alt sammen tiltag der potentielt kan supplere og understøtte UNFCCC-processen snarere end nødvendigvis at udgøre et alternativ til den.

12. Cartagena Dialogen er ikke en officiel forhandlingsgruppe, men et forum hvor deltagere udveksler ideer, forståelser af positioner og forhandlingerne, men i lige så grad forsøger at formulere fælles fodslag i konkrete tekstforslag, som landene hver især kan lægge frem i forhandlingerne. Antallet af deltagere i Cartagena Dialogen varierer fra møde til møde. Der er ca. 30 kernelande, men med observatører og andre inviterede lande, kan der deltage mellem 40 og 50 lande. Kendetegnende er, at alle medlemslande ønsker reelle fremskridt i klimaforhandlingerne.

13. Brasilien, Sydafrika, Indien og Kina etablerede sig op til COP15 i alliancen BASIC.

14. Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines og Venezuela er i dag medlemmer af alliancen ALBA, som blev etableret i 2004 (ALBA 2013).

15. UNFCCC har ikke vedtaget regler for, hvorledes man træffer beslutninger, og der er derfor ikke nogen klar definition af, hvornår der er konsensus. På baggrund af praksis inden for UNFCCC er det ikke usædvanligt, at et enkelt lands indvendinger ikke er i stand til at blokere en vedtagelse (Legal Response Initiative 2011).

16. EU havde allerede vedtaget et reduktionsmål for 2020, der som EU-lovgivning var juridisk bindende i EU-regi, men ikke internationalt. Den hjemlige binding er dog juridisk set stærkest.

17. Association of Independent Latin American and Caribbean states. AILAC tæller Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Peru, Guatemala og Panama og støttet af den Dominikanske Republik.

18. Venezuela (fra ALBA) lagde også billet ind på CO P20. I juni 2013 blev Peru valgt som vært for COP20, og Venezuela som vært for præ-COP'en (UNFCCC 2013d).

Paper 2: Mapping the narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC

Lau Øfjord Blaxekjær^{a*}, Tobias Dan Nielsen^b

Abstract

Since 2009, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) regime has seen the emergence of several new political groups. This article analyses how the new political groups are positioning themselves in relation to the key UNFCCC principles (the North–South divide and ‘common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities’, CBDR/RC). Drawing on original data, including official statements and submissions, observations at COP 17, COP 18, COP 19, and interviews with delegates, the article analyses the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action (CD), the Durban Alliance (DA), the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), and the Association of Independent Latin American and Caribbean States (AILAC). Modelled after Hendrik Wagenaar’s approach to narrative policy analysis, the article draws a map of narrative positions based on the North–South and new CBDR/RC divisions. This framework reveals the embeddedness of narratives in practice as they unfold in the formation of new political groups. CVF, CD, DA and AILAC align on a narrative of ‘shared responsibility across the North–South divide’. This meta-narrative challenges the hitherto dominant notion of CBDR/RC, which BASIC and LMDC defend through a meta-narrative of ‘differentiated responsibility upholding the North–South divide’.

Policy relevance

As we approach the UNFCCC 2015 deadline, this article presents a study of the new political landscape for negotiations, specifically of six new political groups in relation to the core principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities’ (CBDR/RC). Prior to COP 15, groups primarily organized based on the categorization of their members as either an Annex I (developed country) or non-Annex I (developing country) Party. This created two opposing understandings of CBDR/RC, especially regarding who has the responsibility to act on climate change. This article finds that some of the new

political groups are challenging this North–South divide, contributing to a more complex relationship between Annex I and non-Annex I Parties on the CBDR/RC issue. This article provides practitioners and analysts with up-to-date knowledge on the developments of new political groups, which will necessarily form the basis of any policy analysis of the UNFCCC leading up to the 2015 deadline.

Keywords: governance; institutional framework; international negotiations; negotiating capacity/process; North–South; UNFCCC

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Mapping the narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC

1. Introduction¹

The particular division of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations in a North–South divide, also referred to as ‘the firewall’, can be seen as representing a narrative division of the world into those with a greater historical responsibility for and capability to combat global climate change (Annex I) and those with relatively less (or no) such responsibility and capability (non-Annex I) (cf. Yamin & Depledge, 2004, p. 24). Essentially, this narrative division is about who has the responsibility to act on climate change. It is manifested in the Convention’s core principle of common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities (CBDR/RC) (see UNFCCC Article 3).¹ CBDR/RC is one of the most defining principles of UNFCCC negotiations and is invoked in virtually all major decisions and instruments adopted in the UNFCCC, including the Kyoto Protocol (cf. Brunnée & Streck, 2013; Haldings, Jürisoo, Carson, & Atteridge, 2013). CBDR/RC has primarily assumed the form of a clear distinction between the commitments required of Annex I and non-Annex I Parties. However, developed and developing countries alike have increasingly been challenging this balance between commitments and the current model of differentiation.

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This is also reflected in the academic literature (cf. Klinsky & Dowlatabadi, 2009). This has led to a call for a reinterpretation of the CBDR/RC principle ‘in a more nuanced fashion if it is to operationalize equity and help guide the fashioning of commitments in a regime “applicable to all” under the UNFCCC’ (Winkler & Rajamani, 2014, p. 103). Several new political groups have formed in recent years, some challenging CBDR/RC, others seeking to maintain the status quo. Thus, our research question is: What are the narrative positions of the new political groups under the UNFCCC in relation to the main organizing principles of Annex I/non-Annex I and CBDR/RC?

1.1. Political groups and the UNFCCC negotiations

The failure at the 15th Conference of the Parties (COP 15) in 2009 to reach agreement on a comprehensive global climate change deal represents a significant setback in climate negotiations and has led parties to think of new ways to overcome the deadlock (Skovgaard & Blaxekjær, 2013). Since 2009, we have seen the emergence of several new political groups within the UNFCCC negotiations. The role of these new groups has not been comprehensively addressed in the negotiations literature. As this article demonstrates, however, they call for a revised understanding of the political landscape in the run-up to the new deadline for a global climate deal at COP 21 in 2015 (see also Herold, Cames, & Cook, 2011; Herold, Cames, Cook, & Emele, 2012; Herold, Cames, Siemons, Emele, & Cook, 2013; reports that reflect the increase in political groups, although they only include the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action (CD), the Like-Minded Developing Countries (LMDC), and the Association of Independent Latin American and Caribbean States (AILAC)). At COP 18, Nicholas Stern referred to ‘the brutal arithmetic of climate change’, meaning that even if the developed countries stopped all emissions, it would not be enough to keep the global temperature increase below 2°C (Harvey, 2012). This message, echoed by several intergovernmental

reports, emphasizes a sense of urgency by identifying the widening gap between national and international commitments and what must be done to reduce the risk of significant climate change (IPCC, 2014; UNEP, 2013). Some developed and developing countries have started working together and organized themselves into new political groups, attempting to facilitate progress through a sense of shared responsibility and urgency.

Prior to COP 15, the UNFCCC organizational landscape was relatively static in its North–South divide. Annex I groups included the European Union (EU), the Umbrella Group² and the Environmental Integrity Group³. These groups had many disagreements on issues such as binding targets, and Annex I was rather fragmented. The non-Annex I groups included the African Group (AG, the only active regional group), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of Our America (ALBA in Spanish)⁴, the Central American Integration System (SICA in Spanish)⁵, Central Asia, the Caucasus, Albania and Moldova Group (CACAM), the Coalition for Rainforest Nations (CfRN)⁶, the League of Arab States, sometimes known as the Arab Group (LAS), the Least Developed Countries (LDCs), the Group of 77 and China (G77), the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)⁷, and the Small Island Developing States (SIDS). For an in-depth discussion of these groups, see Yamin and Depledge (2004, pp. 32–48).

This article identifies seven new political groups established since 2009: the BASIC group, the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), CD, the Durban Alliance (DA), the Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries (MLDC), LMDC, and AILAC. See Table 1 for an overview of the old and new political groups. We apply a narrative policy analysis framework to analyse each new political group, with which we then demonstrate how the groups adhere to either a bridge-building narrative on CBDR/RC focused on shared responsibility across the North–South divide or a narrative on CBDR/RC as differentiated responsibility upholding the North–South divide.⁸ Following this introduction,

Section 2 presents our theoretical approach, model of analysis, applied methods, and data. Section 3 analyses six new political groups and their individual narratives, mapping the groups according to their identified narrative positions. Section 4 discusses the implications of these new political groups and their narratives in relation to CBDR/RC and the coming climate negotiations deadline in Paris 2015. Section 5 concludes.

Table 1: List of old and new political groups under the UNFCCC according to categorization.

	Annex I Party Group	Non-Annex I Party group	Both Annex I and Non-annex I Party group
Old groups	EIT EU Umbrella	AG AOSIS ALBA SICA CACAM CfRN LAS LDC G77 and China OPEC SIDS	EIG
New groups		BASIC (2009) CVF (2009) MLDC (2012) LMDC (2012) AILAC (2012)	CD (2010) DA (2011)

* Parentheses indicate year of first appearance

2. Theoretical approach

2.1. Narrative policy analysis and narrative positions

A narrative framework is applied to understand how the narrative positions of new political groups have manifested themselves in a new political landscape of UNFCCC negotiations. The article draws on Wagenaar's (2011) narrative approach to identify the main narratives of the political groups in order to map their narrative positions in the negotiations landscape. The basic assumption here is that language, through, e.g. frames or narratives, profoundly shapes our view of the world and reality instead of merely being a neutral medium mirroring it (cf. Fischer & Forester, 1993; Wagenaar, 2011). Hence, meaning is not given by a phenomenon in itself; instead, it is established through intersubjective, linguistic practices, such as narratives. Climate change does not imminently produce (or call for) certain patterns of social change. Instead, actors' interpretations of climate change problems and proposed solutions – in our case, in UNFCCC negotiations – are the outcome of political deliberations on climate change and are being shaped by linguistic dynamics (cf. Demeritt, 2001; Nielsen, 2014; Pettenger, 2007).


We define narratives as means by which actors make sense of the world, a 'mode of knowing', 'providing distinctive ways of ordering experience, of constructing reality', such as an organization's origin and identity (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 209). This way of ordering is further understood in a simple but recognized template given by Aristotle, where the narrative brings 'unity of action ... from the linear sequence that runs from a beginning, in which the protagonist of the story is faced with a challenge or puzzle, via a middle section in which the events develop, to a final section in which the initial challenge is met or puzzle solved' (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 210). Narratives also serve a 'larger purpose of allowing humans to affirm and reaffirm identities' (Cobley, 2001, p. 222), which is why it is relevant to apply a narrative analysis to new political

groups, because narratives then allow us to understand the arguments (strategic rhetoric) of these political groups and examine how these arguments are also expressed and reaffirmed in narrative form as identity through the very organization of the political group, thus also reinforcing an identity-based imperative for certain action. This leads to the development of the concept of narrative position, which allows us to combine argumentative and organizational practices in the same analysis of a political landscape. Following Wagenaar (2011, p. 218), we focus on ‘the work that stories do in a particular political or administrative context’ in order to ‘bring out the story’s impact on policy making’. Thus, narratives also imply the taking of certain actions (Wagenaar, 2011, p. 215) or, we might add, narratives imply a certain action space. The emergence of new narratives shapes new understandings of what the goals of the UNFCCC negotiations ought to be and ways of reaching them. By mapping the narrative positions of the new political groups, we can draw out some fundamental aspects of the new negotiation dynamics under the UNFCCC.

2.2. Model of analysis, methods, and data

This article analyses the specific narratives of new political groups in relation to the North–South divide and CBDR/RC based on the premise that these are the defining principles for much of the negotiations. The analysis presents the protagonists (each new group) of the narratives, what they see as the problem(s), and how they suggest reaching a solution. We then draw a map of the groups’ narrative positions based on the two dimensions of North–South and CBDR/RC (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. Narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC.



New political groups were identified through own observations at COP 17, COP 18, and COP 19; party submissions, statements, and press releases; UNFCCC webpages about groups (2014a, 2014b) and UNFCCC COP reports since COP 15 (UNFCCC, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014c). The narratives are identified through qualitative content analysis (Bryman, 2001, p. 180) and triangulation of sources. Narratives can be found in a range of different sources and, because it has not been practically possible to secure the same type of sources for all groups, we have worked to secure first-hand sources from every group that also relates to CBDR/RC. Our primary first-hand sources are party or political group statements, submissions, and press releases, and our primary secondhand sources include several Earth Negotiations Bulletins and other observers’

descriptions. In addition, to secure enough data on the CD, 15 semi-structured interviews were conducted and analysed. If otherwise not mentioned, the analysis is based on the sources listed in the online Appendix. The aim here is to present a broad view of the new political groups involved in the 2015 negotiations. We are not aware of other academic work providing such an overview. Consequently, the article does not go into great detail with each group, instead analysing six of seven new political groups in order to provide a more comprehensive view of the organizational context and narratives as well as making a stronger (representational) empirical contribution to the field of UNFCCC research.

3. Narratives and narrative positions of new political groups under the UNFCCC

3.1. Political group narratives: identities, problems, and solutions

The analysis of the six new political groups under the UNFCCC from 2009 to 2013 presents the main narrative of each group, including a brief background of group formation and identity, what they see as the problem(s), and how they suggest reaching a solution. Each group is then plotted on a map according to narrative position in relation to the two main UNFCCC principles (see Figure 1). Groups are analysed chronologically. We then discuss new possible policy scenarios.

3.1.1. BASIC

“The 2015 agreement must therefore adhere to the principles, provisions and structure of the Convention, in particular the provisions of Articles 4 and 12, which reflect the common but differentiated responsibilities of developed and developing countries.” (BASIC ADP 2–5 statement 2014).

In anticipation of difficult COP 15 negotiations, the BASIC group met in Beijing on 26–28 November 2009 and agreed to work together as a group in climate negotiations (Dasgupta, 2009).⁹ During COP 15, the BASIC group is credited for brokering the Copenhagen Accord together with the US, but only after the initial plan for a global deal had failed, something for which some blame the BASIC group (Christoff, 2010; Haldings et al., 2013). BASIC is also blamed by some developing countries for going it alone (Observations, COP 17, COP 18, COP 19). In addition to the numerous meetings and strategizing during UNFCCC negotiations, the BASIC group holds regular meetings at the level of environment ministers. In the BASIC narrative, the group presents itself as an integral part of G77 and often concurs with their statements. The group also identifies itself as speaking on behalf of developing countries at large (partly to avoid being criticized in G77).

The problem that BASIC is promoting is that the global North (Annex I countries) has been the main contributor to the current GHG emissions levels and has not lived up to its responsibility and capability. According to the BASIC narrative, the increasing risk of climate change is thus caused by a lack of action from developed countries, which continue to side-step their UNFCCC commitments. The solution is that Annex I countries should continue to assume a heavier burden in efforts to better combat climate change issues. Developed countries must also increase their commitments in the 2015 agreement. Moreover, the key solution in this narrative includes ‘equitable’ access to sustainable development and technology. An important part of the narrative is the continuation of a strong ‘South–South’ relation in the negotiations – to maintain a unified negotiation block amongst non-Annex I Parties. Any talks about developing countries taking on more climate actions or the re-negotiation of the principles of the Convention are heavily criticized. In the context of the 2015 deadline for a new global climate deal, it is questionable whether the BASIC group is likely to play a central role (as it did at COP 15), as it has

become less vocal and united as a group since at least COP 17, where it seemed that South Africa and Brazil were softer than India and China on CBDR/RC (Hochstetler, 2012; Hochstetler & Milkoreit, 2014). However, BASIC still meets, coordinates, and issues statements, and is still part of the political landscape.

3.1.2. CVF

“As leaders of nations highly vulnerable to [climate change], we have a special responsibility to tackle this historic challenge.” (CVF, 2013a).

Initiated by the Maldives and since joined by 19 other countries, the CVF was formed prior to COP 15 and was presented there.¹⁰ Active in the subsequent COPs in connection with the flagship reports *Climate Vulnerable Monitor*, published in 2010 and 2012, and at COP 19 in connection with the presentation of the Costa Rica Action Plan for 2013–2015 (CVF, 2013a), CVF focuses on side-events and advocacy (also outside the UNFCCC) instead of participating in UNFCCC negotiations directly.¹¹ The CVF’s own narrative presents itself as a group of 20 highly vulnerable developing countries already experiencing the negative effects of climate change. In line with other developing groups, a very prominent problem in the CVF narrative is the slow progress in UNFCCC negotiations and the resulting ambition gap. Global inaction is strongly associated with the CVF countries’ existence, and the CVF is ‘reminding developed countries of their historical responsibilities’ (DARA, 2013).

Unlike the hitherto dominant developing-country narrative, however, the solution in the CVF narrative is to be based on ‘moral leadership’ from other countries as well, and the CVF narrative also reminds emerging economies such as China and India of their moral obligation to also take action. The CVF then underpins this call with its own commitments to a low-carbon

development path (CVF, 2009, 2011; DARA, 2013; Observations, COP 17, COP 18). Action is clearly understood in relation to ‘the brutal arithmetic of climate change’ (cf. Stern, above), recognizing that especially the industrialized countries have a historical responsibility to act and assist the developing world but that all states must act nonetheless. ‘Let’s all aim for a truly equitable and successful outcome here at the COP’ (CVF& DARA, 2012). In the CVF narrative, the interpretation of – and required action in relation to – equity and CBDR is thus dynamic and forward-looking. Problem and solution call ‘for the most extensive and inclusive cooperation by all countries, on the basis of equity and in accordance with common but differentiated responsibilities, historical responsibility, and respective capabilities and socio-economic conditions as laid down in the UNFCCC’ (CVF, 2011, p. 1). The CVF warrants action with a positive climate change narrative; the CVF (and others) should ‘seize this challenge of climate change as an opportunity ... to help lead the world into a new era of prosperity’ (CVF, 2011, p. 2). And ‘we are improving our competitiveness and believe action on climate change can be configured to boost socio-economic development’ (CVF, 2013b). This draws on narratives (of opportunities) found outside the UNFCCC negotiations in especially the green growth communities (Blaxekjaer, forthcoming). Equity and CBDR are understood and presented by CVF with emphasis on shared responsibility. The CVF narrative is clear on the need for all to act and the road ahead, that action must be taken before 2020, and that COP 21 in 2015 is of pivotal importance, thus making the new Costa Rica Action Plan for 2013–2015 a central part of these efforts (CVF, 2013b). The CVF narrative is very much about action based on shared responsibility.

3.1.3. CD

“The Cartagena Dialogue is a forum for developed and developing countries to have frank discussions to better understand others’ positions and find areas of possible middle-ground. The Dialogue contributes to progressing the UNFCCC negotiations, especially negotiation on a new global climate change agreement by 2015.” (Anonymous interview with CD participant since COP 15, February 2014).

According to the CD narrative, ‘after the breakdown of COP15’, delegates from EU, AOSIS, LDCs, and Latin America met¹² ‘to discuss what went wrong and how to prevent it from happening again’. This group of countries ‘felt a common need to sit together and discuss these matters in a more honest manner and decided to meet again’. The founding meeting was held in March 2010 in Cartagena, Colombia; hence the name, the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action, which is also meant to summarize the group’s narrative: they met in a developing country in order to engage in dialogue, implying at least two groups (viewed as North–South or as representatives from the EU, Umbrella Group, LDC, and AOSIS), and the participants are progressive and share the view that all must take action. The participants vary from meeting to meeting, and as of writing there are 42 regular participants.¹³ The participants are very explicit, both internally and externally, about the identity of CD: ‘It is a dialogue, not a formal political negotiation group.’¹⁴ The explanation is that many developing countries apparently find it difficult to be associated too closely with developed countries in negotiations due to formal group memberships and a sense of loyalty to G77 (Yamin & Depledge, 2004, p. 36). However, the CD has been credited for getting the negotiations back on track at COP 16 and COP 17 and contributing substantially to the Cancun Agreement and Durban Platform texts (Araya, 2011; Casey-Lefkowitz, 2010; Herold et al., 2011, 2012, 2013; Lynas,

2011), which is also part of the self-understanding of the participants (Commonwealth of Australia, 2011, p. 90). Despite not being a formal group, the CD narrative places the act of bridging the North–South divide through dialogue and trust as a central part of the CD identity.

The CD narrative identifies the problem to be the general division between the negotiation groups from developed and developing countries and the general lack of trust. The solution, ‘an ambitious, comprehensive and legally-binding regime in the UNFCCC’ (Lynas, 2011), is to be reached by working together ‘to clear misunderstandings’, ‘to restore trust between countries and in the UNFCCC after the chaos of COP15’, and to be a ‘below-the-radar facilitator of knowledge that performs important functions in negotiations’, thereby trying ‘to find common ground on all issues’. Like the CVF narrative, the CD narrative also draws on the general green growth narrative of opportunities that lie in the action of leading the way to be ‘committed domestically to becoming or remaining low-carbon economies’. The CD narrative is supported by its organizational practice, which does not merely argue for shared responsibility but also illustrates that it is possible in practice. And as some delegates have noted, the CD North–South bridge contributed to the formation of the LMDC (Observations, COP 19).

3.1.4. DA

“What we need is to effectively stop climate change. And that can only happen if all parties to the UNFCCC process will be committed to concrete efforts.” (EU, LDC, & AOSIS, 2011).

The DA came to light during COP 17 in 2011 in Durban, South Africa. This alliance grew out of the trust established through the CD. Its members consist of the EU, and the AOSIS and LDC political groups. In addition to CD, it also

includes the COP 17 host nation South Africa. The DA is argued to have had significant influence on the Durban outcome (Death, 2012) and was able to place more ‘official’ pressure on the BASIC group and the US than the CD or CVF. DA played a limited role at the following COP 18 (interview with Martin Lidegaard, Minister for Climate, Energy and Building, Denmark, 12 June 2013), however, and our observation is that DA has not been vocal since. The DA narrative presents the group as an example of North and South coming together to address the urgency of climate change by strengthening the outcome of the UNFCCC negotiations and not the particular interest of either the North or South.

The problem in the DA narrative is the negative effects of the CBDR/RC principle and the resulting stalemate amongst Annex I and non-Annex I Parties and the resulting lack of progress at the UNFCCC negotiations. The solution calls for North and South to stand together and demand action from all parties. The DA objective is to work as a bridge towards brokering agreements with other developing countries, in particular emerging economies. As such, CBDR/RC remains an important principle, but the emphasis is on shared as opposed to differentiated responsibilities. Hence, this narrative focuses on the increasing urgency of climate change action and overcoming North–South differences.

3.1.5. LMDC

“[N]egotiations shall be ‘under the Convention’ and must be guided by and consistent with the principles and provisions of the Convention, especially the principles of equity and common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. These principles of the Convention, and the provisions that reflect these principles, are at the foundation of the work of the ADP.” (LMDC, 2013).

In 2012, a group of ‘like-minded developing countries’ held its first official meeting on 18–19 October, hosted by China (IISD, 2012a). This was in the aftermath of the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action in which all of the parties recognized the need to draw up the blueprint for a universal, legal agreement to deal with climate change beyond 2020. A key element in the LMDC narrative in relation to LMDC identity is that universality is not the same as uniformity and that CBDR/RC should remain, as it is also a key pillar for the Convention. The LMDC membership consists of an intrinsic part of G77, but the parties behind the group’s statements and submissions are not completely fixed.¹⁵ The LMDC is a very vocal group with an increasing number of submissions and statements. Similar to BASIC, it promotes itself as unifying and strengthening the position of developing countries in the UNFCCC. It presents itself as being closely aligned with G77 but appears to use a more direct approach in its criticism of the lack of action undertaken by developed countries. It should be noticed that Brazil and South Africa have not joined LMDC.

The problem and solution in the LMDC narrative also resemble the BASIC narrative following an interpretation of equity and CBDR/RC; the global North is the problem – both in terms of historic responsibility and lack of action – and should do more to realize a solution. This is often expressed through criticism of ‘inadequate’ or ‘extremely disappointing’ efforts to reduce GHGs. Hence, the LMDC narrative emphasizes that rather than the contents of the Convention’s provisions, it is the lack of implementation by developed countries that is the problem. According to the LMDC narrative, the solution, ‘achieving the combined goals of environmental sustainability, social and economic development and equity’, will only be reached if certain actions are taken. These include (in no particular order) the ADP negotiations being under the Convention and following the CBDR/RC and equity principles as well as developed countries increasing their ambitions to reduce emissions and

facilitating technology transfer, capacity building, and funding to developing countries.

3.1.6. AILAC

“AILAC’s spirit in these negotiations is to build bridges within the variety of realities, capacities and responsibilities among different groups of countries. We have the willingness to act and remain at your disposal for ideas, available to enhance our ambition and to lead with example.” (AILAC, 2013a).

At the Bonn climate summit in 2012, AILAC (2013b)¹⁶ officially declared itself as representing a negotiation group of progressive countries within the G77 (IISD, 2012c). AILAC usually aligns with general G77 statements in UNFCCC negotiations. However, the AILAC narrative follows the CD and CVF positions when it comes to North–South bridge-building and a reinterpretation of CBDR/RC. AILAC can be seen as a ‘revolt of the middle’ consisting of neither the poorest nor the richest developing countries (Roberts & Edwards, 2012). The AILAC narrative identifies a key problem to be the graveness and proximity of severe climate change and the impact this has on developing countries in particular. AILAC presents the principle of CBDR/RC as relevant (especially in terms of equity), but in its current form it has unfortunately led to a stalemate between developed and developing countries, which in turn has contributed to the lack of progress in negotiations (IISD, 2013). They want action to happen faster.

The solution to the problem is for developing countries not to hide behind CBDR/RC but instead to assume responsibility both at home and abroad to demonstrate leadership on climate change and stimulate negotiations. AILAC thus proposes reinterpreting the meaning of the principles of the Convention as

well as connecting the UNFCCC negotiations of the 2015 agreement with the domestic action countries (developed and developing countries alike) are already taking. ‘Even though developing countries did not make a major contribution to the emissions of greenhouse gasses and global warming, they can make a substantial contribution to recovering the balance of the world’ (Gabriel Quijandria, Vice Minister of the Environment, Peru, COP 18 Statements at the High-level Segment, 6 December 2012). Thus, the narrative solution entails a more dynamic understanding of CBDR/RC in which CBDR/RC represents a tool for global action (according to one’s capabilities) and not an excuse for inaction (IISD, 2013). Hence, CBDR/RC should allow countries to become more ambitious when their circumstances evolve. The AILAC narrative promotes an understanding of the climate change challenge as a ‘shared responsibility’ and a future climate regime based on commitments from all parties (IISD, 2013).

3.2. Political groups’ narrative positions

As presented in the analysis above, certain perceptions and narratives of problems and solutions are overlapping. In the pre-COP 15 period, narrative positions were generally divided along the so-called North–South divide (Gupta, 2000), where the South (i.e. G77), stood united (at least officially) in the claim that the North should lead on climate action. From the above analysis, it is possible to map the six political groups according to the two main principles of UNFCCC negotiations: how the groups identify in relation to Annex I/non-Annex I, and how the groups also argue for action with reference to this identity (of self and others) in relation to CBDR/RC. Our narrative analysis brings together questions of a group’s identity and understandings of problems and solutions. From this analysis, the groups’ narrative positions emerge, which suggest that CBDR/RC is no longer – as the only option – interpreted aligning with a fixed Annex I/non-Annex I division (as was the case

with the Kyoto Protocol, cf. introduction); instead, the two organizing principles now cross each other and create new possibilities for political action.

In Figure 1, CD and DA are placed between Annex I/non-Annex I, illustrating their mixed membership. All other groups are placed towards the non-Annex I area. However, we find that CD, DA, AILAC, and CVF are all placed towards the area of shared (North–South) action in relation to CBDR/RC, which represents a challenge to that which has thus far been the dominant political landscape or action space, particularly as CD and DA also organize accordingly. BASIC and LMDC take up a narrative position towards the area where non-Annex I membership aligns with differentiated action. This meta-narrative states that all negotiations shall be under the existing UNFCCC principles on CBDR/RC and equity, and developed countries must take the lead and raise their ambitions, at a minimum implementing that to which they have agreed. Developing countries are the victim of developed countries' historic emissions. Their responsibility is to pull their people out of poverty and must therefore receive financial and technical support for their differentiated responsibility.

4. Implications of a new political landscape

The analysis has touched upon a general theme relevant for further discussion: the question of implications following the emergence of a more complex political landscape leading up to the 2015 agreement. With seven new political groups (and some old groups, like the League of Arab States, becoming more vocal, UNFCCC, 2013, 2014a), the UNFCCC regime is clearly becoming more complex and fragmented organizationally. The growing number of political groups leads to more actors and voices in the negotiations, and political groups can also become more specialized and may be formed on specific issues such as REDD +17 or loss and damage. Alternatively, political groups will only come

together briefly in relation to specific points of time in the negotiations, as was the case with DA at COP 17.

The trend of increasing complexity and fragmentation mirrors the overarching trend in the fragmentation of global environmental governance (Zelli & van Asselt, 2013). Conversely, our analysis also shows that the narrative positions of the new political groups are aligned to the extent where they really only represent two meta-narratives: bridge-building or upholding the North–South divide, which illustrates a less complex map or scenario. Looking ahead to the Paris (COP 21) 2015 deadline, this article shows that we find ourselves in a different situation than was the case in Copenhagen (COP 15). The failure of COP 15 was partly explained by a significant gap between developed and developing countries. As we have indicated, this gap is no longer as clearcut and facilitates a more promising outcome in Paris, with the possibility for increased cooperation across the North–South divide. However, it may also complicate things further. Negotiators are now facing a mosaic of political groups with different agendas and fluid memberships. Getting all parties on board might add to the complexity of UNFCCC negotiations. Finding ways to accommodate new narratives will be key to success in Paris.

5. Conclusion and broader implications

This article has analysed an organizational and narrative shift in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations since 2009. Seven new political groups have emerged: the BASIC group (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), the Climate Vulnerable Forum, the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action, the Durban Alliance, the Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries, the Like-Minded Developing Countries, and the Association of Latin American and Caribbean States. All but the MLDC were analysed. In addition to the organizing principle of Annex I/non-Annex I, also referred to as the North–South divide, UNFCCC negotiation

positions are now also organized according to a narrative dimension of ‘bridge-building’ or ‘upholding the North–South divide’ in relation to the common but differentiated responsibility and respective capabilities (CBDR/RC) principle. The article identified the narratives and narrative positions of the new political groups and then plotted all of the groups on a new narrative-organizational map, where the CVF, CD, DA, and AILAC narrative positions align through a similar understandings of problems and solutions, the latter with a focus on ‘shared responsibility across the North–South divide’. The BASIC and LMDC narrative positions align through similar understandings of problems and solutions, the latter focusing on ‘differentiated responsibility upholding the North–South divide’. This leads to some broader implications.

The conceptual implication is that practices and narratives shape how we respond to climate change, which can be set up against mainstream analyses of climate negotiations based on (fixed) interests and power. This article demonstrates that negotiations and responses to the changing circumstances for negotiations are not given from the beginning; they evolve through shared practices, as in the new political groups. One of these shared practices is the distinct manner in which groups ‘narrativize’ their roles and positions in negotiations as well as problems and solutions. Thus, we must re-evaluate our analyses of negotiations, interests, and positions in light of changing narratives based on shared practices and how narratives shape the potential action space for negotiations.

Narrative policy analysis brings forward key aspects for understanding certain aspects of the UNFCCC negotiations. It is suggested that future analyses of UNFCCC negotiations pay greater attention to this new organizational narrative landscape and the increasing fragmentation amongst developing countries, especially with respect to understanding CBDR/RC. The article has also demonstrated how a narrative approach can be used to understand recent organizational changes in the UNFCCC negotiations and

suggests further research to be carried out on the narratives of these new political groups with respect to other climate governance issues, including equity or loss-and-damage, and how they act upon them.

Notes

1. The principle of common but differentiated responsibility is one of the Convention's defining principles (Article 3). The full wording is as follows: 'The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof.'
2. Usually consisting of Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, the Russian Federation, Ukraine, and the US.
3. Mexico, South Korea, and Switzerland (www.unfccc.org).
4. Established in 2004, ALBA consists of Antigua and Barbuda, Bolivia, Cuba, Dominica, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Venezuela (ALBA, 2013).
5. Belize, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Nicaragua, Panama, and Dominican Republic (www.sica.int).
6. Formed in 2005 and covering more than 50 rainforest countries working together on a voluntary basis, not just within the UNFCCC (see also www.rainforestcoalition.org).
7. The draft rules of procedure refer to the procedural rules under the Convention and the status of 'draft', as a final agreement on the rules has never been reached (Yamin & Depledge, 2004, p. 432).
8. Due to insufficient data, we do not analyse the Mountainous Landlocked Developing Countries (MLDC), consisting of Afghanistan, Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. However, it seems as though MLDC is mainly focused on the issue of adaptation (see supplemental data). When MLDC does mention CBDR/RC, the narrative appears to follow BASIC and LMDC (cf. analysis).

9. The precursor to BASIC might have been the BASIC-Project, an EU-supported project from 2004 to 2007 aimed at enhancing and strengthening institutional capacity on climate change for Brazil, China, India, and South Africa (www.basic-project.net).
10. Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Barbados, Bhutan, Costa Rica, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Kiribati, Madagascar, Maldives, Nepal, Philippines, Rwanda, Saint Lucia, Tanzania, Timor-Leste, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Vietnam (founding countries in bold; DARA, 2013).
11. The only negotiation statement found was from the COP 18 President's stocktaking plenary, 3 December 2012, when 'Bangladesh, for the CVF, identified finance, technology and capacity building as critical for the 2013-2020 period' (IISD, 2012b).
12. Sources are unclear on which countries actually came together at COP 15.
13. Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Burundi, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, EU, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Maldives, Marshall Islands, México, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway Panama, Peru, Rwanda, Samoa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, and the UK.
14. However, for analytical reasons we categorize the CD as a political group.
15. The participation of countries is fluid, but the following countries usually take part: Algeria, Argentina, Bolivia, Cuba, China, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Dominica, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, India, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Malaysia, Mali, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Philippines, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Syria, and Venezuela (cf. LMDC 2014).
16. Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, Peru, Guatemala, and Panama (AILAC, 2013b). AILAC is also supported by the Dominican Republic (IISD, 2013).

17.Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation, as well as conserving and enhancing forest carbon stocks, and sustainably managing forests.

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Appendix [online only]

Table 2. List of primary sources for seven new political groups under the UNFCCC.

Group	First-hand primary sources	Second-hand primary sources
BASIC	BASIC 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2010d, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2011d, 2012a, 2012b, 2012c, 2012d, 2012e, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f, 2014a, 2014b, and 2014c.	Earth Negotiation Bulletin, vol. 12, numbers: 567, 568, 570, 571, 584, and 585; Dasgupta 2009.
CD	Maldives 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, and 2010d; 15 interviews were conducted from November 2012 to February 2014. Interviews span all regional representation in CD, five from developing countries and ten from developed countries, covering government officials, diplomats, and ministers.	Earth Negotiation Bulletin, vol. 12, number 487, 535, and 584.
CVF	CVF 2009, 2011, 2013a, and 2013b; CVF and DARA 2012; DARA 2013; McKinnon 2011.	CDKN 2011a and 2011b.
DA	EU, LDC and AOSIS 2011; Interview with Martin Lidegaard, Minister for Climate, Energy and Building, Denmark, 12 June 2013.	
MLDC	MLDC 2012, 2013a, and 2013b.	
LMDC	LMDC 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f, 2013g, 2013h, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, 2014e, 2014f.	Earth Negotiation Bulletin, vol. 12, numbers: 549, 563, 567, 568, 570, 571, 578, 584, 590, and 594; TWN 2012.
AILAC	AILAC 2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d, 2013e, 2013f, 2014a, 2014b, 2014c, 2014d, and 2014e.	Earth Negotiation Bulletin, vol. 12, numbers: 563, 566, 567, 568, 570, 571, 578, 584, 586, 590, 592, and 594.

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Paper 3: Diplomatic Learning and Trust: How the Cartagena Dialogue brought UN Climate Negotiations Back on Track

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Abstract

How did the UN climate negotiations get back on track and advance after the COP15 breakdown in December 2009? The Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action, a new type of political group under the UNFCCC, is acknowledged by many observers as instrumental in this change, but has received little academic recognition. One, it operates under the radar, and two, the negotiations literature tends to focus on theoretical, principal, and/or future scenarios, and thus risks overlooking informal governance practices and innovations. Based on own observations at COP17, COP18 and COP19 (2011-2013), interviews with 15 Cartagena participants, and available official sources, the paper analyses Cartagena from an international practices approach combining macro- and micro-sociological insights. The paper finds that Cartagena has been instrumental by building trust and creating a learning space across the North–South divide through a range of practices and that this has led to real compromises moving formal negotiations forward.

Keywords: Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action, community of practice, North–South, climate negotiations, UNFCCC

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Diplomatic Learning and Trust: How the Cartagena Dialogue brought UN Climate Negotiations Back on Track

Introduction: UN Climate Negotiations from Breakdown to Revival

How did global negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) get back on track and even advance after the breakdown at the 15th Conference of the Parties in December 2009, Copenhagen, Denmark (COP15)? This research question is yet to be asked, although there are at least three good reasons to do so. Firstly, UNFCCC negotiations have always fluctuated between success and failure, but COP15 was an all-time low threatening to end UNFCCC climate negotiations. Other fluctuations include how specific negotiation issues appear, disappear, reappear, and change; how Parties change their preferences; and how Parties organize themselves in political groups and informal alliances. Secondly, these empirical observations challenge mainstream approaches and call for academic analyses of negotiations to be both theoretically informed and empirically rich. Thirdly, the new political groups and alliances are relevant and timely to analyze both as governance innovations and as new actors, because negotiations are fast approaching the next deadline in 2015 at COP21 in Paris for a globally binding agreement. This paper focuses on the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action, since it crosses the North-South divide and has been accredited for being instrumental for getting negotiations back on track at COP16 and COP17.

COP15, or “Hopenhagen” turned into “Brokenhagen” left participants and observers disillusioned.²¹

“The current situation in the UN multilateral process is worse than before Copenhagen. Failure to adopt the lightest possible nonbinding declaration underscores the bleak prospects of the consensus-based UN process for

²¹ see e.g. IISD 2009.

responding to climate change. (...) Whereas previously we held out hope that omnipotent heads of state could resolve outstanding political differences in one fell swoop, we have now lost even that hope. If the highest-level leaders cannot settle differences, who can?”²²

Leading up to COP16 in Cancun, Mexico, “key players [said] a further breakdown in fresh discussions this fortnight could spell the end of the UN multilateral negotiating process”²³ leading to climate unilateralism in fora like G8, G20 or G2 (USA and China).²⁴ But, COP16 adopted the Cancun Agreements and re-established some trust and legitimacy in the UNFCCC; COP17 in Durban, South Africa, decided on a second commitment period for the Kyoto Protocol and delivered a text known as the Durban Platform, a new process to negotiate a globally binding agreement in 2015 at COP21 in Paris, France. COP18 in Doha, Qatar, managed to finish the old negotiations from COP13 (the Bali Action Plan) and set a more detailed timetable for the Durban Platform.²⁵ As well as decide upon a second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol.

The climate negotiations literature generally falls within rationalist, constructivist, and descriptive approaches.²⁶ The first two are often theoretical. The latter is often policy-oriented. However, much of the literature is done from a distance.

“Much published work offers recycled information that can be derived without negotiations actually having been observed. (...) The dynamics around the negotiation table often remain hidden. What is the verbal

²² Dimitrov 2010, 22.

²³ Willis 2010.

²⁴ Casey-Lefkoeitz 2010.

²⁵ Christoff and Eckersley 2013, 118. See also UNFCCC 2014a and 2014b for an official account.

²⁶ Dimitrov 2013, 340.

exchange? What are the offers and responses made during informal consultations? Relevant literature tends to avoid these questions and gravitate toward related topics such as theorizing about the creation of institutions and their impact on state behaviour.”²⁷

Likewise, a recent call for a change in theorizing diplomacy in International Relations argues that personal relationships in negotiations can increase cooperation, because “[f]ace-to-face meetings allow individuals to transmit information and empathize with each other, thereby reducing uncertainty, even when they have strong incentives to distrust the other.”²⁸ Like other scholars I argue for a reorientation of academic analyses to be both theoretically informed and empirically strong, and thus to pay closer attention to the diplomats and governance practices.²⁹ Looking elsewhere than the aggregate unitary state or the high-level political leaders, one suggestion is a stronger focus on “international bureaucracies as drivers of incremental yet significant changes to the UN’s performance in environmental governance.”³⁰

I argue for inclusion of the different national delegations as part of the international (UNFCCC) bureaucracy or the “process-community”, because these diplomats spend most of their time working on climate negotiations together and internationally and are the ones developing the processes and the regime.³¹ Cartagena as community seems to be instrumental and able to create changes in processes leading to success, however, Cartagena rarely appears in the academic literature.³² Cartagena was established in March 2010 and is today “a collection of around 40 countries working towards an ambitious legally binding agreement under the UNFCCC, and who are committed to becoming or

²⁷ Dimitrov 2013, 346-347.

²⁸ Holmes 2013, 829.

²⁹ See also Eckersley 2012; Audet 2013; Bauer 2013, 332; Dimitrov 2013, 346.

³⁰ Bauer 2013, 329.

³¹ Sjöstedt 2003, cited in Depledge 2006, 11; Depledge and Yamin 2009, 439.

³² Araya 2011; Casey-Lefkowitz 2010; Lynas 2011; Herold et al. 2011; 2012; 2013; Author.

remaining low carbon domestically” as defined by the United Nations.³³ Australia was part of COP15 discussions leading to the establishment of Cartagena, and acknowledges Cartagena as instrumental in the successful outcome of COP16 “identifying areas of convergence and advocating ambition across its diverse regional constituencies. It is gearing up to similarly influence outcomes at COP 17 in 2011.”³⁴ Furthermore, Cartagena is described as empowering the middle ground and crossing the North-South divide in negotiations.

“As the divide between developed and developing countries represents one of the key obstacles to agreement in international climate change talks, the approach taken by the Cartagena Dialogue to combine the voices and interests of developed and developing countries is a major advance. The group draws its strength from this diversity.”³⁵

The literature generally disregards bridging the North–South divide as a realistic option:

“[The North-South divide] would not necessarily be a problem, if there were sufficient trust to enable developed and developing countries to communicate positively and constructively. Unfortunately, however, negotiations between the groups tend to be dominated by knee-jerk suspicion, defensiveness, and misunderstanding, which hinder the rational discussion of proposals.”³⁶

³³ UNFCCC 2014c. A similar definition is given by other sources closer to Cartagena (e.g. Lynas 2011; IISD 2014).

³⁴ Commonwealth of Australia 2011, 90

³⁵ Commonwealth of Australia 2011, 90.

³⁶ Depledge and Yamin 2009, 444. See e.g. Kaufmann 1988 on categories of groups and alliances.

Cartagena is difficult to understand within the usual approaches. I suggest turning to face-to-face diplomacy, dialogue, and learning.³⁷ As Dimitrov notes: “Systematic observations on the actual behavior of actors in building or undermining trust would be an important follow-up in this line of research.”³⁸

In this paper, I argue and demonstrate that the recent practice turn in IR and especially theories on *communities of practice* will be useful when addressing the issues raised above and seeking to understand and explain how Cartagena has been instrumental in getting negotiations back on track. Firstly, this approach is theoretically inspired by Pierre Bourdieu’s political sociology, and has as main characteristic a strong empirical grounding often through own data collection. Secondly, *practice* in this perspective is both a theoretical and empirical way of bridging the material and ideational dualism haunting the Social Sciences. Thirdly, the concept of *community of practice* offers a focus on actors’ shared practices, not just knowledge³⁹, but the continued interactions and mutually recognized performances of delegates.⁴⁰ Increased interaction can, however, also lead to negative personal relationships.⁴¹ Through this approach, I can combine the questions of learning or ossification⁴² with how actors are organized in new political groups and how actors develop new practices and change negotiation processes.

Following this introduction I continue with a theory section, where I explain the community of practice approach, and I present my analytical model. I then explain the relevant methods of gaining access to the Cartagena community; observations at COP17, COP18, and COP19 as well as 15 interviews with Cartagena participants. My analysis is structured in relation to

³⁷ Depledge 2006; Depledge and Yamin 2009; Dimitrov 2013; Eckersley 2012; Holmes 2013; Sebenius 1992, 329.

³⁸ Dimitrov 2013, 345.

³⁹ Cf. Sebenius 1992.

⁴⁰ Adler 2008; Adler and Barnett 1998; Adler and Pouliot 2011; Adler-Nissen 2013; Adler-Nissen 2014; Neumann 2002; Pouliot 2008; 2010.

⁴¹ Depledge 2006, 11.

⁴² Depledge 2006; Depledge and Yamin 2009.

the *community*, who participates and what that tells us compared to other political groups; in relation to the *domain of knowledge*, what issues the participants share and work to resolve; and in relation to participants' specific *practices*, what they do and how. I also discuss some challenges facing Cartagena. In the final section I conclude and point to the need for further analyses of political groups as communities of practice.

Practice Theory and Community of Practice

I am inspired by the research agenda on Bourdieu in International Relations, which studies practices and not fixed conceptual categories like the state, sovereignty, power, and interests as such.⁴³ However, “there is no such thing as the theory of practice but a variety of theories focused on practices.”⁴⁴

“Practices are socially meaningful actions that reify background knowledge and discourse in and on the material world. Practices are the dynamic material and ideational processes that enable structures to be stable or to evolve, and agents to reproduce or transform structures.”⁴⁵

This Bourdieusian approach is epistemologically reflexive about theoretical concepts and knowledge; it dissolves the structure-agency divide beginning with a relational ontology, where actors structured by the field logics continually struggle to keep or advance positions and distinctions in the field, and sometimes struggle and strategize over the definition-making power of fields. Field logics can be what Rationalists refer to as interests, which Bourdieu termed *illusio* to denote the idiosyncratic nature of interests; what actors believe to be at stake in the specific field, what the exchange rate is between different

⁴³ Adler-Nissen 2013.

⁴⁴ Adler and Pouliot 2011, 5.

⁴⁵ Adler and Pouliot 2011, 6.

capital forms, and acting out “a feel for the game” – also in a more unconscious manner.⁴⁶ The practice approach also practically dissolves the material-ideational divide in a second way, because research and researchers have to engage and interpret the field. It builds on what Wagenaar calls dialogic meaning in action, where “[i]t doesn’t make sense to try to locate meaning ontologically in the mind or in some reified cultural or institutional pattern.”⁴⁷ Researchers should approach meaning through the study of social action as something that is both particular to the specific actor and moment and also generally meaningful because it signifies something larger.

“[Meaning] is more a shared set of understandings that are linguistically and actionably inscribed in the world, and that are invoked, and, in an ongoing dialectical movement, sustained, whenever actors engage in a particular behavior, and whenever we ‘read’ the symbolic meaning of that particular behavior.”⁴⁸

In this approach, a political group under the UNFCCC, like Cartagena, is understood as a *community of practice*, broadly defined as “groups of people who share a concern, a set of problems, or a passion about a topic, and who deepen their knowledge and expertise in this area by interacting on an ongoing basis.”⁴⁹ The community of practice concept was developed with an eye to business and professional communities,⁵⁰ and further developed within IR:

“The community of practice concept encompasses not only the conscious and discursive dimensions, and the actual doing of social change, but also

⁴⁶ Bourdieu 1998, 80; Pouliot and Mérand 2013, 33.

⁴⁷ Wagenaar 2011, 21.

⁴⁸ Wagenaar 2011, 21.

⁴⁹ Wenger, McDermontt, and Snyder 2002, 4.

⁵⁰ Wenger 1998; Wenger, McDermontt, and Snyder 2002.

the social space where structure and agency overlap and where knowledge, power, and community intersect. Communities of practice are intersubjective social structures that constitute the normative and epistemic ground for action, but they also are agents, made up of real people, who – working via network channels, across national borders, across organizational divides, and in the halls of government – affect political, economic, and social events.”⁵¹

Empirically, communities of practice vary a great deal; they can be small or big (membership size), long-lived or short-lived, colocated or distributed (place of interaction), homogenous or heterogeneous (members’ backgrounds), inside and/or across organizational boundaries, they can emerge spontaneously or intentionally, and they can be unrecognized to formally institutionalized.⁵² Common to communities of practice is that they consist of a basic structure defined as 1) a *community* of people who care about 2) a *domain* of knowledge, which defines a set of issues, and 3) the shared *practices* that they are developing to be effective in their domain. To identify a community of practice one has to go beyond the abstract and desk-based studies: “You have to look at how the group functions and how it combines all three elements of domain, community, and practice.”⁵³

Community, Domain, and Practices

The *community* element is more than a description of the participants, their backgrounds, the size, meeting places and frequency of the community. In combination with the domain of knowledge it is about learning *together* and “a sense of belonging and mutual commitment”, e.g. bringing down barriers and

⁵¹ Adler and Pouliot 2011, 17-18.

⁵² Wenger et al. 2002, 24-27.

⁵³ Wenger et al. 2002, 44.

making it easier and more acceptable to approach each other and ask (the difficult) questions, ask for help, or voice ideas. People stay and contribute to this learning because of a recognized reciprocity, *trust*, and with time a developed shared history and identity. However, communities also encourage and even thrive on differentiation, so individuals can develop own and distinct roles and contributions fostering “richer learning, more interesting relationships, and increased creativity.”⁵⁴

The element of *domain of knowledge* is more than the common interest in an issue. It is the “*raison d’être*” of the community and what “guides learning”. Members *know* what is relevant and useful for the community they *experience* the same issues and problems; they share a *passion* and a *will* to collectively succeed and steward the community’s expertise and capabilities. The community’s expertise and capabilities are important vis-à-vis the wider organizational context. If recognized for its knowledge and developed practices, higher levels of authority in the field will most likely consult the community before making important decisions that relate to the community’s knowledge domain.⁵⁵ In a Bourdieusian sense, consulting the community becomes part of other actors’ *illusio* as a way of securing legitimacy of own actions.

Practices are what bind the community together and what e.g. makes it different from an epistemic community, also analytically, because of the focus not just on shared knowledge, but on the specific ways of doing things; “a set of common approaches and shared standards that create the basis for action, communication, problem solving, performance, and accountability.” Practices are based on both explicit and tacit knowledge, “a specialized tool or a manual, to less tangible displays of competence” like ability to interpret slight changes in e.g. diplomatic language. Practices embody “a certain way of behaving, a perspective on problems and ideas, a thinking style, and even in many cases an

⁵⁴ Wenger et al. 2002, 33ff.

⁵⁵ Wenger et al. 2002, 29ff.

ethical stance.”⁵⁶ To understand change, we should practices, because they shape “thought and language into regular patterns of performance and turn contexts or structures into (individual and corporate) agents’ dispositions and expectations.”⁵⁷

Gaining Access to Practices

Methodologically, taking practice theory seriously means thorough empirical work and mixed methods. This entails moving beyond merely increasing internal and external validity; it is about understanding complexity and interdependence between history and situated practices. Only in combination of methods and the knowledge this produces do the different theoretical concepts applied in practice make sense.⁵⁸ Getting direct access to observe and record the Cartagena practices has not been possible for this study, firstly because of the time and geographical span of the community, and secondly, because Cartagena meetings and other activities are closed to observers and media. As with other studies of diplomacy, practices need to be interpreted from and through other sources. “The rationale is that, even when practices cannot be ‘seen,’ they may be ‘talked about’ through interviews or ‘read’ thanks to textual analysis.”⁵⁹ My research is based on interviews and other observations, where I have sought to identify the community, its domain of knowledge and specific practices, and how these three elements come together.

As primary first-hand sources, I conducted 15 interviews from November 2012 to February 2014. Interviews span all regional representation in Cartagena, five from developing countries and ten from developed countries, covering government officials, senior diplomats, and ministers. Interviews are skewed with twice as many developed country interviewees if following Cartagena

⁵⁶ Wenger et al. 2002, 37ff.

⁵⁷ Adler and Pouliot 2011, 20.

⁵⁸ Pouliot 2013; Wagenaar 2011.

⁵⁹ Pouliot 2013, 49.

composition where about two thirds are developing countries, however, interviewees gave very similar answers to my questions. Interviews were granted based on anonymity, so I will not use direct quotes or reference interviews. I have likewise chosen not to identify specific Parties, when analyzing different roles, like those of the secretariat or leads. An anonymized description of the 15 interviews is presented in the appendix. The same semi-structured interview guide was used for all interviews with a focus on getting interviewees to describe the Cartagena history and purpose, how Cartagena works as well as its strengths, successes, and challenges. I approached delegations at COP18 and COP19 based on a list of 42 participating countries (including the EU Commission), which I got in January 2012 from one of the founding participants. I have since come across several lists from other sources, but the most accurate list I have seen is from the Cartagena secretariat, which I got before COP19. Generally, delegates were open to talk about Cartagena.

Other primary and first-hand sources are official statements from Parties with reference to Cartagena, a few media sources and press releases in relation to Cartagena meetings, a video-blog from the Norwegian delegation from COP19 explaining what Cartagena is, and observations from the Danish delegation's closed briefings at COP17, COP18, and COP19, where the development in negotiations were presented (briefings are only used as background knowledge). I consider 15 interviews in combination with other first-hand sources relating to Cartagena to be sufficient to analyze Cartagena practices: Interviewees cover different positions in own delegations and in the Cartagena community, experiences, background, and all regional and political groups are represented as well. Interviewees gave very similar answers, indicating that additional interviews would not provide much additional information. Interviewees emphasized different aspects relating to their personal experiences, which indicate that answers were not rehearsed and officially sanctioned.

As secondary sources, I rely on background knowledge of the organizational developments stemming from participatory observations at COP17, COP18, and COP19 focusing on major topics such as negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol (KP), Long-Term Cooperative Action (LCA), and the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (ADP). I have also participated in side-events relating to issues of obtaining a global agreement, and presentations by Parties such as China, EU, USA, Climate Vulnerable Forum and several international organizations like UNEP and NGOs.

Analyzing the Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action

The analysis follows the concepts of community, domain and practice with most weight on the specific practices of Cartagena and how it has been instrumental in getting UNFCCC negotiations back on track.

The Cartagena Community

Cartagena was officially formed in March 2010 in Cartagena, Colombia, by UNFCCC negotiators and experts from around 30 Parties representing all regions except North America. Cartagena did not suddenly emerge; many experienced negotiators from EU, AOSIS, LDC, and Latin America and the Caribbean have for many years cultivated an informal community, but it was the common experience of failure at COP15 and the feeling of being left out of influence, when USA and BASIC negotiated the Copenhagen Accord, which brought negotiators more formally together. The founding meeting resulted in an understanding of the community as “an informal space, open to countries working towards an ambitious, comprehensive and legally-binding regime in the UNFCCC, and committed domestically to becoming or remaining low-carbon economies.”⁶⁰ Participants agreed to be explicit about Cartagena *not*

⁶⁰ As reported by Lynas 2011, who worked for the Maldives at the time. Also corresponding to UNFCCC webpage and confirmed by interviews.

being described as a political group, but as a dialogue with *participants* instead of members (pointed out to me by all interviewees). I use the term *political group* as an analytical concept to distinguish Cartagena from other organizational forms within UNFCCC and to better compare with other new political groups like the Like Minded Developing Countries (whose participants likewise distances themselves from the term “group”). In practice, there are many terms used for political groups, even the UNFCCC website is rather confusing.⁶¹

There are different explanations for why participants want to distance Cartagena from formal groups. The UNFCCC negotiations are still, first and foremost, organized according to the principle of Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties, also referred to as the firewall between North and South. Cartagena is a community that breaks down that firewall, which other developing countries seek to uphold.⁶² Many substantive negotiations distribute responsibilities and actions according to the North–South divide, e.g. on mitigation, adaptation, Green Climate Fund, Technology, or loss and damage. This also influences the internal G77 negotiation dynamics, where it is viewed negatively if Parties are seen as cooperating too closely with North Parties. Cartagena as a *dialogue* is more acceptable to G77 than if it were a formal political group. It is more practical for Cartagena to be an informal space distanced from formal political positions to better be able to explore new suggestions without being held responsible afterwards for what was said and written in an attempt to reach compromises. This brings negotiations forward.

⁶¹ Non-defined terms used for political groups are: “grouping” (Coalition for Rainforest Nations), “collection of countries” (Cartagena Dialogue), “negotiating alliance” (G77 and China), “negotiating group” (Group of Mountain Landlocked Developing Countries), “Countries” (LDCs), and “alliances” (regional groups). UNFCCC 2014c and 2014d.

⁶² Depledge and Yamin 2009; Yamin and Depledge 2004. Author;

Regarding size, Cartagena has grown to regularly include 42 Parties including the EU Commission.⁶³ Cartagena participants span Umbrella, EU, AOSIS, LDC, AG, EIG, AILAC, and G77 and China, and thus many different cultural and political backgrounds. There are also commonalities: Except maybe for Australia, there are no large emitters in Cartagena. All are smaller or middle-sized countries, all are already climate friendly or have set out to become so, and many have a history in negotiations of being constructive. The regular participants (individuals) in Cartagena are the senior and junior officials of delegations; ministers rarely participate. These negotiators have been part of the international bureaucracy of UNFCCC for some time, thereby sharing a certain international culture focused on their special knowledge of negotiation issues, and knowledge of other cultures one gets through the practices of working within a UN framework. Theoretically, this shared knowledge and culture, but different background, are important to get a community to work in practice, because learning requires openness.⁶⁴

Other Parties or actors are sometimes invited to meetings, e.g. the UNFCCC Presidency, Chairs of formal groups like the LDC or G77, or the Presidency of the EU. Other Parties are sometimes invited as observers, if they are geographically close to the meeting. The purpose is partly to demystify Cartagena. Lack of knowledge about Cartagena has made it prone to criticism from Parties with other agendas. This is a strategic choice and a balancing act, and is a practice consistent with the name of dialogue.

Furthermore, it seems Cartagena participants have agreed to keep the size at 42. It is manageable and representative of the UNFCCC field. Including more

⁶³ Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Bangladesh, Barbados, Burundi, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ethiopia, European Union, France, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Indonesia, Kenya, Lebanon, Malawi, Maldives, Marshall Islands, México, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Panama, Peru, Rwanda, Samoa, Spain, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Uganda, United Arab Emirates and the United Kingdom (List of participants as of COP19 provided by Cartagena secretariat).

⁶⁴ Wenger et al 2002, 37.

Parties is thought jeopardize the personal and intimate atmosphere from years of regular meetings and discussions. In short, size is closely related to the level of trust between participants. Related to trust and community composition, there is also an example of a Cartagena participant, Belgium, which no longer participates. Explanations are difficult to verify, but at least two-fold. Belgium has not been able to prioritize Cartagena with the expected resources, and there is an understanding in Cartagena, that the composition has to accommodate developing countries' sense of keeping the power asymmetry in relation to developed countries at bay.

Domain of Knowledge

The domain of knowledge can be divided into a more general level of Cartagena participants' shared understanding of what is at stake in UNFCCC negotiations and a more specific level of knowledge production and issues that Cartagena seeks to advance. At the general level, the Cartagena community shares an understanding that COP15 could have succeeded if Parties had listened to each other; and that it is of utmost importance that negotiations do not fail again.. Cartagena also recognizes the ambition gap. The Cartagena community is (self-)framed as taking "progressive action" both inside and outside UNFCCC negotiations. Cartagena participants understand themselves to be progressive, but also framing a need for progressive action as opposed to the kind of action that blocks action.. Progressive action is most directly referring to leading by example domestically with mitigation policies..

At the more specific level, Cartagena's domain of knowledge mirrors UNFCCC negotiation issues, evolving partly with official decisions at UNFCCC meeting, e.g. the Durban Platform (decision 1/CP.17), and partly with the actual debate on the floor, where specific issues and technicalities tend to disappear and reappear according to the diplomatic logic or sense of the

political support of even talking about something.⁶⁵ The Cartagena community discusses these issues and agrees to develop common understandings of some. Other issues are found too difficult to bridge. Under the current UNFCCC negotiations Cartagena is constructively discussing these issues: *the post-2020 agreement (ADP Workstream 1)*, *mitigation and raising ambition before 2020 (ADP Workstream 2)*, *finance, adaptation, and MRV (monitoring, reporting, and verification)*. An issue like *loss and damage* has been discussed, but Cartagena has not been able to resolve differences between Parties. These issues jointly make up Cartagena's specific domain of knowledge and help shape participants' illusion of UNFCCC negotiations. Through the specific practices where this knowledge is developed and put to action, Cartagena as a community makes a significant contribution to UNFCCC negotiations.

Practices

I have identified a range of practices that Cartagena participants have developed over the years. For analytical purposes I have structured these practices under the following types, which emerged through an initial inductive content analysis: *boundary spanning (bridging formal groups)*, *face-to-face diplomacy (meeting and engaging in dialogue)*, *internal and external communication*, and *organizing and advancing knowledge*. I end this section with a discussion of *challenges* to Cartagena's trust-building and influence-seeking efforts.

Boundary spanning refers to practices where Cartagena participants from different political and regional groups come together, spanning some of the dividing organizational boundaries in UNFCCC negotiations. Boundary spanning occurs across the North-South divide, but also between regions, and types of Parties with different domestic and international experiences and knowledge. Examples include: when delegates from Norway, Australia and New Zealand are able to apply their knowledge from Umbrella meetings and

⁶⁵ See e.g. UNFCCC 2013 for an overview. Observations.

better explain nuances of the American or Canadian positions to some developing countries which otherwise would get these “analyses of positions” from e.g. China or India in G77. Likewise, developing country participants can explain to developed country counterparts where and how G77 could be open to compromises in negotiations. Furthermore, participants can share national experiences with policy planning and implementation, and how it can be incorporated in specific UNFCCC issues, e.g. Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Commitments or Actions by Developed Country Parties and Nationally Appropriate Mitigation Actions by Developing Countries, Technology Transfer, or Capacity Building. Or they can share perspectives on opportunities and challenges with sustainable development or green growth in practice without necessarily thinking in UNFCCC terms (and boundaries). Participants also share strategic views on how to make progress in the negotiations. Because Cartagena is built on a culture of trust and knowledge of each other’s positions and realities, participants are better able to know what relevant information to bring into the dialogue.

Face-to-face diplomacy refers to the actual meeting and engaging in dialogue. This happens through a range of practices; different types of meetings during or between UNFCCC meetings, preparatory meetings with lead groups or Cartagena secretariat, social meetings, and ad hoc issue specific meetings during UNFCCC negotiations. It is a *learning by doing* process, and Cartagena increasingly institutionalizes its face-to-face diplomatic practices. Since 2010, Cartagena has been meeting regularly before UNFCCC meetings two to three times a year, always in a developing country. The host country also invites neighbors and UNFCCC representatives as observers. In the first years, the host country had many tasks besides preparing the agenda, e.g. distribution of input from participants between meetings and during the COP. In 2012, Cartagena decided to establish a core group of countries with regional and political group representatives to alleviate the host country, to secure better inclusion of all

views and ownership of the process. This core group contributes with logistical decisions and assists the host country prepare the meeting agenda. The host country is also a member of the core group prior and after the meeting to facilitate learning.

Practices at meetings include discussing and planning common approaches to upcoming UNFCCC negotiations issues (also based on sharing interpretations of previous negotiation outcomes), and also building stronger personal ties through social events like dinners where participants get to know each other better. , The semi-planned social events – are important to participants and something they look forward to, but also something that provides participants with the necessary confidence to approach each other during UNFCCC negotiation meetings outside of the Cartagena setting, if a specific question arises that needs discussing. Time is short and some delegates are hard to locate since they do not have official office space. Knowing who to talk to from other delegations – especially across boundaries – is conducive to even attempt to do so. Cartagena delivers an open space for diplomatic learning, especially helpful for negotiators from developing countries without the same capacities as developed countries. This is a significant process innovation in the UNFCCC field.

Cartagena invites observers to participate in their meetings. It is a common practice in negotiations for the political groups to set up meetings to explore positions or get input from NGOs and experts. Conference diplomacy can be understood as a collection of meetings. And it is of course one of the ways Cartagena participants can gain influence in negotiations, by engaging with other actors, especially the UNFCCC secretariat, the COP presidency, or specific negotiation issue co-chairs, like the ADP co-chairs who are tasked with trying to find common ground. Cartagena is an attractive negotiation partner, because Cartagena has put in many efforts to explore common ground across North–South and regions on dividing issues. Cartagena’s negotiation input has

bridging potential. Cartagena meets regularly during the UNFCCC meetings, sometimes twice a day; however, it can be difficult for all to participate, especially developing countries with small delegations that have to prioritize more official meetings over informal dialogue. However, being part of Cartagena and having developed personal relationships and knowledge of each other, many delegates also meet on their own. This type of ad hoc face-to-face meeting rarely took place before COP15, but it is now common among Cartagena participants; a significant process innovation.

Internal and external communication refers to the way Cartagena communicates. Internally, Cartagena communicates in an open and bridge-building style, and participants generally think of Cartagena as a space of sincere communication (of course participants also communicate tactically as well). Internally, Cartagena bases communication on a few principles; the Chatham House rule, presentation of as many views as possible, strong personal relationships, and no journalists present or any kind of reporting from meetings. Participants recognize that this space of sincere communication is something unique in UNFCCC negotiations usually based on rhetorical positions of national interests. This space of allowing participants from different groups to venture beyond national interests, explore new ideas, and figure out a way of creating common ground, is central in the explanation of how UNFCCC negotiations got back on track. Cartagena as a *dialogue* is different from UNFCCC *negotiations*, because Cartagena meetings do not have to result in a consensus agreement. Participants share and discuss views, and can then incorporate these views or new common perspectives in their own Party or formal groups as they find appropriate. And participants learn something new. For specific issues, appointed leads have prepared a presentation for discussion, otherwise each participant is expected to share views and analyses for all to discuss. Outside of meetings, communication is based on an email listserv run

by the secretariat as well as direct, personal communication between two or more participants.

Although Cartagena engages and invites others, Cartagena does not engage in formal communication externally like the LMDC, BASIC or AILAC. These groups all make official submissions and statements in relation to negotiations.⁶⁶ Cartagena participants have only made a few statements referring to Cartagena. Usually participants make a statement either with no reference or with reference to their formal political or regional groups, and then other Cartagena participants from other groups will support that statement and maybe add something to it. Cartagena also rarely communicates through the public media. There are some examples of media pieces, mostly in conjunction with the preparatory meetings in developing countries, where the host (often minister level) speaks about the need for climate action, about the vulnerability of the host country and the region, and that progressive countries meet there to prepare for the next UNFCCC meeting.⁶⁷ Some participants use their ministries' official channels to send a message of active engagement and bridge-building in UNFCCC negotiations.⁶⁸ Most participants are silent about Cartagena.

Difference in internal and external communication highlight important UNFCCC dynamics. Due to formal group memberships, loyalty, and tactical reason within these groups, Parties find it difficult to be too closely associated with Parties from other groups. Below-the-radar practices increase Parties' manoeuvrability and ability to keep potential conflicts within Cartagena. Changes in Parties' external communication reveal this challenge. Australia used to communicate engagement with Cartagena, likely targeted a domestic audience. Since 2013, the Australian government has abandoned progressive climate action. Prime Minister Tony Abbott has stated that "climate change

⁶⁶ Author.

⁶⁷ Maldives 2010a; 2010b; IISD 2012; 2014; RTCC 2014.

⁶⁸ Commonwealth of Australia 2011; 2012. Klima- og miljødepartementet 2013.

science is crap”⁶⁹, and at a recent Cartagena meeting, host and Foreign Minister of the Marshall Islands expressed concern over Australia’s commitment: “The previous government of Australia (was) instrumental in helping establish Cartagena Dialogue. This week, they’re sending a very junior official to represent Australia. I’m not sure how we should interpret that.”⁷⁰ I will return to this example below, when I discuss the challenges of Cartagena.

Organizing and advancing knowledge refer to how Cartagena participants over the years have organized themselves and the domain of knowledge, and how they seek to advance their new shared knowledge to gain influence in negotiations. Cartagena participants are professionals, state officials with different levels of technical and specific knowledge of the different UNFCCC negotiation issues. Practices reflect this shared and mixed background of technical and diplomatic knowledge and habitus. Cartagena participants have organized knowledge in lead teams responsible for specific issue areas, which follow the main UNFCCC negotiation issues; mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology transfer, national reporting (including monitoring, reporting, verification (MRV)), ADP workstreams 1 and 2, and loss and damage. Lead teams consist of two to three delegations (usually one official from each) spanning North and South. Leads are responsible for developing and drafting notes for discussion at the meetings. This leadership role is important, since this practice is the initial process of bridge-building of specific issues. Failure to deliver bridge-building notes that the community can work with risks undermining the sense of common cause and identity.

Cartagena does not negotiate text through consensus. Notes from leads are discussed and modified, but not agreed upon. Parties can use them as they see fit in their own negotiation strategies; knowing well how other Parties stand on the issues. Cartagena participants have several options of using these notes in

⁶⁹ Marks 2014; Readfearn 2014.

⁷⁰ ABC 2014.

other negotiation practices; they can use them in developing proposals within their formal political groups, or they can put forward their own interpretation of the notes in the formal UNFCCC negotiations, e.g. as non-papers, submissions or statements. When notes developed within Cartagena find their way into formal negotiations, there is a strong likelihood of Cartagena participants supporting each other's proposals (without referring to Cartagena). This is difficult to observe and prove as an outsider, but I have observed a developing country put forward a rather long text in a formal COP negotiation, which gained wide support from Cartagena participants. Through triangulation with different sources (interviews, negotiation texts, observations) I am confident of the connection. Also, the secretariat or the co-chairs of an agenda item have used Cartagena as a sounding board for new proposals. At COP16 and COP17, Cartagena played a crucial role as a way of testing and developing compromises, and Cartagena proved itself to be a constructive partner in negotiations.

The challenges ahead for Cartagena?

Communities of practice experience challenges most obviously if participants fail to connect and develop trust, if the domain of knowledge does not arouse passion, and/or if the shared practices do not develop but remain stagnant.⁷¹ This is not the case for Cartagena which seems to be a strong community of practice. However, other challenges exist:

“[C]ommunity disorders are frequently an extreme version of a community's strength. The very qualities that make a community an ideal structure for learning – a shared perspective on a domain, trust, a communal identity, long-standing relationships, an established practice – are the same qualities that can hold it hostage to its history and its

⁷¹ Wenger et al. 2002, 140.

achievements. The community can become an ideal structure for avoiding learning.”⁷²

Reflecting on Cartagena’s strengths and challenges mentioned in interviews, I will further discuss Cartagena’s challenges ahead. Strengths are informal dialogue instead of formal negotiation, bridge-building instead of trench-digging, strong personal relationships that build trust, and learning across diverse experiences. The risk of relying too much on informal dialogue is that Cartagena never moves beyond talk. We might understand the establishment of the Association of Independent Latin American and Caribbean Countries (AILAC) as these Parties, many from Cartagena, moving further beyond informal dialogue to be able to make specific submissions and statements. As documented elsewhere, however, Cartagena and AILAC are actually complementing each other, strengthening the same meta-narrative in negotiations about bridge-building and sharing responsibilities to act on climate change.⁷³ External dynamics can also challenge an informal dialogue. Especially at COP19, bridge-building in Cartagena and elsewhere was hampered as developed countries failed to deliver on finance promises.⁷⁴ But Cartagena keeps talking, testament to its strong community.

Cartagena’s informal nature leads to structural challenges. Cartagena has no formal recognition within UNFCCC, so at COP18 in Qatar and COP19 in Poland, with host governments’ illusia connected with the fossil fuel economy, it was easier for the COP Presidencies to exclude Cartagena as they were not obliged to include and utilize Cartagena’s expertise and capabilities. Cartagena can initiate meetings with other UNFCCC actors, but Cartagena cannot be sure to be invited and listened to. If Cartagena gets more recognition in the wider field for its expertise and capabilities, then COP Presidencies or co-chairs more

⁷² Wenger et al. 2002, 141.

⁷³ Author.

⁷⁴ Dent 2013; IISD 2013, 28; Observations.

or less have to involve Cartagena to secure legitimacy of the process. COP20 and COP21 are in Peru and France respectively, both Cartagena participants, and Cartagena can again play a significant role as sounding board. Secondly, since smaller delegations have difficulties with allocating time and resources for actual participation and contributions, since other formal groups and negotiations have to be prioritized; Cartagena needs to strengthen this aspect of the community.

Cartagena's emphasis on personal relationships as basis for trust and learning leads to actor specific challenges. Although many officials spend many years in the same delegations and have followed UNFCCC negotiations for a long time, replacements in national bureaucracies do happen, and this of course changes the personal composition of Cartagena. All communities must find ways of dealing with this type of change, and interviewees suggest that Cartagena is able to transfer the culture of trust. New-comers are met with a greater level of trust than before Cartagena was established. Secondly, people leave with their specialized knowledge and capabilities, e.g. if they were part of a lead team. These people are difficult to replace and Cartagena would need to have some measure of documentation and accumulation of learning so as not to lose valuable knowledge. Usually, national delegations have strong measures of documentation and although not mentioned by interviewees, I expect the Cartagena secretariat to also document shared practices. But the real strength of a community of practice is that knowledge and learning are anchored in practice not primarily in individuals' minds. More difficult to deal with, lead teams might function poorly. An informal space based on equal cooperation and trust is not conducive to replacing or correcting someone who does not deliver. Interviewees mentioned the challenge of securing continued contributions from smaller developing countries which lack the needed resources to prioritize Cartagena. And developed countries might reverse their level of engagement

based on changes in political priorities when government changes, cf. the case of Australia.

Conclusion

The Cartagena Dialogue for Progressive Action is a significant governance innovation in UNFCCC negotiations. Personal ties and strong commitments from Parties made Cartagena able to not only bring trust back into the UNFCCC negotiations at a critical moment in history, this community of practice was also able to deliver specific suggestions on key issues about how to reach needed compromises to move negotiations forward. Cartagena is a community that thrives on boundary spanning as a defining practice whereby necessary face-to-face dialogue between North and South and between political groups actually takes place; necessary because it creates the basis for trust, learning and new ideas, which contribute to negotiations moving forward. Both the Mexican and South African COP Presidencies were able to use Cartagena as a sounding board for difficult issues. After the failure of COP15, where especially the EU, AOSIS, and LDC experienced being left out of influence, Cartagena has become that community of practice, where Parties supporting an action-oriented approach can engage with each other and develop compromises based on in-depth knowledge of other Parties' positions and reasoning. Such compromises have the potential to be strong and long-lasting.

Despite Cartagena being significant, it has received very little academic recognition. Obviously below-the-radar practices are difficult to observe and study, but in the negotiations literature both theoretical and policy-oriented analyses are often detached from the actual happenings on the ground. In this paper, I have sought to shed some light on how Cartagena as a community of practice contributes to moving the negotiations forward. I argue that it is time to re-evaluate UNFCCC successes and failures in light of communities of practice. Through this paper I have illustrated and argued that it is not just possible to be

both theoretically and empirically grounded, it is also very important if we truly want to understand the nature and dynamics of UNFCCC negotiations.

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Appendix

Table 1: List of interviews

Interviewee	Position	Date and place
Anonymous 1	Member of developing country delegation. Occasional participant in CD.	30 Nov 2012, COP18.
Anonymous 2	Senior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	3 Dec 2012, COP18.
Anonymous 3	Senior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	3 Dec 2012, COP18.
Anonymous 4	Member of developed country delegation. Participant in CD since 2011.	13 Dec 2012, Skype.
Anonymous 5	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	13 Dec 2012, Skype.
Anonymous 6	Member of developed country delegation. Participant in CD since 2011.	23 Jan 2013, Skype.
Anonymous 7	Minister-level politician from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	16 April 2013, Copenhagen.
Anonymous 8	Minister-level politician from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since COP17.	12 June 2013, Minister's office.
Anonymous 9	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	Nov 2013, Warsaw, Poland
Anonymous 10	Junior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since COP18	Nov 2013, Warsaw, Poland
Anonymous 11	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	Nov 2013, Warsaw, Poland
Anonymous 12	Junior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD in the first year.	Nov 2013, Warsaw, Poland
Anonymous 13	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	E-mail, December 2013

Anonymous 14	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Secretariat function in CD since establishment.	E-mail, February 2014
Anonymous 15	Senior observer and expert. Participant in CD from establishment until COP17.	E-mail, February 2014
Anonymous 16	Senior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	3 December 2014, COP20, Lima, interview – not recorded
Anonymous 17	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	6 December 2014, COP20, interview – not recorded
Anonymous 18	Senior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	6 December 2014, COP20, recorded interview
Anonymous 19	Senior diplomat from developed country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	10 December 2014, COP20, recorded interview
Anonymous 20	Senior diplomat from developing country delegation. Participant in CD since establishment.	12 December 2014, COP20, conversation – not recorded

Table 2: List of observations

Name of event	Place of event	Time of event	Participation
The Durban Climate Change Conference. COP17/CMP7.	Durban, South Africa	28 November – 11 December 2011	29 November – 9 December 2011
The Doha Climate Change Conference. COP18/CMP8.	Doha, Qatar	26 November – 8 December 2012	30 November – 7 December 2012
The Warsaw Climate Change Conference. COP19/CMP9.	Warsaw, Poland	11 – 23 November 2013	13 – 21 November 2013
The Lima Climate Change Conference. COP20/CMP10.	Lima, Peru	1 – 14 December 2014	1 – 14 December 2014

Paper 4: The Emergence and Spread of Green Growth: A New Global Governance Field

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Abstract

Through analysis of more than 1,000 sources summarising 379 identified green growth actors and their connections, this paper analyses the emergence and spread of the green growth field from 2005–2013. It is argued that field theory offers better concepts than dominant global environmental governance theories, because it moves the analysis beyond unresolved dichotomies of global/domestic, state/non-state actors, and ideas/interests. It is demonstrated that green growth emerged in 2005 as a governance solution to Asian environmental, economic, and social challenges driven primarily by Korea and UNESCAP. It further spreads to become a global response to governance crises; financial crisis in 2008, and the UN climate negotiations crisis in 2009/2010. Korea and Denmark are centrally positioned actors initiating several new networks and governance units regulating the field. It is demonstrated that green growth governance is transscalar, multi-actor, and multi-issue, which in turn challenges knowing when and if action is effective.

Keywords: Green growth, global environmental governance, field theory, strategic action field

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The Emergence and Spread of Green Growth: A New Global Governance Field

1. Introduction*

How can we explain the emergence and spread of green growth as a global environmental governance phenomenon?⁷⁵ Although green growth is a global governance phenomenon in policy and academia (G8 2009, UNDESA 2012, Jacobs 2013, Author), this question is yet to be asked. In addition to the empirical insights of such a study, I argue and demonstrate that this phenomenon offers an excellent illustration of why we need to reconsider central theoretical problems in the global (environmental) governance literature. One overarching debate concerns social change and continuity or how to approach the stages of emergence, spread, consolidation, disappearance and further change (Hall 1993, Woods 1995, Finnemore and Sikkink 1998, Bernstein 2001, Scott 2001, Campbell 2004, Bulkeley and Newell 2010, Padgett and Powell 2012, Young 2012, Jordan and Huitema 2014). Typical questions include: where does global regime change take place, are states or non-state actors the main drivers of change in global governance, are ideas or material interest the main drivers of policy change, and why does change take place in the form it does? (cf. Bulkeley and Newell 2010, p. 8-10, Young 2012). I argue that this debate, through these questions, is locked in a circular argumentation process, and that these questions are only relevant to the extent that they open our eyes to their irrelevance.

The theoretical problems of change and continuity raised above have been approached by some authors ‘by keeping three broad theoretical lenses in play’ through ‘analytical eclecticism’ (Bulkeley *et al.* 2014, p. 179) and focusing on a large number of empirical examples of ‘Transnational Climate

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⁷⁵ Global governance refers here to the empirical phenomenon. It can also refer to a theoretical approach (Stripple and Stephan 2013).

Change Governance’. The latter I argue is helpful, but does not resolve the theoretical problems. I suggest adapting and applying a sociological perspective. I argue and demonstrate that Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) field theory⁷⁶ offers a better perspective than the usual regime theory or multi-level governance approaches when analysing global governance phenomena like green growth. Field theory is part of a new research agenda in International Relations (IR), a Bourdieusian inspired practice approach, where key concepts like the global, the state, power, and governance are re-examined and re-applied using Bourdieu’s concepts of practice, field, habitus, capital, doxa, etc. (cf. edited works of Adler and Pouliot 2011, Bigo and Madsen 2011a, Adler-Nissen 2013a). Field theory moves beyond the dichotomies of global/domestic, states/non-state actors, and ideas/interests. I use field theory to analyse green growth as a new governance field, how it is structured, and by which actors. I focus on the first stages of field development, i.e. emergence and spread of green growth, as this represents the biggest gap in the green growth literature, and because this account is necessary to better contextualise studies of the next stages as well as green growth governance case studies focusing on subfields and fewer actors.

2. The context of green growth and global environmental governance

I have identified five academic approaches to Green Growth Studies. The list mentions illustrative examples only. Green growth is studied as

(1) a buzz word, an empty shell, or yet another green label (Bowen and Fankhauser 2011);

(2) part of a general “turn by liberal theorists to environmental concerns” (Meyer 2011, p. 357) resulting in neoliberal rhetoric emphasising economic

⁷⁶ Although mainly developed for national scale analyses.

growth (Christoff and Eckersley 2013, see also Urhammer and Røpke 2013) to the detriment of the social pillar of sustainable development (Hsiao and Hsiao 2011);

(3) a new (national) economic policy programme (Jacobs 2013, Zysman and Huberty 2014);

(4) a new type of hybrid diplomacy and international strategic action of middle power states (often with South Korea as case) (Shapiro 2009, Seung 2014, Watson and Pandey 2014, Author)⁷⁷, sometimes taking the shape of an overseas development aid strategy focusing on own economic interests and infrastructure projects (Kalinowski and Cho 2012, Tonami and Müller 2014); and

(5) part of a new growth ethics discourse (Methmann 2010, Ferguson 2015), or a new macroeconomic narrative responding to the crises complex of economic, environmental, and social problems (Urhammer and Røpke 2013).

Many policy studies complement the third and fourth approach (e.g. UNEP 2010, GGGI 2011, Hallegatte *et al.* 2011, OECD 2011, UNDESA 2012). Green Growth Studies is, however often case-based, and we do not know exactly when and how green growth emerged and spread, what actors and issues it encompasses, and thus how it is organised as a global governance phenomenon. These questions are not systematically and thoroughly being studied. A preliminary search reveals that green growth as label is central in many organisations like the Seoul Initiative Network for Green Growth (SINGG), the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), the Global Green Growth Forum (3GF), and the Green Growth Best Practice Initiative (GGBP). Actors⁷⁸ behind these

⁷⁷ See also [Author] for review of Korea green growth studies.

⁷⁸ A full list of 381 identified green growth actors is provided in the appendix.

organisations support green growth by producing and disseminating policy papers, participating in conferences elaborating on the meaning of green growth as concept and policy by developing and implementing policy plans. Furthermore, green growth draws on the global context of the financial crisis and the climate crisis, and is heralded as a win-win-win solution in support of the three pillars of sustainable development (see also Jacobs 2013, Urhammer and Røpke 2013). There are several definitions and content of green growth (UNDESA 2012), but I begin with a definition from the Green Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP), because it was established by central actors in global governance; the World Bank, OECD, UNEP, and the Global Green Growth Institute:

‘Green growth means fostering economic growth and development, while ensuring that natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our well-being relies. It focuses on the synergies and tradeoffs between the environmental and economic pillars of sustainable development. Importantly, green growth does not neglect the social pillar; on the contrary, without good governance, transparency, and equity, no transformative growth strategy can succeed.’ (GGKP 2012).

Asking about the emergence and spread of green growth could be analysed with the dominant global environmental governance approaches; regime theory or multi-level governance theory (Okereke and Bulkeley 2007).⁷⁹ The choice of one over the other, however, will skew the analysis as some theoretical-empirical problems are yet to be resolved as argued above. Regime theory is skewed towards states and material interests at the international level missing

⁷⁹ Okereke and Bulkeley (2007) also discuss two non-traditional approaches; “neo-Gramscian” and “governmentality” approaches.

the importance and independent role of non-state actors, ideas, and governance taking place at multiple levels. Multi-level governance theory takes the opposite stance. In other areas of International Relations analysis such as security and diplomacy, a Bourdieusian research agenda has proven very useful and innovative in bridging dichotomies and explaining social change (Neumann 2002, Bigo 2005, Adler 2008, Pouliot 2008, Adler and Pouliot 2011, Bigo and Madsen 2011a, Adler-Nissen 2013a).

3. Theoretical perspectives: Field theory and global governance

I develop and apply the *field* concept to analyse green growth. A field is a mesolevel concept that delineates a socially constructed space. The approach is theoretically informed, and based on thorough empirical analysis, which ensures that I do not overemphasize one type of actor over others or one type of field logic over others, when analysing how green growth is emerging as a field.

‘This relational approach suggests a research agenda on the practices of transnational activities which avoids simplistic boundaries between domestic and international arenas and examines the historical trajectories through which some social universes extend their circuit of legitimization of authorities and expertise in the world.’ (Bigo and Madsen 2011b, p. 221).

I do not theorise the field – and thus the governance taking place in the field – at a specific discrete place like *the international level* and/or *the domestic level* (cf. critique from Bulkeley and Newell 2010, p. 8, Adler-Nissen 2013b, p. 10, Scholte 2014, pp. 6-8, 13-15). This does not mean that the state is not recognised, only that I do not conflate the empirical concept of the state with a theoretical one dominant in many theories and their ontologies. The critical edge of a field approach compared to both regime theory and multi-level

governance theory is the focus on social domination and power, which adds two important elements to my analysis: a more reflexive understanding of the state as powerful, “the holder of meta-capital due to its privileged position in the center of the field of power” (Pouliot and Mérand 2013, p. 36); and a more sociological understanding of the power plays of actors in relation to green growth.

Although the concept of field helps avoid the state versus non-state and other dichotomies (Bigo 2011, p. 226), IR scholars also recognise that “the *field* is a fuzzy term” in concrete analyses of fields and their relations (Adler-Nissen 2013b, p. 13). Many field analyses by IR scholars deal with the specific case of the European Union and tend to treat the field *ex post facto* (Kauppi 2003, Bigo 2005, Adler-Nissen 2011).⁸⁰ The general field theory of Fligstein and McAdam (2012) is more useful as a theoretical model of emergence and spread of a new field. They have synthesised many converging field approaches from across disciplines, however, excluding International Relations thus reifying the global-domestic dichotomy. I seek to remedy this by adapting and applying Fligstein and McAdam’s field theory to the global governance problem of emergence and spread of green growth. I analyse green growth in line with the fourth and fifth approach mentioned above foregrounding the discursive and contingent strategic action of actors promoting an essentially contested concept.

To Fligstein and McAdam, it is important for analysts to understand and identify the possible contestations or different social projects or actors (2012, p. 171). In line with this as well as Bourdieu’s analysis of language and symbolic power (1991), I understand green growth as part of a linguistic struggle between both competing and complementing policy concepts such as sustainable development, ecological modernisation, low carbon, zero carbon, de-growth, etc. I argue that green growth as a concept is connected to actors, their positions

⁸⁰ Pouliot and Mérand (2013, 34-35) mention Yves Choula (2002) and Yves Buchet de Neuilly (2005) as examples of field analyses in Francophone IR.

and agendas within global environmental governance already full of other policy concepts, and thus it is an essentially contested concept. Further,

‘to use an essentially contested concept means to use it against other uses and to recognize that one's own use of it has to be maintained against these other uses. Still more simply, to use an essentially contested concept means to use it both aggressively and defensively.’
(Gallie 1956, p. 172).

Fligstein and McAdam's field theory highlights fields as places of strategic collective action (and problems). Any field analysis should identify members (based on members own criteria), boundaries although contingent, and what is perceived to be at stake in relation to different positions and perspectives (2012, p. 10-11). The central concepts are *strategic action fields*, *field incumbents*, *challengers*, and *internal governance units*.

‘Strategic action fields are the fundamental units of collective action in society. A strategic action field is a constructed mesolevel social order in which actors (who can be individual or collective) are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others in the field (including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action in the field.’ (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012, p. 9).

Fields are dynamic social spaces always changing, which range from the piecemeal to fundamental change. Fields are settled or unsettled; the former varying from high to low consensus as well as hierarchical to equal, whereas the latter exists as a new situation if the field ruptures (Fligstein and McAdam 2012,

p. 83-113). Fields can relate to each other in three ways; unconnected, dependent (hierarchical), or interdependent (reciprocal). Larger social fields like the state are composed of smaller subfields, which might be related to each other within the state or to other subfields in other states. Fields can be linked to each other directly, when actors in two fields sustain routine interaction, or indirectly through ties to a third field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012).

Incumbents are the dominant actors whose perspective is heavily represented in the organisation of the field, whereas *challengers* are less privileged mostly conforming “grudgingly” to the order of things, taking what comes and waiting for opportunities to advance or change the field more fundamentally, in which case challengers would become the new incumbents (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, p. 13). A distinct feature in this field theory is the concept of *internal governance unit* (IGU) which is created by incumbents and ‘charged with overseeing compliance with field rules and, in general, facilitating the overall smooth functioning and reproduction of the system’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, p. 13-14). The concept of IGU fits well with the insight from global governance theory that authority (both formal and informal) has been delegated or moved from states to non-state actors (Rosenau 1992, Strippel and Stephan 2013: 149). The IGUs are organisations or associations set up (or co-opted) by incumbents with direct and indirect purposes. IGUs free incumbents of governance tasks and field management which they spent time on during field establishment. IGUs are ideational and material symbols of legitimacy; they collect and analyse data and disseminate the official and standardised version of how to view the world. IGUs are also used as liaisons with relevant external fields (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, pp. 14, 77ff). Generally, ‘governance units can be expected to serve as defenders of the status quo and are a ... conservative force during periods of conflict within the strategic action field.’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, p. 14).

In terms of analysing governance in its substance, Fligstein and McAdam suggest focusing on rules governing legitimate action in the field as well as each actor's different interpretive frames reflecting their position and power in the field. In Fligstein and McAdam's perspective, the state seems to be the final outer boundary of social action and a theoretical actor with near-total influence over fields and IGUs, however, multi-level governance has pointed to the existence of transnational fields, where actors like cities, businesses, or local political representatives do not necessarily deal with states and can act politically as states would (Neumann 2002, Bulkeley and Newell 2010). In the words of Jan Aart Scholte:

'[G]overnance under conditions of large-scale globalization has come to involve more than states. Authority has become increasingly 'multi-level' or 'multi-scalar' across substate (municipal and provincial) bodies and suprastate (macro-regional and transworld) agencies as state organs. In addition, various private sector and civil society actors have taken on regulatory roles.' (2005, p. 25).

In global governance, authority is no longer the prerogative of states, and the concept of IGU should be decoupled from the state's domination and creation, and should be understood to have and be able to exert its own authority beyond state dominance in the field. IGUs in this view possess the political authority to define the rules of the game, to render some practices more adequate than others, and hold symbolic capital like states. Incumbents can be both state and non-state actors, and they can all set up new IGUs. The social recognition in the field of the IGU's authority is what is important in this regard. By identifying the incumbents, challengers, and IGUs, and how they are connected, the field(s) and power relations will become visible. 'Following the historical trajectories of these actions permits us to understand their deployment, the limited repertoires

that each social universe constitutes, and also to unpack the strategies through which any durable institution is legitimized.’ (Bigo 2011, p. 228).

4. Drawing up the field of green growth

In this section I explain my model of analysis and sources. Field emergence and spread is rarely studied and analysed systematically and in-depth (Fligstein and McAdam 2012, Padgett and Powell 2012), although social media network analyses offer methodological insights (Hansen *et al.* 2011). My approach to identify the members of a new green growth field and how it is organised, I explore the practices of and relations between actors who have begun to use the term green growth proactively. Applying a field theory approach, the analysis of field emergence and spread should be theoretically informed but empirically driven. Secondly, the model of analysis is to delineate the field to identify incumbents, IGUs, patterned practices, relations, and possible subfields. The broad scale of the field analysis does not allow in-depth identification of challengers, but will establish the needed first step to do so in future studies.

In field analysis, a common method is to draw the field to visualise actors and relations to bring to light the trajectories forming the logic of transformation of the field(s) (cf. Bigo 2011, p. 237). However, no standard method is suggested, only the mixed methods approach associated with practice and field theory. Fligstein and McAdam suggest a thorough empirical data collection and analysis to draw up the field and actor relations, but warn against computer programmes that automatically draw networks (fields) with no prior conceptual thinking by the analyst about the network. Many field analyses, they argue, falsely take the computer generated drawings to correspond to the field in question (2012, p. 214). To draw the field *theoretically informed*, I apply the theoretical concepts explained above to my empirical sources. I follow the

empirically driven ‘database approach’ of Bulkeley *et al.* (2014)⁸¹ and apply the qualitative *method of display*. This is especially suitable in cases of inter-linkages and interdependencies between the studied objects.

The method of display

Firstly, the method presents relationships and trajectories over time to illustrate how the parts relate in systemic patterns that were not otherwise visible, and, secondly, provides the researcher with new knowledge to rethink categories and theoretical claims (Dahler-Larsen 2010, p. 205). The method should present data through displays authentically, inclusively, transparently, and easy to read and understand (Dahler-Larsen 2010, pp. 195-199). An ‘authentic display’ shows the sources as they are. This is to illustrate to the reader and the researcher that the display has not ‘jumped to a conclusion’ that the sources cannot bear. An ‘inclusive display’ shows all sources and categories representing sources. This is to secure that anomalies are identified, and that categories and expectations can be rethought, and to secure that conclusions can be made on the basis of all sources. This can also make the displays rather complex or big. A ‘transparent display’ relates to how the displays are built and explaining that. The displays are used to conclude from the visible to more conceptual claims thus connecting the sources with the theoretical model. Building displays is an iterative learning process based on qualitative analysis, and it usually takes many attempts (Dahler-Larsen 2010, p. 209).

Sources

I have collected a range of publicly available green growth sources from which I analyse the emergence and spread of the green growth field. I have included sources found through a range of search methods; internet searches using the

⁸¹ See method description in Bulkeley *et al.* (2014, p. 17-37) explaining building the database to identify transnational climate change governance networks.

words “green growth”, marking and collecting other sources referenced by initial “green growth” sources, collecting material at events (including taking notes and photos), and in interviews and conversations also asking for references to sources.⁸² I have only included green growth actors, practices and events that are beyond the scale of actors’ internal jurisdiction, which means I have not included many sources pertaining to green growth activities that are not connected to actors outside of a given nation state. Also, I have not included academics unless they participate in relation with other actors.⁸³ It has not been practically possible to include sources at this smaller scale, if the global scale and breadth was to be kept. Similarly, the individual actor scale is not included, although I have identified some individual actors with central roles (like economist Nicolas Stern, former President of South Korea Lee Myung-bak, and former President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón).

Sources were collected between April 2011 to December 2014 (for this paper, but collection is ongoing). My collection of sources consists of more than 1,000 units of different type; official documents, copies of designated green growth webpages, press releases, annual reports, summit agendas and declarations, meeting agendas and minutes, policy reports and papers, academic works, news articles, own field notes and visual documentation from 10 participatory observations. In addition I have conducted 30 interviews and conversations with central actors (See also appendix for further description). In the course of this project I have been identified by practitioners and journalists as an “expert on green growth” and have accepted invitations to participate in public debate (newspaper, radio, TV, online, and public meetings) based on my

⁸² I have limited the search to English language sources, thereby restricting the representation of the field. However, given the global scale of the analysis, and that many sources are from non-English speaking actors, I argue that this lack of other potential sources is not causing significant mis-representation.

⁸³ Likely the first academic contribution on green growth predating the governance phenomenon is Colby (1989) which associates green growth with ecological development and ecological economics.

academic knowledge of green growth. Some actors have also invited me to closed working group meetings for input. These experiences of participatory observations gave new insights and sources, but also confirmed that a new governance field had emerged, and that I had also become part of it.

The database approach

Following the innovative methodology of Bulkeley *et al.*, I first developed a database to analyse the green growth field. I constructed a list of global green growth events in chronological order including the actors directly involved in those events as well as their formal relations.⁸⁴ The list covers more than 200 events (meetings, conferences, launching of new organisations, signings of memoranda of understanding, etc.) beginning in 2005. For practical reasons I only include events until December 2013.⁸⁵ This list containing about 25,000 words is not visually helpful, thus not included as a display. From this list, I identified 379 collective actors and their formal relationships with other actors. Formal relationship includes e.g. membership in green growth organisations; financial commitments; MOUs, partnerships, joint projects, and alliances; and participation in working groups or other networks. To make the displays simpler, I did not include non-green growth relationships, e.g. EU countries' membership in the EU. I developed the database using Microsoft Excel, where I listed the actors in the first column, and year of entry in the field in the second column. I then developed nine actor categories to distinguish the actors in types: City; Company; Development, finance and investment; Forum and network; Multilateral organisation; NGO; Region; Research and policy; and State. Regions can be both within and cross state borders. Research and policy actors include think tanks, universities, and independent institutes and agencies. States

⁸⁴ I have not included actors who only participate in different green growth event as participation at a meeting or conference is not enough to be recognised by other incumbents as an incumbent in the field. And participants' lists are difficult to obtain.

⁸⁵ This list of events and full database is available through Author.

include government agencies and government dependent institutes. From these two displays I began identifying networks or subfields, added each network in its own column in the master display, and identified the members (with a ‘yes’ or ‘no’). I have then utilised different tools in Excel to analyse and visualise the data in various ways. The software NodeXL was used to generate display 3 and 4 using the Fruchterman-Reingold layout.⁸⁶ Although a computer-based generation, as analysts I had to re-arrange and define actors, thus staying true to theory and method of display. See appendix for a full list of actors.

5. Analysing and visualising the green growth governance field

The analysis of emergence and spread of the green growth field is based on four displays each of which provides answers but also helps ask further questions to develop the following displays. Display 1 summarises the identified 379 green growth actors according to type and time of entrance in the field. Display 2 summarises the establishment of 19 green growth networks (constituting subfields) and the IGU connected with each network. These displays visualise when and from where green growth emerged and spread, which I then explore through content analysis of sources. Incumbents are identified as those actors who support and actively apply green growth in their political activities. I identify IGUs as those actors who are central to each subfield in its management and functioning; collective actors specifically created or at least charged with overseeing and maybe regulating a part of the green growth field. Display 3 illustrates the green growth field as a network of subfields, incumbents, and IGUs. Display 4 is an enlargement of the centre of display 3, highlighting the most connected actors, IGUs, and subfields.

⁸⁶ ‘The Fruchterman-Reingold layout is a force-directed layout algorithm, which treats edges like springs that move vertices closer or further from each other in an attempt to find an equilibrium that minimizes the “energy” of the system’ (Hansen et al. 2011, p. 96).

Emergence and spread of the green growth field

Display 1 depicted below is an overview table of the number of actors based on type and year of entry in the field. Display 1 illustrates, firstly, that green growth emerged in 2005 with seven different actors; secondly, by 2009, 36 additional actors were engaged, in aggregate 43 actors or 12 percent of the 379 actors who had joined by 2013, and thirdly, in 2010, the number of actors increased significantly with 107 new actors, and again in 2012 with 111 actors. It suggests that emergence began in 2005 and that some form of change occurred in 2008, 2010, and 2012 (or just before). I focus on these years initially. Relationships between actors are not visible in this display. Thus, green growth could have emerged in either a scattered or concerted manner. To know this, I turn to display 2 further below, which lists the 19 different networks established from 2005 to 2013.

From 2005 to 2007 green growth was mainly organised and developed within and by UNESCAP and Korea through the Seoul Initiative Network on Green Growth (SINGG) proposed by Korea and established at UNESCAP's Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development in Asia and the Pacific (MCED5), 24-29 March 2005 held in Korea (Jones and Yoo 2011, footnote 2, UNESCAP 2012). At MCED5, Japan and the Japanese think tank Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) also accepted to include green growth in their UNESCAP-project, the Kitakyushu Initiative, although Japan was and is proponent of the concept of low carbon society.

Display 1. Number and type of green growth actors' year of entrance (2005-2013).

Actor type \ Year	Year									Total No.	Total %
	05	06	07	08	09	10	11	12	13		
State	2		2	4	10	26	20	5	26	95	25
Company		1			1	14	8	20	20	64	17
Research and policy	1			1	2	10	3	26	4	47	13
Forum and network	1			4	3	14	3	15	5	45	12
Development, finance and investment					1	7	8	21	4	41	11
City	2					21	2	11		36	9
Multilateral organisation	1			2	5	12	8	7		35	9
Region						2	6	2		10	3
NGO						1	2	3		6	2
Total	7	1	2	11	22	107	60	110	59	379	100
Aggregated, no.	7	8	10	21	43	150	210	320	379		
Aggregated, %	2	2	3	6	12	40	56	85	100		

The concept paper (MCED 2005) presented shows some resemblance to the ideas found in economist Paul Ekins' book, *Economic Growth Human Welfare and Environmental Sustainability: The Prospects for Green Growth* (1999), e.g. it mentions 'ecological efficiency' and a 'new Green Growth paradigm' which harmonises 'economic growth' with 'environmental sustainability.' However, the main focus is on the specific Asia-Pacific problems related to the combination of population growth, rapid economic growth, poverty, and environmental degradation. In this approach, green growth is presented as a solution to deal with the unintended ecological consequences of economic growth, since many parts of Asia is experiencing high and rapid growth rates. This is different from declarations by G8 which becomes part of the field in 2008, and begins to present green growth as a solution to a lack of economic growth:

‘The interlinked challenges of climate change, energy security and the sustainable and efficient use of natural resources are amongst the most important issues to be tackled in the strategic perspective of ensuring global sustainability. A shift towards green growth will provide an important contribution to the economic and financial crisis recovery. We must seize the opportunity to build on synergies between actions to combat climate change and economic recovery initiatives, and encourage growth and sustainable development worldwide.’ (G8 2009 Declaration, paragraph 60).

Display 1 illustrates that 2008 and 2009 saw new actors enter the field. For these actors, the financial crisis was the new problem to frame solutions in relation to. The field began to move in two directions while it was still emerging: 1) an Asia-Pacific and 2) a global financial crisis direction. However, President of the Republic of Korea, Lee Myung-bak (2008-2013), did a lot to merge the two. In July 2008, he put green growth on the agenda at the G8 Extended Summit, and later on 15 August 2008, President Lee made green growth the centre of a new vision at the 60th anniversary of the founding of Korea. Lee’s agenda-setting also took place at the 2008 ASEM Summit, and in 2009, Korea chaired and assisted in preparing the OECD meeting together with among others Denmark as COP15 president, and green growth became a central part of the 2009 OECD declaration (OECD 2009, Jones and Yoo 2011, footnote 2; Interview with Helen Mountford, Deputy Director, Environment Directorate, OECD, 7 December 2012, Doha, Qatar). In Korea’s ‘Framework Act on Low Carbon, Green Growth’ it is clearly formulated that Korea understands green growth both as a national and an international strategy. Through national examples Korea is to spread the green growth policy concept internationally:

‘[The Framework Act] mandates strengthening environmental diplomacy to tackle climate change and to increase international cooperation as a world leader in the field of green growth. It promotes information sharing and networking with international organizations and foreign governments to jointly pursue global green growth.’ (GGGI 2011, p. 30).

Indicative of field spread, the first big increase in members happened in 2010. Sources tell a story of a new crisis. Green growth is seen as a solution to the failure of the UN climate negotiations, which failed to deliver the expected global agreement at COP15 in Copenhagen in December 2009. Another big increase came in 2012. This development came at a time, when green growth was one of the official themes at first the G20 Summit in Mexico and then the Rio+20 Summit. Korea’s role in this agenda-setting and spread together with partners in the Green Growth Alliance (Denmark and Mexico) is further analysed below in relation to display 2. First, I want to highlight that display 1 also illustrates other characteristics of field membership. States dominate the field in numbers (95) followed by companies (64); research and policy (47); forums and networks (45); development, finance and investment (41); cities (36); and multilateral organisations (35). A few regions (10) are involved, but almost no NGOs (6). This composition indicates that the green growth field was state driven at least until 2010 when most companies and other non-state actors entered. I follow Bernstein, who suggests that liberal environmentalism spread from government action which empowered other actors (2001, p. 181). Many sources use the language of public-private partnerships. Furthermore, in terms of diverse membership, the green growth field mirrors the general recognition that a state-centrist governance approach is not the right solution to the three crises mentioned, especially after the failure of COP15. However, the display does not illustrate roles and connections between these actors, which is what I

have sought to illustrate in the next display illustrating 19 green growth networks constituting the subfields of the larger green growth governance field.

Display 2. Establishment of 19 green growth networks

Network	Initiated by	Established	No. of members	IGU	IGU's no. of member-ships
Seoul Initiative Network for Green Growth	Korea	March 2005	23	SINGG	2
UNESCAP's green growth network	Korea	March 2005	47	UN-ESCAP	8
East Asia Climate Partnership	Korea	July 2008	22	EACP	3
ASEM (Asia Europe Meeting) green growth network	Korea	October 2008	30	ASEIC	2
Donor Committee for Enterprise Development's green growth working group	Germany and UNDP	January 2010	26	DCED	1
Nordic Council of Minister's green growth working group	Denmark	May 2010	7	NCM	2
Green Growth Cities	OECD	May 2010	61	OECD	10
Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)	Korea	June 2010	103	GGGI	8
Green Growth Leaders	Monday Morning	September 2010*	26	MM	1
Astana Green Bridge Initiative	Kazakhstan and UNESCAP	October 2010	29	UN-ESCAP	8
Green Growth Alliance (including the Global Green Growth Forum (3GF))	Denmark and Korea	December 2010	66	3GF	6
Green Growth Initiative	AfDB	February 2011**	62	AfDB	4

STRING green growth network	STRING members***	September 2011	7	STRING	1
Mekong region's green growth network	Vietnam, ADB, UK, UNEP, WWF, Denmark	December 2011	14	GGGI	8
Green Growth Knowledge Platform	World Bank (with GGGI, UNEP, and OECD)	January 2012	46	GGKP	2
C40 green growth network	New York and Copenhagen	March 2012	18	Copenhagen	6
G2A2 – Green Growth Action Alliance	B20 Task Force on Green Growth	June 2012	59	WEF	4
Green Growth Best Practice	GGGI, CDKN, the European Climate Foundation, and Germany	October 2012	37	GGBP	3
Green Growth Group	The Prince of Wales EU Corporate Leaders Group and Cambridge University	October 2013	29	CPSL	1

* In July 2012, GGL was transformed into a different international network named Sustainia with a broader focus on sustainable development. Sustainia is not found to be a member of other green growth networks, and is no longer included in the green growth field.

**It has not been possible to verify exactly when the AfDB established GGI, so I have used the earliest presentation of its green growth strategy for Africa.

*** It has not been possible to confirm, who put green growth on the agenda, however, the STRING Political Forum, where the green growth vision was adopted, took place in Denmark (STRING 2011).

Display 2 illustrates that Korea and Asia stand out in the early years. Korea establishes two networks in 2005, two in 2008, and two in 2010, one of which is

the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI). GGGI is further part of establishing three new networks. Displays 1 and 2 suggest that the green growth field begins to develop and spread more globally from 2008 gaining pace in 2010. Through Korea's strategic action⁸⁷ of agenda setting, organisation building, and financing Korea targets platforms in Asia like ASEM and also establishes the East Asia Climate Partnership, and targets global platforms like the OECD, G8, G20, and different United Nations organisations. Display 2 also illustrate that several actors take part in establishing new green growth networks. First of all, Denmark stands out, because of the spread of Danish actors from government to regions, the City of Copenhagen, and the energy companies involved in the B20 network, and because Danish actors participate globally. Secondly, multilateral organisations like the OECD, World Bank and UNEP are central to many networks. Other central initiating actors are the usual suspects like Germany and UK, but also relatively new in global governance, Vietnam and Kazakhstan, in close cooperation with Korea and the GGGI.

Korea and Denmark, together with host of COP16, Mexico, began to promote green growth in connection with UNFCCC events as a supplementary process to the UNFCCC negotiations, and in 2010 they established the Green Growth Alliance, which was joined by China, Kenya, Qatar (2012), and Ethiopia (2014). Korea and Denmark have been shaping green growth to encompass public private partnerships through investments in the green sector and market-driven principles, but have kept green growth connected to the aim of contributing to global development and fighting poverty, while also positioning Korea and Denmark as responsible members of the global community. Bridging the North-South divide is a central goal of the Green Growth Alliance (Presidential Committee on Green Growth 2012, 3GF 2010, 12 May 2011, Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, 20 January 2012). In 2010, Korea and Denmark further establish the Global Green Growth

⁸⁷ For extended analysis see (Author).

Institute (GGGI) and the Global Green Growth Forum (3GF) respectively. GGGI transforms to a fully-fledged international organisation in 2012, still headquartered in Korea. 3GF is both a forum and the secretariat of the Green Growth Alliance placed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Both 3GF and GGGI have actively promoted green growth at own summits and to other platforms like the UNFCCC, G20, and Rio+20 Summits.

Display 2 also illustrates that the field with 19 green growth networks is global in scope, but stronger in Asia, Northern Europe, and Africa with support from the development community. The networks have developed into subfields all with IGUs either created to oversee, regulate, or carry out other governance functions, or an incumbent has been given or taken on the role of IGU. Seven of the identified IGUs (SINGG, EACP, GGKP, GGBP, ASEIC, GGGI, and 3GF) are set up by Korea alone or in partnerships. The GGGI as an IO also functions as IGU of other subfields. In display 2 central actors are states; companies; multilateral organisations; and development, finance, and investment actors like development banks. The most connected IGUs are OECD, UNESCAP, and GGGI with ten, eight and eight network memberships correspondingly. These central positions give these three actors relatively more power than other IGUs and incumbents.


One such powerful subfield and IGU is the Green Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP) proposed by the World Bank and established together with the OECD, GGGI, and UNEP. The stated purpose of the GGKP is to develop and spread green growth in theory and practice, which we should to reflect the perspectives of the initiating actors. The GGKP is also actively supported by a long range of actors in the field. Recalling the GGKP's definition of green growth presented above, we see that it is different from the focus of other networks, e.g. UNESCAP or Kazakhstan who focus more on poverty eradication and environmental measures, and security issues respectively. Subfields each have their focus, but are nevertheless all connected and thus

contribute to a wide range of policy issues that green growth covers. These range from climate mitigation and adaptation, development, finance and investment in both North and South, environment, energy, water, forests, agriculture, trade, business and industry, technology, security, labour, health, education, and community-building. Continuing with understanding the subfields and how actors are connected, I mapped all incumbents and IGUs formal connections to the identified networks, which I present in the next two displays.

Connecting the dots

Display 3 illustrates a simple relational organisation of the green growth field with two types of actors; incumbents (small circle) and IGUs (solid diamond) and their formal memberships (line) of networks (solid square). Even though the display cannot portray actors' motives for participation and connections, or their understandings and contestations of green growth, the display still tells many stories about the green growth field. The first story is about centrally and marginally positioned incumbents and IGUs. There are different areas with different levels of connections. Around three quarters of incumbents are only members of one or two networks. Centrally positioned incumbents and IGUs are members of many networks and gravitate in the field towards Asian and European networks, which each constitute a subfield. Taken together they also constitute a larger subfield or a core where the 20 most connected actors are Korea (13 memberships), UNEP (12), OECD (10), Denmark (9), Germany (9), China (9), GGGI (8), UNESCAP (8), UNIDO (8), World Bank (8), EU (7), Japan (7), Netherlands (7), ADB (7), 3GF (6), Copenhagen (6), Indonesia (6), UK (6), Vietnam (6), and UNDP (6). This is further illustrated in display 4.

Display 3: The green growth governance field (in 2013)



Legend:
 Small circle = incumbent
 Solid square = subfield
 Solid diamond = IGU
 Line = formal relationship

North-South divide, and bridging multiple issues besides climate change or environment. This really illustrates that neither regime theory nor multi-level governance theory can adequately be applied in analysis of green growth governance.

Korea and Denmark stand out because they are also behind the centrally positioned IGUs, the GGGI and 3GF. Further, the Danish capital, Copenhagen, is also centrally positioned as both incumbent and IGU of the C40 green growth thereby potentially acting as a bridge-builder between the centre and margins of the field. What the display of the larger field also illustrates is that green growth can be characterised as multi-actor and multi-issue, because actors participate with each their perspective on green growth and priorities of issues. This poses both a positive development of climate governance and a negative one. It is positive that actors are working together across formal boundaries and jurisdictions trying to connect issues and governance problems. It seems that green growth governance has solved one the problems of UNFCCC stalemate; getting China and other developing economies to take on global responsibility. However, this transscalar, multi-issue, and multi-actor global governance phenomenon also poses challenges of knowing when and if action is effective.

6. Conclusion

In this paper I asked how we can explain the emergence and spread of green growth as a global environmental governance phenomenon. Although green growth is a noticeable policy concept and practice, and there are at least five academic approaches to green growth, no analysis of the emergence and spread of green growth exist. I first argued that dominant theoretical approaches to the study of global environmental governance, regime theory and multi-level governance theory, are misleading in their preoccupation with false dichotomies. Secondly, I argued that a sociological approach would be more adequate. I developed a field approach based on recent insights from the

practice turn in IR and specifically concepts from Fligstein and McAdam's (2012) field theory, highlighting a field as a meso-level social order consisting of incumbents, challengers and what they term Internal Governance Units (IGUs). This theoretical model informed my empirically-driven analysis based on a database approach and the method of display; a qualitative approach to the study and visual organisation of a large quantity of sources.

My displays and analysis highlighted the following concerning emergence and spread of green growth. It began as a distinct Asian policy project in 2005–2008 as a collaboration driven by primarily Korea and UNESCAP within the social fit of specific Asian discourses about social, environmental, and economic problems. From 2008 onwards, newly elect President Lee of Korea further spread green growth more globally through agenda-setting practices in relation to G8, G20, OECD, UNEP, and World Bank and drawing on the financial crisis as opportunity to get Western actors on board. At this point, green growth became seen as a solution to lack of growth (in Western societies). From 2010, Korea was joined by several other actors like Denmark and Mexico and increasingly also the business, research, and development communities. Green growth was further interpreted in relation to the failure of UNFCCC governance (COP15) to deliver a global agreement, but also of the UNFCCC's regime inability to incorporate non-state actors and bridge the North-South divide. Two interesting examples of green growth bridge-building practices are seen in relation to GGGI and 3GF, who incorporate all actor types and several issues illustrating that green growth in some subfields is transscalar, multi-actor, and multi-issue.

As many have noted before, the financial crisis plays a significant role in the framing and global acceptance of green growth (Urhammer and Røpke 2013); however, it emerged in 2005, and it is in 2010, and 2012 some years after the financial crisis hit that the field expands significantly. Green growth should rather be seen as mirroring two general trends; firstly a further

development of what Bernstein calls the compromise of liberal environmentalism (2001). My analysis demonstrates that green growth is driven by state practices which then empower non-state actors, especially those who become IGUs. I would, however, go further than Bernstein following Fligstein and McAdam and argue that different actors in the same field have different interpretations of green growth (and liberal environmentalism, that we should study these through practices. With states dominating the green growth field, we should also consider that liberalism or neoliberalism comes in different forms, and green growth from a state perspective is then closer to neoliberalism's intellectual roots in the German Freiberg School and ordoliberalism as a moderate economic philosophy (Boas and Gans-Morse 2009). Secondly, the general trend in climate governance of 'the concurrent demise of effective megamultilateral treaty-making and the rapid emergence, but uncertain effectiveness, of new initiatives' (Hoffmann 2011, p. 10). The financial crisis and other crises are in this view parts of, but not direct causes of, the attraction and further spread of green growth, and so each subfield develops according to own social fit and actor interpretations.

I do not claim to have covered the whole field, all actors, and events as the search was limited to English and other criteria, however, the scope and diversity of actors and networks identified as well as the significantly larger number of sources gathered compared to other green growth studies provide a solid foundation for rethinking new climate governance approaches and theoretical claims. It does so, firstly because it connects the actors and demonstrates that green growth is not a collection of diverse and separated governance approaches, but a field containing subfields with some field incumbents and Internal Governance Units spanning several of these subfields. Furthermore, the field approach with focus on relations also highlight possible differences in power positions distinguishing between central and marginal actors in the field. I have demonstrated that global governance innovation has

come from states, companies, multilateral organisations and the development banks – and perhaps surprising to some began in Asia and through strategic effort by relatively few actors has spread globally becoming an organising concept bringing in multiple issues and actors. This overview of central and marginal incumbents and IGUs will be an excellent starting point for further analysis of green growth governance. Future research should seek to explore at least three topics to understand how green growth governance will evolve: First, how are the centrally positioned collective actors themselves organised as strategic action fields, where actors struggle for positions and authority to define the content of green growth? Second, how is green growth implemented, where, by whom, with what purpose, and how effective is it? And third, how are both central and marginal incumbents and IGUs connected as liaisons with other strategic action fields like the UNFCCC, the global energy sector, and the global development sector, and how do these fields relate to each other?

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Appendix 1: List of green growth actors alphabetically ordered after abbreviated name. Actors described with full name, year of entry in green growth field, and type of actor.

Abbreviated name	Full name	Year	Type
2030 Water Resources Group	2030 Water Resources Group	2013	Forum and network
2iE	International Institute for Water and Environmental Engineering	2012	Research and policy
3GF	Global Green Growth Forum	2010	Forum and network
ABB	ABB	2011	Company
Abu Dhabi	Abu Dhabi	2011	City
Accenture	Accenture	2012	Company
Acciona	Acciona	2013	Company
Adaptation Fund	Adaptation Fund	2011	Development, finance and investment
ADB	Asian Development Bank	2010	Development, finance and investment
AfDB	African Development Bank	2011	Development, finance and investment
AFFM	Africa Fertiliser Financing Mechanism	2011	Development, finance and investment
AFoCO	Asian Forest Cooperation Organization	2011	Multilateral organisation
AIT	Asian Institute of Technology	2008	Research and policy
Alcatel-Lucent	Alcatel-Lucent	2012	Company
Alphen aan de Rijn	Alphen aan de Rijn	2010	City
Alstom	Alstom	2013	Company
Amsterdam	Amsterdam	2012	City
Angola	Angola	2013	State
APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation	2010	Forum and network
Applied Materials	Applied Materials	2012	Company
APRSCP	Asia Pacific Roundtable for Sustainable Consumption and Production	2008	Forum and network
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations	2009	Multilateral organisation
ASEF	Asia-Europe Foundation	2010	Multilateral organisation

ASEIC	ASEM SME's Eco-Innovation Center	2010	Forum and network
ASEM	Asia-Europe Meeting	2008	Forum and network
ASFGGSME	ASEM Forum on Green Growth and SMEs	2008	Forum and network
Astana	Astana	2010	City
ATAG	Air Transport Action Group (ATAG)	2012	Forum and network
ATPSN	African Technology Policy Studies Network	2013	Research and policy
AUC	African Union Commission	2011	Multilateral organisation
Australia	Australia	2009	State
Austria	Austria	2011	State
Aviva	Aviva	2013	Development, finance and investment
AWF	African Water Facility	2011	Development, finance and investment
AWNGAD	Asian Women's Network on Gender and Development	2012	Forum and network
Azerbaijan	Azerbaijan	2010	State
B20	B20	2010	Forum and network
B4E	Business for the Environment	2010	Forum and network
BAC Economic Institute	Bay Area Council Economic Institute	2010	Research and policy
Bangladesh	Bangladesh	2009	State
Bank of America	Bank of America Merrill Lynch	2012	Development, finance and investment
Barclays	Barclays Capital	2012	Development, finance and investment
Barilla	Barilla	2013	Company
BASF	BASF	2013	Company
Beijing	Beijing	2012	City
Beijing Normal University	Beijing Normal University (School of Economics and Resource Management)	2012	Research and policy
Belarus	Belarus	2013	State
Belgium	Belgium	2013	State
Bhutan	Bhutan	2010	State
BIG	Bjarke Ingels Group	2010	Company
Bloomberg Phil	Bloomberg Philanthropies	2010	Development, finance and investment
BNEF	Bloomberg New Energy Finance	2012	Company
BNU	School of Economics and Resource Management Beijing Normal University	2012	Research and policy
Bogota	Bogota	2010	City

Boulder	Boulder	2010	City
Bordeaux	Bordeaux	2010	City
Brazil	Brazil	2010	State
Brookings	The Brookings Institution	2009	Research and policy
Brunei Darussalam	Brunei Darussalam	2010	State
BSPC	Baltic Sea Parliamentary Council	2011	Forum and network
BSTDB	Black Sea Trade and Development Bank	2012	Development, finance and investment
Buenos Aires	Buenos Aires	2012	City
Bulgaria	Bulgaria	2013	State
Burkina Faso	Burkina Faso	2011	State
BYD	BYD Group	2011	Company
C40	C40 Cities	2012	Forum and network
Cambodia	Cambodia	2007	State
Canada	Canada	2010	State
Care	Care International	2012	NGO
CBFF	Congo Basin Forest Fund	2011	Development, finance and investment
CCC	Copenhagen Cleantech Cluster	2010	Forum and network
CCI	Clinton Climate Initiative (Clinton Foundation)	2010	Development, finance and investment
CDKN	Climate and Development Knowledge Network	2012	Forum and network
CGF	Consumer Goods Forum	2013	Forum and network
Cheju Halla University	Cheju Halla University	2012	Research and policy
Chicago	Chicago	2012	City
China	People's Republic of China	2009	State
CIF	Climate Investment Funds	2012	Development, finance and investment
CIFF	Children's Investment Fund Foundation	2012	Development, finance and investment
City of Tuxtla Gutierrez	City of Tuxtla Gutierrez	2010	City
ClimateWorks	ClimateWorks Foundation	2009	Development, finance and investment
ClimDev-Africa Special Fund	ClimDev-Africa Special Fund	2011	Development, finance and

			investment
Club de Madrid	Club de Madrid	2010	Forum and network
Coca-Cola	Coca-Cola	2013	Company
Colombia	Colombia	2009	State
Comoros	Comoros	2013	State
Consumers International	Consumers International	2010	NGO
Copenhagen	Copenhagen	2010	City
Costa Rica	Costa Rica	2012	State
CPI	Climate Policy Initiative	2010	Research and policy
CPSL	Cambridge Programme for Sustainable Leadership	2013	Research and policy
Czech Republic	Czech Republic	2010	State
Danfoss	Danfoss	2011	Company
Dar es Salaam	Dar es Salaam	2010	City
DBA	Danish Bioenergy Association	2012	Forum and network
DBG	Deutsche Bank Group	2013	Development, finance and investment
DBSA	Development Bank of Southern Africa	2013	Development, finance and investment
DCED	Donor Committee for Enterprise Development	2009	Forum and network
Delhi	Delhi	2012	City
Denmark	Denmark	2009	State
DIE	The German Development Institute / Deutsches Institut für Entwicklungspolitik	2012	Research and policy
DNV GL	DNV GL	2010	Company
DONG	DONG Energy	2010	Company
DOOSAN	DOOSAN	2013	Company
DR Congo	Democratic Republic of the Congo	2011	State
E3G	Third Generation Environmentalism	2012	NGO
EACP	East Asia Climate Partnership	2008	Forum and network
EBRD	European Bank for Reconstruction and Development	2010	Development, finance and investment
ECF	European Climate Foundation	2012	Development, finance and investment
Ecofys	Ecofys	2012	Research and policy
EDF	Environmental Defense Fund	2012	Development, finance and investment

EEA	European Environment Agency	2010	Multilateral organisation
EfD	The Environment for Development Initiative	2012	Research and policy
Egypt	Egypt	2011	State
EIB	European Investment Bank	2010	Development, finance and investment
ENVforum	Asia-Europe Environment Forum	2010	Forum and network
ERCN	Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands	2012	Research and policy
Eskom Holdings	Eskom Holdings	2012	Company
Estonia	Estonia	2010	State
Ethiopia	Ethiopia	2010	State
EU	European Union	2010	State
Fairwood Group	Fairwood Group (Ranbir Saran Das)	2010	Company
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations	2012	Multilateral organisation
FAPA	Fund for African Private Sector Assistance	2011	Development, finance and investment
FEMSA	FEMSA	2012	Company
Fiji	Fiji	2011	State
Finland	Finland	2010	State
Ford Foundation	Ford Foundation	2012	Development, finance and investment
France	France	2010	State
G20	Group of Twenty	2009	Forum and network
G2A2	Green Growth Action Alliance	2012	Forum and network
G8	Group of Eight	2009	Forum and network
GBPN	The Global Buildings Performance Network	2013	Forum and network
GDF Suez	GDF Suez	2010	Company
GE	General Electric	2010	Company
GEF	Global Environmental Facility	2010	Multilateral organisation
Georgia	Georgia	2013	State
Germany	Germany	2009	State
GGA	Green Growth Alliance	2010	Forum and network
GGBP	Green Growth Best Practice	2012	Forum and network
GGGI	Global Green Growth Institute	2010	Multilateral organisation
GGKP	Green Growth Knowledge Platform	2012	Research and policy

GGL	Green Growth Leaders	2010	Forum and network
Ghana	Ghana	2013	State
GIIDS	The Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies	2012	Research and policy
GlaxoSmithKline	GlaxoSmithKline	2013	Company
Greater Mekong Subregion	Greater Mekong Subregion	2011	Region
Greece	Greece	2010	State
GreenBiz	GreenBiz Group	2012	Company
Growth Dialogue	Growth Dialogue	2012	Forum and network
Grupo Financiero Banorte	Grupo Financiero Banorte	2012	Development, finance and investment
GTC-Korea	Green Technology Center Korea	2012	Research and policy
Guyana	Guyana	2011	State
Hamburg	Hamburg	2011	City
Hanwha	Hanwha Group	2012	Company
Heller Manus Architects	Heller Manus Architects (Jeffrey Heller)	2010	Company
Hong Kong	Hong Kong	2012	City
HSBC	HSBC	2012	Development, finance and investment
Hungary	Hungary	2013	State
Hyundai	Hyundai Motors	2011	Company
Iberdrola	Iberdrola	2012	Company
IBM	IBM	2013	Company
ICC	International Chamber of Commerce	2013	Forum and network
ICCG	International Center for Climate Governance	2012	Research and policy
Iceland	Iceland	2010	State
ICLEI	International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives	2010	Multilateral organisation
ICTSD	International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development	2011	NGO
IDB	Inter-American Development Bank	2009	Multilateral organisation
IEA	International Energy Agency	2010	Multilateral organisation
IFC	International Finance Corporation, World Bank Group	2010	Development, finance and investment
IGES	Institute for Global Environmental	2005	Research and policy

	Strategies		
IHEID	Graduate Institute for International and Development Studies	2012	Research and policy
IIED	International Institute for Environment and Development	2011	Research and policy
IIP	Institute for Industrial Productivity	2012	Research and policy
IISD	International Institute for Sustainable Development	2012	NGO
ILO	International Labour Organization	2011	Multilateral organisation
IMF	International Monetary Fund	2012	Multilateral organisation
IMO	International Maritime Organization	2011	Multilateral organisation
India	India	2010	State
Indonesia	Indonesia	2009	State
Infosys	Infosys	2012	Company
International Synergies Ltd.	International Synergies Ltd.	2013	Company
IPEEC	International Partnership for Energy Efficiency Cooperation	2012	Forum and network
IRENA	International Renewable Energy Agency	2011	Research and policy
Italy	Italy	2013	State
ITC	International Trade Centre	2012	Multilateral organisation
IUCN	International Union for Conservation of Nature	2012	Forum and network
Jakarta	Jakarta	2010	City
Japan	Japan	2005	State
Jeju	Jeju Self-governing Province (Korea)	2010	Region
JI Network	Joint Implementation Network	2012	Research and policy
Johnson-Johnson	Johnson-Johnson	2013	Company
Jordan	Jordan	2011	State
JREF	Japan Renewable Energy Foundation	2012	Research and policy
Kalimantan (Indonesia)	Kalimantan (Indonesia)	2010	Region
Karnataka (India)	Karnataka (India)	2012	Region
Kazakhstan	Kazakhstan	2007	State
Kenya	Kenya	2011	State
KfW Bankengruppe	KfW Bankengruppe	2012	Development, finance and investment
Kingfisher	Kingfisher plc	2013	Company
Kiribati	Kiribati	2010	State

Kitakyushu	Kitakyushu	2005	City
Korea	Republic of Korea	2005	State
KPMG	KPMG	2010	Company
Kyrgyzstan	Kyrgyzstan	2013	State
Laos	Lao People's Democratic Republic	2008	State
Leaderlab	Leaderlab	2013	Company
LEDS Global Partnership	Low Emissions Development Strategies Global Partnership	2011	Forum and network
Lexxion Renewable Energy Law Policy Review	Lexxion Renewable Energy Law Policy Review	2010	Research and policy
Liberia	Liberia	2013	State
Lisbon	Lisbon	2010	City
London	London	2010	City
LSE	London School of Economics and Political Science	2010	Research and policy
MacArthur Foundation	MacArthur Foundation	2012	Development, finance and investment
Madagascar	Madagascar	2013	State
Madrid	Madrid	2012	City
Malawi	Malawi	2013	State
Malaysia	Malaysia	2011	State
Mali	Mali	2013	State
Malmo	Malmo	2010	City
MAPS	Mitigation Action Plans and Scenarios (SouthSouthNorth)	2012	Research and policy
Masdar Institute of Science and Technology	Masdar Institute of Science and Technology	2011	Research and policy
Mauritius	Mauritius	2013	State
McKinsey	McKinsey	2009	Company
Melbourne	Melbourne	2010	City
Mexico	Mexico	2010	State
Mexico City	Mexico City	2012	City
MGSSI	Mitsui Global Strategic Studies Institute	2013	Research and policy
Microsoft Europe, Middle East and Africa	Microsoft Europe, Middle East and Africa (Ray Pinto)	2010	Company
Millennium Institute	Millennium Institute	2012	Research and policy
MM	Monday Morning	2010	Research and policy

Mongolia	Mongolia	2010	State
Montenegro	Montenegro	2013	State
Morgan Stanley	Morgan Stanley	2012	Development, finance and investment
Morocco	Morocco	2010	State
Moscow	Moscow	2012	City
Mozambique	Mozambique	2011	State
Myanmar	Myanmar	2011	State
Nacional Financiera SNC	Nacional Financiera SNC	2012	Development, finance and investment
Namibia	Namibia	2013	State
Nantes	Nantes	2010	City
NCC	Natural Capital Coalition	2013	Forum and network
NCM	Nordic Council of Ministers	2011	Multilateral organisation
NDF	The Nordic Development Fund	2012	Development, finance and investment
NEPAD-IPPF	The New Partnership for Africa's Development Infrastructure Project Preparation Facility	2011	Development, finance and investment
Netherlands	Netherlands	2011	State
New York	City of New York	2012	City
Niger	Niger	2011	State
Nigeria	Nigeria	2011	State
Norway	Norway	2009	State
Novozymes	Novozymes	2011	Company
NREL	National Renewable Energy Laboratory (USA)	2012	Research and policy
OAS	Organization of American States	2012	Region
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development	2009	Multilateral organisation
OPIC	Overseas Private Investment Corporation	2012	Development, finance and investment
Oracle	Oracle	2010	Company
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	2010	Multilateral organisation
Oxford Economics	Oxford Economics	2012	Research and policy
Pakistan	Pakistan	2012	State
Papua New Guinea	Papua New Guinea	2012	State
Paraguay	Paraguay	2012	State

Paris	Paris	2010	City
Peru	Peru	2013	State
Philippines	Philippines	2008	State
Philips	Philips	2013	Company
PIIE	Peterson Institute for International Economics	2009	Research and policy
Portugal	Portugal	2010	State
POSCO	POSCO	2011	Company
PSCSDS	Private Sector Center for Sustainable Development Studies	2012	Research and policy
PSI	Public Services International	2010	Forum and network
PwC	PricewaterhouseCoopers International Limited	2006	Company
Qatar	Qatar	2012	State
Rabat	Rabat	2010	City
Realdania	Realdania	2010	Development, finance and investment
REEEP	Renewable Energy and Energy Efficiency Partnership	2012	Forum and network
Reegle	Reegle (Clean Energy Info Portal)	2012	Research and policy
Region Skåne	Region Skåne	2011	Region
Region Zealand	Region Zealand	2011	Region
Romania	Romania	2013	State
Rome	Rome	2010	City
RRCAP	AIT-UNEP Regional Resource Center for Asia and the Pacific	2012	Research and policy
Russia	Russian Federation	2013	State
Rwanda	Rwanda	2011	State
Samsung	Samsung	2011	Company
SAS	Scandinavian Airlines System	2012	Company
SBN	Sustainable Biofuels Network	2012	Forum and network
Schleswig-Holstein	Schleswig-Holstein	2011	Region
Sekunjalo Investments	Sekunjalo Investments	2012	Development, finance and investment
SEA	SUSTAIN EU-ASEAN	2013	Research and policy
Seoul	Seoul	2005	City
Shell	Shell	2013	Company
SHHP	Scandinavian Hydrogen Highway Partnership	2012	Forum and network
Siemens	Siemens	2011	Company
Sierra Leone	Sierra Leone	2013	State

Singapore	Singapore	2010	State
SINGG	Seoul Initiative Network on Green Growth	2005	Forum and network
Skanska	Skanska	2013	Company
Slovakia	Slovakia	2010	State
Slovenia	Slovenia	2013	State
South Africa	South Africa	2011	State
Spain	Spain	2010	State
Sri Lanka	Sri Lanka	2011	State
Standard & Poor's	Standard & Poor's	2012	Company
Standard Chartered Bank	Standard Chartered Bank	2012	Development, finance and investment
Stanford University	Stanford University (James L. Sweeney)	2010	Research and policy
State of Green	State of Green	2012	Forum and network
Stockholm	Stockholm	2010	City
STRING	STRING	2011	Region
Sudan	Sudan	2013	State
Suntech Power	Suntech Power	2012	Company
Suzlon Energy	Suzlon Energy	2012	Company
Swaziland	Swaziland	2013	State
Sweden	Sweden	2010	State
Swiss Re	Swiss Reinsurance Company	2012	Development, finance and investment
Switzerland	Switzerland	2009	State
Tajikistan	Tajikistan	2010	State
Tanzania	Tanzania	2013	State
TERI	The Energy and Resource Institute	2012	Research and policy
TESCO	TESCO	2013	Company
Thailand	Thailand	2009	State
The Capital Region of Denmark	The Capital Region of Denmark	2011	Region
The Growth Dialogue	The Growth Dialogue	2012	Forum and network
Thomson Reuters	Thomson Reuters	2012	Company
Tokyo	Tokyo	2012	City
Toronto	Toronto	2010	City
Trina Solar	Trina Solar	2012	Company
Tunisia	Tunisia	2011	State
Turkey	Turkey	2010	State

UAE	United Arab Emirates	2011	State
UC Berkeley	University of California Berkeley	2010	Research and policy
UCLG	United Cities and Local Governments	2010	Forum and network
UK	United Kingdom	2008	State
ULAI	Union of Local Authorities in Israel	2010	Forum and network
UN Foundation	UN Foundation	2012	Multilateral organisation
UNCTAD	United Nations Conference on Trade and Development	2012	Multilateral organisation
UNDESA	United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs	2008	Multilateral organisation
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme	2009	Multilateral organisation
UNECA	United Nations Economic Commission for Africa	2011	Multilateral organisation
UNECE	United Nations Economic Commission for Europe	2011	Multilateral organisation
UNECLAC	United Nations Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean	2012	Multilateral organisation
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme	2008	Multilateral organisation
UNESCAP	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific	2005	Multilateral organisation
UNESCWA	United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia	2010	Multilateral organisation
UNGC	United Nations Global Compact	2011	Multilateral organisation
UN-Habitat	UN-Habitat	2010	Multilateral organisation
UNIDO	United Nations Industrial Development Organization	2009	Multilateral organisation
Unilever	Unilever	2013	Company
UNITAR	United Nations Institute for Training and Research	2010	Multilateral organisation
United Technologies	United Technologies	2013	Company
University of Colorado	University of Colorado (Alice Madden)	2010	Research and policy
University of Copenhagen	University of Copenhagen (Katherine Richardson)	2010	Research and policy
University of Oxford	University of Oxford	2010	Research and policy
USA	United States of America	2010	State
VELUX	VELUX	2010	Company
Vestas	Vestas	2010	Company
Vietnam	Socialist Republic of Vietnam	2008	State

Vinci	Vinci	2010	Company
Vnesheconom bank	Vnesheconombank	2013	Development, finance and investment
Vodafone	Vodafone	2013	Company
Wal-Mart	Wal-Mart Stores	2012	Company
Warsaw	Warsaw	2010	City
WBCSD	World Business Council for Sustainable Development	2010	Forum and network
WCL	World Climate Ltd	2010	Company
WEF	World Economic Forum	2011	Forum and network
Welspun Energy	Welspun Energy	2012	Company
Wermuth Asset Management	Wermuth Asset Management	2012	Development, finance and investment
WHO	World Health Organisation	2010	Multilateral organisation
World Bank	World Bank	2010	Multilateral organisation
WRG	Water Resources Group	2012	Company
WRI	World Resources Institute	2012	Research and policy
WTO	World Trade Organization	2012	Multilateral organisation
WWF	World Wide Fund for Nature	2011	NGO
Xyntéo	Xyntéo	2013	Company
Yara International	Yara International	2012	Company
Yokohama	Yokohama	2010	City
Zambia	Zambia	2011	State
ZEF	The Center for Development Research (ZEF), University of Bonn	2012	Research and policy
Zimbabwe	Zimbabwe	2013	State
Zurich Insurance Group	Zurich Insurance Group	2012	Development, finance and investment

Appendix 2: Overview of interviews, conversations, and field observations

Table 1. List of interviews.

Name and position of interviewee(s)	Place of interview	Time of interview
<i>Kristian Ruby</i> , Assistant to the European Union Climate Commissioner, Connie Hedegaard.	European Commission, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Dan Jørgensen</i> , Member of the European Parliament (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), Vice-Chair ENVI, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety.	European Parliament, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Annika Ahtonen</i> , Policy Analyst, European Policy Centre.	European Policy Centre, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Lee Me Kyung</i> , Policy Advisor, Climate Change Office, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)	COP17, Durban, South Africa	7 December 2011
<i>Marie-Lousie Wegter</i> , Head of Office, Global Green Growth Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. <i>Erik Næraa-Nicolajsen</i> , Deputy Head of Office, Environment, Climate and Energy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. <i>Tomas Anker Christensen</i> , Head of Centre, Global Challenges, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen.	20 January 2012
<i>Park Chinjung</i> , Policy advisor, Korea's Presidential Committee on Green Growth.	COP18, Doha, Qatar	1 December 2012
<i>Yu Bok-hwan</i> , Secretary General of Korea's Presidential Committee on Green Growth PCGG Director (Email interview).	COP18, Doha, Qatar	5 December 2012
<i>Helen Mountford</i> , Deputy Director, Environment Directorate OECD.	COP18, Doha, Qatar	7 December 2012
<i>Hans Jakob Eriksen</i> , Director, GGGI Copenhagen regional office	Phone interview	9 January 2013
<i>Lars Løkke Rasmussen</i> , former Danish Prime Minister, Chairman of GGGI since May 2012. (E-mail interview for background only).	Copenhagen, Denmark	29 April 2013
<i>Martin Lidegaard</i> , Denmark's Minister for Climate, Energy and Building.	Copenhagen, Denmark	12 June 2013

<i>Kim Joy, Programme Officer, Green Economy Initiative, Economics and Trade Branch, United Nations Environment Programme .</i>	Phone interview	19 December 2013

Table 2. List of conversations.

Name, position and event	Place of conversation	Time of conversation
<i>Eva Grambye</i> , Head of Office, Global Green Growth Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Meeting with secretariat and political science students.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen.	1 November 2012
<i>Seungwon Lee</i> , Director for Development Cooperation Division Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea. Side event organized by Korea. (Including copy of powerpoint presentation from side event).	COP18, Doha, Qatar	1 December 2012
<i>Gino Van Begin</i> , Secretary General, ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability. Following side event organized by Korea.	COP18, Doha, Qatar	5 December 2012
<i>Yu Bok-hwan</i> , Secretary General of Korea’s Presidential Committee on Green Growth PCGG Director. Side event organized by Korea. (Including powerpoint presentation from side event with notes).	COP18, Doha, Qatar	5 December 2012
<i>Howard Bamsey</i> , Director-General, GGGI. After “Interview from Warsaw UNFCCC Climate Studio TV” event.	COP19, Warsaw, Poland	18 November 2013
<i>Mattia Romani</i> , Deputy Director-General, Green Growth Planning & Implementation, GGGI. After “Interview from Warsaw UNFCCC Climate Studio TV” event.	COP19, Warsaw, Poland	18 November 2013

Table 3. Field observations.

Name of event	Place of event	Time of event
Global Green Growth Forum 2011, Plenary debate I, II, III, and IV.	Copenhagen, Denmark	11-12 October 2011
Take Lead Conference, experts' workshop on communicating Green Growth.	Copenhagen, Denmark	12 October 2011
The Green race to Durban and Beyond: A debate on comparability, competitiveness and compatibility of climate actions around the world. Arranged by the Greens, European Free Alliance in the European Parliament.	European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium	9 November 2011
The Durban Climate Change Conference. COP17/CMP7.	Durban, South Africa	28 November - 9 December 2011
The Doha Climate Change Conference. COP18/CMP8.	Doha, Qatar	30 November - 7 December 2012
Asian Development Bank's Launch of Asian Development Outlook 2013.	Copenhagen, Denmark	19 April 2013
STRING green growth working group meeting.	City of Hamburg, Germany	23 April 2013
The Warsaw Climate Change Conference. COP19/CMP9.	Warsaw, Poland	13-21 November 2013
Global Green Growth Forum 2014.	Copenhagen, Denmark	20-21 October 2014
The Lima Climate Change Conference. COP20/CMP10.	Lima, Peru	1-14 December 2014

Paper 5: Korea as Green Middle Power: Green Growth Strategic Action in the Field of Global Environmental Governance

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Abstract

In the field of global environmental governance South Korea stands out. Since 2005 it has been the initiator and central node in a majority of international networks and organizations promoting *green growth*. Based on new theoretical approaches and empirical analysis, this article highlights the significance of Korea's middle power diplomacy in relation to *green growth governance*, establishing it as a "Green Middle Power." Middle power analyses of Korea usually portray it as a regionally constrained and secondary actor in global governance. This article supplements middle power theory's behavioral approach with a *strategic action* approach inspired by Bourdieu's practice theory, which it applies to an original database of more than 1,000 sources, 18 interviews and 10 participatory observations. The article argues that Korea has become a primary actor in global environmental governance by demonstrating how Korea has established a sub-field of green growth governance through a wide range of strategic moves.

Key words: South Korea, middle power, green growth, strategic action, global environmental governance

Korea as Green Middle Power: Green Growth Strategic Action in the Field of Global Environmental Governance

1. Introduction*

Since 2010, *green growth* has become increasingly institutionalized in the larger field of global environmental governance. It is supported by many international actors like the OECD, World Bank, UNEP, G20, B20, ASEM, C40, the World Economic Forum, as well as states such as Germany, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden.⁸⁸ The relatively fast spread of *green growth* can be partly explained by changing dynamics in the larger field of global environmental governance, such as the failure of the UN system to deliver a global agreement on greenhouse gas mitigation and the trends of multi-level governance (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010), of increasing institutional fragmentation (Zelli, 2011; Zelli and van Asselt, 2013), and of a multitude of governance experiments (Hoffmann, 2011). Added to these changing dynamics, the

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⁸⁸ Based on extensive data collection, this author has found that green growth (as concept, strategy, program, and paradigm) is now used by actors ranging from international and transnational organizations, states, cities, and political parties of both socialist and liberal inclination, and is being applied to areas such as climate mitigation, climate adaptation, development, finance and investment, environment, water, forests, agriculture, trade, business and industry, technology, security, labor, health, education, and community-building. Green growth is applied globally in all regions of the world. Green growth is an essentially contested concept, sometimes called a buzzword (e.g. Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011) or mere rhetoric as opportunity for economic growth (e.g. Christoff and Eckersley, 2013). I call green growth a policy program to denote both material and ideational content of policy (for a discussion see e.g. Woods, 1995), and I do not seek to define green growth more precisely than as falling within a possible “definition’s space” (illustrated in figure 1 below).

financial crisis with its strong focus on renewed economic growth, and job creation also helped pave the way for the concept of green growth (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011; Christoff and Eckersley, 2013; Jacobs, 2013).

The question still remains why *green growth* rather than other concepts such as *low carbon*, *zero carbon*, or the lesser known *Cool Earth*⁸⁹ has become popular in the field of global environmental governance. In order to understand this, we must identify the actors actively promoting the concept. Here, South Korea (henceforth Korea) has played a prominent role; a comprehensive study of the history of green growth (Blaxekjær, forthcoming) has established that Korea was the first actor to strategically promote green growth internationally, starting in 2005. Korea is the actor that has initiated most new networks and the most connected actor in a new web of international networks and organizations promoting green growth. Korea has “put into practice the creative diplomacy and behavior that is potentially the theoretical hallmark of middle power behavior” (Beeson and Higgott, 2014: 233). Although a handful of scholars study Korea’s global strategy of transforming economic power into political power with a focus on green growth (Kalinowski and Cho, 2012; Seung, 2014; Watson and Pandey 2014), middle power analyses of Korea are generally biased towards a regional focus, except when it comes to the study of economy and trade. Further, as argued by Kalinowski and Cho, the rising BRIC countries have captured scholars’ attention, thus leading to “underappreciate and understudy” Korea (2012: 243). Addressing the relative paucity of globally orientated studies of Korea as a *Green Middle Power*, my research question is: How has Korea become a primary actor in global environmental governance? This question is answered through analysis of an original database of more than 1,000 sources pertaining to green growth, 18 interviews and 10 participatory observations. An overview of sources is presented in the appendix.

⁸⁹ Promoted by Japan at the 2008 G8 summit.

Following this introduction, section two identifies five different “images” of Korea in IR, Asian Studies, and the burgeoning Green Growth Studies. It discusses examples of middle power analyses of Korea and green growth, and suggests applying the *strategic action field approach*, which is presented in section three. Strategic action is practiced through specific strategic moves or tactics in relation to the spatial and temporal dimensions of a field. Section four analyzes the fields in question and relates them to each other to contextualize field-specific dynamics. Section five analyzes Korea’s strategic moves in the specific green growth field. Section six concludes. In summary, this article argues that the strategic actions of Korea were of fundamental importance to the establishment of a new field of green growth governance, and that Korea has shown middle-powermanship through these strategic actions and become a primary actor in global environmental governance, moving beyond a merely regional role.

2. Five images of Korea

In 1994, the Kim Young-sam government’s globalization policy explicitly tied growing economic power to an increased global political role (Saxer 2013). Since Roh Moo-hyun (2003-2008), Korean governments have generally incorporated the idea of Korea as middle power (Cotton, 2013), and since 2008, Lee Myung-bak further developed Korea’s middle power diplomacy (Lee 2012; Watson and Pandey 2014). In the academic literature, images of Korea and questions of middle power are usually framed in relation to five specific issue areas. In IR and Asian Studies,⁹⁰ Korea is framed in relation to 1) the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), including questions of the US-alliance, security, military, peace, and nuclear issues; 2) Korea’s rapid

⁹⁰ Based on a content analysis of abstracts of 737 academic works, where “Korea” appears in the abstract, and published in 39 main IR and Asia journals from January 2000 to February 2013, compiled through a Web of Science search.

economic development from the 1980s to 2000s, 3) Korea's democratization; 4) history, especially the Japanese occupation and the Korean War; and 5) green growth. Image 1 to 4 dominate and middle power is typically equated with questions of regional power or Korea as a secondary player (for example Buzan & Wæver, 2003; Tow and Choi, 2011; Easley, 2012; Ko, 2012). Korea is only represented as having global reach in relation to economy and trade.

The fifth image of "green growth Korea" or "Korea as green power" is found in the burgeoning Green Growth Studies and in middle power analyses. The former can be roughly divided in two approaches focusing either on policy instruments and their applications (Shapiro, 2009; Jänicke, 2012; Martinelli and Midttun, 2012; Mathews, 2012; Robins, 2012; Zysman and Huberty, 2014) or policy ideas (Bowen and Fankhauser, 2011; Jacobs, 2013). Even though Korea is analyzed as a case country of green growth, most accounts overlook that Korea has played a primary and entrepreneurial role in the emergence and global spread of the policy program (for example Jänicke, 2012; Choi, 2014; Seung, 2014). Furthermore, those accounts that do recognize Korea's active role globally, generally have a one-sided focus on the material side of Korea's strategy, i.e. on Korean green tech, green exports, infrastructure, and other economic gains and motives (for example Kalinowski and Cho, 2012; Tonami and Müller, 2014).

In the middle power literature, some analyses take green growth into account (Lee 2012; Saxer 2013; Seung 2014; Watson and Pandey 2014), but in a limited and cursory way. Lee's analysis, although theoretically innovative, is limited to trade, peacekeeping, ODA, and soft power in East Asia. Saxer's analysis is limited to Korea's role in the G20. Seung's analysis conflates the field of green growth with the larger field of global environmental governance and Korea is thus portrayed as a latecomer and secondary actor, when in fact Korea was on the vanguard in establishing the field of green growth. Watson and Pandey's analysis is also regionally biased, but it does argue that "new

middle powers, and South Korea in particular, represent a new geography and geopolitics of environmentalism.” (2014: 76). This article seeks to remedy these absences in Green Growth Studies as well as in IR and Asian Studies by demonstrating how Korea as a *Green Middle Power* is developing a role for itself beyond its regional and secondary status.

3. Middle power from a practice theory perspective

Today, the concept of middle power is usually used to categorize states, sometimes divided into the subcategories of traditional and emerging middle powers (Jordaan, 2003). The status of being a middle power is theorized as “a product of [the] contextually located deliberate action” of these states (Jordaan, 2003: 166) also called “middle-powermanship” (Beeson and Higgott, 2014: 223). Focus has moved from structural and positivist, descriptive accounts to context sensitive and behavioral analysis, which includes studying how states strategically employ middle power diplomacy and network power (Lee 2012). To answer my research question of how Korea has become a primary actor in global environmental governance, I suggest that middle power theory’s behavioral approach be supplemented by the recent focus in IR on practice theory (Neumann, 2002; Bigo, 2005; Adler, 2008; Pouliot, 2008, 2010; Adler and Pouliot, 2011; Bigo, 2011; Bigo and Madsen, 2011; Adler-Nissen, 2013). Two important features of the practice approach are its field-oriented relational ontology and its focus on strong empirical analyses. It offers a way to theorize how not only economic power, but also other types of capital can be exchanged into political and symbolic capital and power, through which international actors can secure or improve their position vis-à-vis others. This is relevant for any analysis of middle powers and niche diplomacy. The focus on practices – the how-questions (cf. Beeson and Higgott, 2014) – enhances the behavioral approach of middle power theory. Also applicable in IR and middle power analysis, Fligstein and McAdam (2012) have developed a more coherent theory

of fields based on the perspectives of collective social action by collective actors through strategic action:

“Strategic action fields are the fundamental units of collective action in society. A strategic action field is a constructed mesolevel social order in which actors (who can be individual or collective) are attuned to and interact with one another on the basis of shared (which is not to say consensual) understandings about the purposes of the field, relationships to others in the field (including who has power and why), and the rules governing legitimate action in the field.” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 9).

This is relevant as a way to understand Korea as both a collective actor (a nation state that acts in international fields) and as a field, within which actors struggle over the power of representing that state and of imposing their principles of vision and division (Pouliot and Mérand, 2013). Fields do not exist independently of other fields, although not all fields are connected. Fields can relate to each other in three ways; unconnected, dependent (hierarchical), or interdependent (reciprocal). Larger social fields like the state are composed of smaller fields, which might be related to each other within the state as field or to fields in other states. Fields can be linked to each other directly, when actors in two fields sustain routine interaction, or indirectly through ties to a third field (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012).

Actors cooperate and compete, they act strategically and tactically, and this approach understands actors’ interests to be more than objective economic or security interests. Fligstein and McAdam “insist that strategic action in fields turns on a complicated blend of material and ‘existential’ considerations.” (2012: 3). Mérand and Forget apply Bourdieu’s notion of strategy as a “more or less conscious pattern of trying to reproduce [or improve] one’s position in a

social field” (2013: 97; cf. Bourdieu, 1984). Strategy is tied to interests, which Bourdieu (1998) calls *illusio*; meaning what actors (also unconsciously) believe to be at stake in the specific field; “a feel for the game” (Bourdieu, 1998: 80; Pouliot and Mérand, 2013: 33). *Illusio* is both actor-specific and field-specific, and can be influential across fields, as is the case when, for example, “logics of economic gain intrude upon the scientific field, where this type of *illusio* is not a priori dominant” (Pouliot and Mérand 2013: 34). Strategic action is related both to one’s own and other’s *illusio*, and it is defined “as the attempt by social actors to create and sustain social worlds by securing the cooperation of others” (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012: 17). This feature of cooperation and bridge-building as strategy is well-known within and thus fits well with middle power theory (Beeson and Higgott, 2014).

Strategic action is more general, where strategic moves are seen as the specific and practical employment of social skill (cf. diplomatic ability in middle power theory; Beeson and Higgott, 2014). Actors make strategic moves through certain means, instruments or capital available due to their position in the field (Bourdieu, 1977, 1984, 1991, 1998; Mérand and Forget, 2013). Practice theory has identified several strategic moves (Bourdieu, 1984; Mérand and Forget, 2013) and even more specific tactics that socially skilled strategic actors employ to induce cooperation of others (Fligstein and McAdam, 2012). I suggest categorizing the different *strategic moves* as 1) *conditioning strategic action*, e.g. seizing or creating the opportunity for strategic action in the first place; 2) *timing strategic action* in relation to past, present and future. Bourdieu distinguishes between two types of relationship between our temporal experience and the future: one relationship in which the future is much closer, almost present, where “pre-perceptive anticipations” and the “feel for the game” guide actions in a very practical way; and one relationship where the future is understood as a possible project (Bourdieu, 1984; 1998: 80). 3) *Strategic action by communicating*, e.g. framing, agenda setting, and using body language

(emotions, signaling, etc.). And 4) *strategic action by networking*, e.g. coalition-building and brokering. This model is illustrated in Table 1 below. The different strategic moves are more effective when they supplement each other.

Table 1. Strategic moves of influential strategic actors.

Categories of strategic action	Strategic moves
<i>Conditioning</i>	<i>Seizing/creating the opportunity</i> <i>Launching many initiatives</i> <i>Asserting one’s position(s)/capital</i>
<i>Timing</i>	<i>Delivering (on time)</i> <i>Timelining</i> <i>Historicizing</i> <i>Futuring</i>
<i>Communicating</i> <i>(spoken, written, and body language)</i>	<i>Framing stories, values, identities</i> <i>Agenda setting</i> <i>Planting ideas</i> <i>Controlling emotions</i>
<i>Networking</i>	<i>“Neutral” brokering</i> <i>Being open-minded and inclusive</i> <i>Coalition-building</i> <i>Isolating disruptive actors</i>

4. Three fields: global environmental governance, green growth governance, and Korea

To explain Korea’s strategic actions in relation to green growth and global environmental governance, we first need to understand these three fields, Korea included. This section contextualizes these fields, what is at stake – part of the *illusio* – and how they relate to each other (see figure 2 below).⁹¹

⁹¹ For a detailed field analysis of green growth governance see Blaxekjær, forthcoming. It is beyond the scope of this article to conduct a comprehensive review of the global environmental governance literature. This literature, like the middle power literature, has shifted from the structural and statist explanations of regime theory to more constructivist approaches that better account for non-state actors and multi-level governance (Okereke and Bulkeley 2007; Bulkeley and Newell 2010). Global governance helps us understand the changing focus from the state-based anarchical system of international politics to global

4.1. The field of global environmental governance

As empirical phenomenon, global environmental governance is a diverse, poly-centric, and fragmented field (Hulme, 2009; Bulkeley and Newell, 2010; Zelli, 2011; Zelli and van Asselt, 2013), where actors share the common issue of dealing with global anthropogenic climate change, among other border-crossing environmental problems. Actors recognize that the fossil fuel dependent economy is the root cause of climate change (IPCC, 2013, 2014), but disagree about solutions and responsibilities, and diverge in their framings and narratives of the issue (Hulme, 2009; Hoffmann, 2011; Christoff and Eckersley, 2013). What is at stake is, on the one hand, the future organization of the global and national economies including issues of national sovereignty and right to development, and on the other hand the existential issue of survival, particularly for small island developing states and other developing countries (Stern, 2006; Hulme, 2009; Gupta, 2014). The 1960's saw a growing environmental awareness, and the conflict between economic growth and a healthy environment and climate was then highlighted by the Club of Rome's 1972 report, *Limits to Growth* (Hulme, 2009). Since the 1972 inaugural UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, a North-South divide perspective has dominated debates on sustainable development and green growth (Runnalls, 2011).

In Fligstein and McAdam's terms, the strategic action field of global environmental governance is composed of several strategic action fields. Some are embedded within like the United Nations climate negotiations. Others are outside, but overlapping, like nation states and their foreign, environment, and finance ministries; international organizations; energy companies; and NGOs. It is also interdependently connected to larger international fields like security,

society and “the rise of hybrid, non-hierarchical, and network-like modes of governing on the global stage” (Stripple and Stephan 2013: 147). My analysis follows this understanding of global governance and focuses on networks and modes of governing *in practice*.

diplomacy, economy, energy, science and education, and food and agriculture. It is therefore a complex matter to determine what is at stake, and action is constrained politically, economically, and militarily by the many vested interests within the fossil-fuel economy, and the North–South divide in climate negotiations. This often boils down to a stand-off between USA and China, creating a status quo situation, which both countries presume (*illusio*) they benefit from (Christoff and Eckersley, 2013). According to middle power theory, middle powers such as Korea cannot play an entrepreneurial and primary role when a field is as divided as global environmental governance also dominated by status quo-seeking great powers. Beeson and Higgott write:

“For all the potential that middle powers may possess in theory, in practice without the agreement and participation of the ‘great’ powers, substantive and effective international cooperation and policy innovation – difficult at the best of times – is all but impossible.” (2014: 2016).

4.2. Green growth governance

Green growth governance is a strategic action field with many specific networks, patterned behavior, and many collective actors agreeing and disagreeing about definitions of green growth (UNDESA, 2012; Scott et al, 2013; Blaxekjær, forthcoming), see also Table 2 below.


Table 2: Key examples of green growth collective actors and networks

Collective actor/network	Established by (year)
Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI)	Korea (2010)
Global Green Growth Forum (3GF)	Denmark, Korea, and Mexico (2010)
Green Growth Action Alliance (G2A2)	B20 Taskforce on Green Growth, Former President of Mexico, Felipe Calderón. WEF serves as secretariat (2012)
Green Growth Alliance	Denmark, Korea, and Mexico (2010)
Green Growth Best Practice (GGBP)	GGGI, Climate Development and Knowledge Network (CDKN), the European Climate Foundation, and the International Climate Initiative (German Government). GGGI serves as the executive agency (2012)
Green Growth Group	United Kingdom (2013)
Green Growth Knowledge Platform (GGKP)	Korea, OECD, UNEP, and World Bank (2012)
Green Growth Initiative	African Development Bank and OECD (2011)
Seoul Initiative Network on Green Growth (SINGG)	Korea (2005)

The field of green growth governance is embedded within the larger global environmental governance field. They relate to each other in an interdependent manner, because green growth proponents are seeking to position green growth within global environmental governance as a solution to the main problems indicated above, and in competition with other solutions or policy programs such as sustainable development, low-carbon society, and ecological modernization. This power struggle feeds back into the green growth field as part of the struggle to define green growth in both theory and practice. At the general level, actors within the field share the idea that economic growth can be decoupled from greenhouse gas emissions and produce a healthier environment, climate, and better quality of life (see for example

www.greengrowthknowledge.org). Green growth is also presented as a reaction to the apparent failure of the UN climate negotiations and framed as a supplementing ‘bottom-up’ approach to the UN's ‘top-down’ climate governance, and as a new way of bridging the North–South divide (Interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen, 20 April 2012; Interview with Martin Lidegaard, Minister for Climate, Energy and Building, Denmark, Copenhagen, 12 June 2013).

Figure 1: green growth definition’s space



Green growth can be defined within two dimensions from narrow to inclusive conceptions of growth and from anthropocentric to Gaia-centric conceptions of green (Hulme, 2009; Connely et al, 2012). Critics of green growth usually accuse it of being too narrowly focused on GDP growth and lacking social and environmental dimensions. Critics point to the many market-based actors involved in green growth and the use of neoliberal language like *public-private partnerships*, *best practices*, *climate action as an opportunity for the economy*,

and management tools like PwC's *the green growth generator* (Blaxekjær, forthcoming). However, many proponents also talk about the need for an economic paradigm shift away from neoclassical and narrow economic thinking, and green growth organization and application is increasingly directed towards aims such as poverty eradication, energy security, education, and well-being, as well as in terms of more Gaia-centric elements of projects. The green growth agenda is much broader than addressing climate change (UNESCAP, 2005; UNDESA, 2012; Zysman and Huberty, 2014; Blaxekjær, forthcoming).

4.3. Korea

According to field theory, Korea is both a collective actor and a strategic action field. Korea can act internationally as a unitary state, but the country is also a field of struggles over power and positions, such as the right to form government and represent Korea in the world. This sub-section will provide some contextual information about Korea, in order to better understand Korea as an international actor, its positions and capital forms. As noted, Korea is regionally constrained. Despite growing economic power and increased integration in different bilateral and multilateral trade regimes since the 1990's, Korea has certain difficulties translating this strength into political and soft power, largely due to the regional competition with Japan and China, and its being under American leadership in terms of security (Kalinowski and Cho, 2012; Lee 2012; Cotton, 2013; Beeson and Higgott, 2014). In some soft power indexes, Korea is at the bottom (Center for Global Development, 2013), stable in the middle (Real Instituto Elcano, 2014), or rising within the middle (The Institute for Government and Monocle Magazine, 2010, 2011, 2012).

Since joining the UN in 1991 and the OECD in 1996 Korea has become increasingly important within the global system through new memberships of international organizations. In 1999, when the G20 was established, Korea joined the first meeting of finance ministers and central bank governors. The

G20 Leaders met for the first time in November 2008, and Korea was chosen to host the 2010 G20 Summit, a sign of international recognition. The appointment of Ban Ki-moon as UN Secretary-General in 2007 is another an example of Korea's growing international recognition, but also a reminder that Korea is seen as a good compromise, a country that is not too powerful, and as a bridge-builder between North and South. According to its economic size, Korea is a natural member of G20, and Korea was even invited to participate and speak at the G8 Summit in Japan in July 2008, the first international setting where President Lee announced the green growth program (G20, 1999, 2009). In the UN climate negotiations Korea forms a part of the Environmental Integrity Group along with Mexico and Switzerland, a group recognized for its bridge-building role between North and South (Observations at COP17, COP18, COP19, and COP20).


Although not fully recognized in the academic literature, Korea has entered the field of global politics, and entered with very explicit global ambitions in recent years, as formulated in President Lee's "Global Korea" strategy and in President Lee's speech to the nation on the 60th anniversary of the Republic, on 15 August 2008. Korea also experiences the dilemma between economic growth and climate change. Energy consumption and imports are increasing, and with it the need for energy security. Meanwhile, temperatures in Korea have increased twice the global average, making Korea more vulnerable than other developed countries. Prior to 2008, climate policies were protective of narrow economic interests, but with President Lee a shift occurred with both domestic and international focus on green growth and significant greenhouse gas reductions (Yun et al, 2011). Lee forged collaboration with Korean industry and garnered support for green domestic and international green action, but failed to include civil society to large extent (Choi 2014).⁹²

⁹² It is beyond the scope of this article to describe Korea's climate and environment track record, but see UNEP 2010 and Choi 2014 for assessments of Korea's achievements.

An important element of any Korean President's *illusio* seems to be to remove the former presidents' political symbols and set one's own agenda. Even though green growth was part of Korean politics before 2008, it is largely seen as synonymous with President Lee, due to Lee's own strategic actions of timing and communicating. Thus it is now being debated in Korea to what extent President Park Geun-hye is framing a new political agenda by moving away from green growth towards concepts like the creative economy (Observations at COP17, COP18, COP19, and COP20; Korea Joongang Daily, 2013; Choi 2014). It seems likely that in anticipation of these strategic moves by the future President, President Lee took steps to secure a green growth legacy by creating enough international cooperation and commitment that would be hard to dismantle by the next President. For example, Lee's Presidential Committee on Green Growth was dissolved very quickly after Park's election. However, Lee turned the Global Green Growth Institute into an international organization, something almost impossible for a new president to remove. It is, however, beyond the scope of this article to analyze how President Park's dissociation from green growth has affected Korea's international position. However, it seems clear that for some middle powers like Australia and Korea changes in government can have bigger impacts on international strategy than international changes do (Cotton, 2013; Beeson and Higgott, 2014).

To summarize, Figure 2 below illustrates how the three fields are connected. Green growth governance is embedded within the larger and older field of global environmental governance, and Korea as field (and actor) overlaps with both.

Figure 2. The relationship between the three strategic action fields of global environmental governance, green growth, and Korea.



5. Korea's strategic action in the field of global environmental governance

I have observed and identified a long range of specific strategic moves, which I seek to analyze according to the model of strategic action explained above (see Table 1). Some of the identified strategic moves fit with the model, others fall outside. However, it is possible to simply extend the model with two more categories of strategic moves. Thus, I add *financing* and *policy planning* to

conditioning, timing, communicating, and networking. I focus on illustrative examples from the categories of communicating, networking, financing and policy planning. I incorporate conditioning and timing when relevant. Table 3 summarizes all identified strategic moves.

5.1. Strategic action as communicating

The first example of Korea communicating green growth was in March 2005, when Korea hosted the UNESCAP's Fifth Ministerial Conference on Environment and Development (MCED5) in Asia and the Pacific (Interview with Lee Me Kyung, KOICA, Durban, 7 December 2011). The Korean diplomat, Chung Rae-Kwon, and head of division in UNESCAP presented a short concept paper called "*green growth @ a glance*" (UNESCAP, 2005). Here green growth was framed as a solution to the bigger problems facing the Asian region. The paper drew on some of the insights from Paul Ekins (1999), an academic who was also invited to various Korean green growth policy debates in the following years. The problems identified by Rae-Kwon's paper are poverty and the need for development, and the lack of a sustainable economic growth model that can secure poverty alleviation without a high strain on the environment and climate. The causes are found in the fossil fuel economy and population growth. The concept paper also links to the value of a right to (sustainable) development, to the Millennium Development Goals, and the moral responsibility for future generations, as well as the environment. At MCED5 green growth was recognized by participants, and Korea's initiative, *The Seoul Initiative Network on Green Growth (SINGG)* was adopted. However, the Korean development model had yet to provide a credible environmental and climate solution (Yun et al, 2011; Dent 2012). This issue was initially solved discursively through a temporal move, which introduced a distinction between the model of the past and the model for the future; a model

and paradigm shift that was further laid out when President Lee enters the stage in 2008.

When President Lee began to communicate green growth internationally, first at the G8 Extended Summit in Japan July 2008, the Korean green growth agenda entered a new phase. In this phase, the focus was still on the developing world, but economic growth began to feature more prominently as part of the solution, especially as a selling point towards developed countries and companies, and by pointing to the global economic crisis as a problem and an opportunity for a much needed paradigm shift. Following the collapse of UN negotiations at COP15 in 2009, green growth was also described as a solution able to bridge the otherwise diverging interests of the developing and developed world, and the Korean development model was again presented as a template. President Lee and other representatives historicized Korea's experience as a recently developed country in order to present Korea as a trustworthy bridge-builder (Interviews with Park Chinjung, Policy advisor, PCGG, Doha, 1 December 2012, and Helen Mountford, Deputy Director, Environment Directorate OECD, Doha, 7 December 2012).

Communicating green growth was also, somewhat unexpectedly, linked with cultural capital when in mid to late-2012 Korean artist Psy became a global YouTube billion-click phenomenon with *Gangnam Style*. The Korean government already ran a state-supported global branding strategy, which includes the promotion of K-pop to bolster Korean soft power (www.koreabrand.net), and the Presidential Committee on Green Growth seized the opportunity and asked Psy to do a video promoting Korea's green growth efforts as part of Korea's official bid to host the UNFCCC's Green Climate Fund (GCF) (Psy, 2012). Korea won the bid on 20 October 2012 and the GCF was placed in a new eco-city some 100 km from Seoul (GCF 2012). In Korea the ability to attract the GCF was seen as a great victory, bearing in mind that Korea was able to host the G20 Summit in 2010 in the name of green growth,

but failed to win the bid to host COP18, which went to Qatar – a partner country in the Green Growth Alliance. Furthermore, as an example of seizing the opportunity and coupling green growth with political capital, the UN General-Secretary Ban Ki-moon is publicly supporting Korea’s initiatives like the Global Green Growth Summit. Personal ties most likely play an important role in this connection; the first chairman of GGGI from 2010-2012, Han Seung-soo (former professor of economics; career diplomat, former prime minister 2008-2009) was Ban Ki-moon's superior, when Han served as President of the UN General Assembly in 2001-2002.

Over the years, communicating green growth has become more detailed, nuanced, and increasingly global and local in scope as more and more Korean officials have been trained in the art of communicating green growth, which was presented by Han Seung-soo as one of his main achievements between 2010–2012:

“I also went around the country to speak, explain and educate the middle ranking officials at division director level on what is meant by the challenge of climate change and green growth paradigm. A total of about 7,000 officials attended these meetings.” (Han, 2012).

Even though green growth was developed and implemented before President Lee, the history being written now (in reports, brochures, speeches, etc.) often begins with President Lee and his speech to the Korean nation on the celebration of the Republic's 60th anniversary in August 2008. Although the audience at the time was Korean, the speech itself is being retold globally and has its own symbolic life. The story is also increasingly one of Korea becoming a global leader:

“At the OECD, Korea championed the OECD Ministerial Declaration on Green Growth in the depth of the global financial crisis in 2009, which included a call for a major horizontal project on green growth strategies. The report from the project was released in May 2011, followed by the declaration of Secretary-General Angel Gurría to mainstream green growth into OECD’s programs, calling President Lee Myung-bak of Korea *the father of green growth*.” (Interview with Yu Bok-hwan, Secretary General, PCGG, 5 December 2012).

Symbolic body language is also applied; when President Lee or Korean diplomats explain the difference between Korea and other developed countries' approaches to developing countries they stretch out both hands with palms up and say that “Korea gives with two hands in a humble manner, where others give with only one hand”. While illustrating this gesture they implicitly say that other donor countries take back with the other hand (Interview with Park Chinjung, Policy advisor, PCGG, Doha, 1 December 2012). Koreans seek to tell a coherent story of a country transforming to the green economy in all spheres of society, partnering with other global leaders, and wanting to “share the green growth experience with the world” as one video playing at the COP meeting shows (Observations at COP18 and COP19). But it is one thing to communicate and story-tell green growth and another to implement it through concrete action. This is where strategic action such as networking, financing, and policy planning become essential as ways to put ideational concepts into action and give them life in material structures.

5.2. Strategic action through networking

Korea pursues the green growth strategy through *networking*, which is a more concrete way of giving the idea of green growth a lasting institutional form, through partnerships, alliances, organizations, conferences, and networks. Thus

the specific organizational materiality of green growth in itself begins to impose symbolic meaning onto the field of global environmental governance. This materiality is part of setting the borders of the field. Setting up or hosting international organizations is a recognized international practice through which states can position themselves and earn political and economic capital. Korea has been the initiating part in networking green growth involving more than 100 partners (Blaxekjær, forthcoming). Many of these connections have been established through the Global Green Growth Institute (GGGI), which in late 2012 became an international organization, and remains headquartered in Korea. The GGGI partner countries are Australia, Brazil, Cambodia, China (Yunnan Province), Costa Rica, Denmark, Ethiopia, Germany, Guyana, India, Indonesia, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kiribati, Mongolia, Morocco, Norway, Qatar, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Rwanda, South Africa, Switzerland, Thailand, the United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, and Vietnam. Also, Korea has set up a new Korean think tank with global ambitions, the “Green Technology Center – Korea”, and the UNFCCC Green Climate Fund is positioned by Korea as part of the Korean green growth network (Interview with Park Chinjung, Policy advisor, PCGG, Doha, 1 December 2012).

As mentioned, these networking strategic moves began in 2005 with the SINGG under UNESCAP, and in 2008 at the G8 Summit President Lee announced the East Asia Climate Partnership to which Korea earmarked \$200 million. The EACP was a continuation of the government’s regional middle power focus. The focus started to broaden with the OECD and G20 activities. Korea chaired the OECD Ministerial Council meeting in Paris in 2009, and here Korea was instrumental to the new OECD Declaration on Green Growth commissioning OECD to develop a green growth strategy, which was completed in 2011 (Interview with Helen Mountford, Deputy Director, Environment Directorate OECD, Doha, 7 December 2012). Korea hosted the

2010 G20 Summit in the name of green growth. Since 2011, the GGGI and 3GF have held six-monthly green growth summits. Networking as such is not spoken or written in text, and needs interpretation and further research, but the connections established are quite apparent.

The many organizations and networks of regional (Asia and the Pacific, Europe, Africa, and Latin America) or global scope are bringing together the developing and developed world countries, as well as public and private sectors actors (both big business and SME sector), and civil society. Korea also approached ICLEI to set up a local ICLEI office in Korea (Conversation with *Gino Van Begin*, Secretary General, ICLEI, Doha, 5 December 2012). With ICLEI as partner green growth is also framed as being local in scale with a focus on city-planning. Networking strategies are also bringing in the financial means through international and regional development banks and the new Green Climate Fund. The strategies also cover technology, R&D, and innovation. Networking strategies supplement what is being communicated, especially by signaling that global environmental governance is possible despite the stalemate of the UN climate negotiations and that it should be more inclusive and bridge-building than the UN organizational set-up. Further, it signals that (Korean) green growth is the right choice, because it is not just words, but dedicated, organized and financially backed action with all relevant stakeholders in a fragmented and multi-level governance field (see section 5.3).

Through the GGGI, further networking and policy-making takes place with local offices around the world. People play a central role in the strategic move of networking: Korean diplomats are placed as green growth “ambassadors” in central positions in partner organizations, and there is a great exchange of diplomats, politicians, and experts between Korea and partner countries and other organizations. By involving European pro-environment countries and green businesses – a strong priority of the B20 Summit, which was part of the G20 Summit in Korea in 2010 – Korea is tapping into these

actors' green credibility (political capital) as well. The GGGI has worked closely with the OECD, UNEP, and the World Bank to establish the Green Growth Knowledge Platform, with the main purpose of exploring, developing, and spreading green growth theory and practice. Guilt by association can also be positive. Korea and the GGGI benefit from the global identity and credibility of its recognized partners such as the UNEP, OECD, and World Bank experts. This is also a mode of accumulation of especially political, knowledge, and symbolic capital with which Korea can advance its own position and the green growth policy program within the larger field of global environmental governance.

One particularly strong relationship is the one between Korea and Denmark. Together they have founded the Green Growth Alliance, and the former Danish Prime Minister Løkke Rasmussen (2009-2011), a liberal like President Lee, became chairman of the GGGI in 2012-2013. For Korea, the active Danish support and advocacy of green growth was important to bring to the project some of the credibility that Korea had not been able to show yet. Denmark has a long history of environmental development and it is globally recognized as environmentally friendly, and – while this is debatable – it is sometimes mentioned as one of few countries in the world, which has achieved a decoupling of economic growth and environmental degradation and GHG emissions. It is quite likely that Korea presented the idea of green growth as a global environmental policy to the Danish government in 2009 during the planning phase of COP15. The Danish government had actually announced a green growth strategy in April 2009, but far from an international agenda this was focused on achieving a reduction in the environmental impact and greenhouse gas emissions of Danish agriculture (Ministry of the Environment, 2009). It seems likely that Korea provided the last push for shift of the Danish government's green growth strategy from domestic agriculture to international relations and global environmental governance. Certainly, COP15 held in

Copenhagen in December 2009 – was an opportunity for both Korea and Denmark to be seized, as a global communication platform for announcing their partnership and dedication to green growth.

5.3. Strategic action through financing

Financing is an important supportive part of framing green growth, which stresses that Korea means business; putting the money where the mouth is. Green is also the symbolic color of money. Furthermore, in Korea green symbolizes energy and fresh start, and is often associated with businesses and good fortune. This quote by former chairman of GGGI, Han Seung-soo, in a speech at Chatham House Director’s Breakfast summarizes the financial resources Korea committed domestically to green growth rather well:

“A total of 50 trillion won (\$40 billion USD) was allocated for the period 2009–2012 on nine key green projects. (...) New demand and markets created through such initiatives would add 956,000 new jobs. (...) Additionally, I instructed the cabinet to draw up a First Five-Year Green Growth Plan. (...) Under the Plan, 107 trillion won (\$97 billion USD), two percent of annual GDP, is being spent on green growth projects under ten specific policy directions. It is estimated that the first Five-Year Plan will induce production worth 182-206 trillion won (20% of 2009 GDP) and create 1.6 to 1.8 million jobs (a 10% rise in employment) by 2013.” (Han, 2012).

Korea has been praised by the UNEP (2010) for delivering the world’s biggest green “new deal” as response to the financial crisis in early 2009. Korea also finances projects through environmental foreign aid in developing countries; through EACP as mentioned above, but also through GGGI projects. Many of the organizational structures mentioned above are supported by cross-financing

from other partner countries and businesses, Denmark, Norway, Japan and Australia which make significant contributions to GGGI. Despite the fact that GCF is not officially a green growth instrument, Korea still presents the GCF funds as a part of green growth. Also, Korea's new development aid approach is in many ways combined with green growth (Tonami and Müller 2014).

Lack of financing is understood as a problem in global environmental governance, and one of the causes of the continued disagreements between North and South (Observations at COP17, COP18, and COP19). It is identified as one of the fundamental stumbling blocks for the project of creating a paradigm shift towards a green economy. To abandon the brown economy and fossil fuels and to provide alternative and economically viable solutions requires a huge shift in financing – divestment in the brown economy and investment in the green economy. It is a sign of recognition of Korea's competent performance that many partners in the GGGI have decided to place parts of their foreign development aid funds in GGGI. For example, Denmark and Norway have recently decided to renew their funding, despite sharp domestic criticisms of this type of development aid. In this sense, what Korea is doing through financing is framing these problems and causes, but also illustrating that green growth can provide financing that flows to the developing world. The combination of green growth and the Korean development model is framed as a credible and morally just solution to the global crisis experienced by the developing world, especially under circumstances where the UN system does not provide the finances that had been promised by the developed world. Further, the financial agreements underlying the green growth public-private partnerships illustrate that Korea is also getting the private sector on board financially, something that is recognized in the field as an achievement of green growth compared to the concept and approach of sustainable development (see also Christoff and Eckersley, 2013).

5.4. Strategic action as policy planning

Korean policy planning seeks to incorporate green growth and to show concretely how it can and should be implemented. Korea has undertaken green growth policy planning domestically, as well as internationally in many developing countries. The extent and speed of domestic policy planning supports communication strategies and also illustrates just what Korea means when describing itself as a fast mover. Policy planning transforms words into action. From 2005 to 2008, policy planning took place through the SINGG and the EACP focusing on the Asian region and development. Policy planning picked up in speed and extent from mid-2008 after President Lee's speech to the nation. The PCGG then became responsible for further development of national green growth policies, with the National Strategy and Five-Year Plan for Green Growth released on the 6th of July 2009, and the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth enacted on the 13th of January 2010 as its key milestones. Green growth policy planning in Korea covers areas such as energy, environment, climate, economy and finance, international trade, business, technology, research, consumer and civil society, foreign policy, development and aid, and education (Interview with Park Chinjung, Policy advisor, PCGG, Doha, 1 December 2012). Korea's strategy for green growth is laid out in the Framework Act on Low Carbon Green Growth, which clearly states that Korea understands green growth as both a national and an international strategy. Through national examples, The Framework Act commits Korea to spread the green growth policy program and planning through international cooperation:

“[The Framework Act] mandates strengthening environmental diplomacy to tackle climate change and to increase international cooperation as a world leader in the field of green growth. It promotes information sharing and networking with international organizations and foreign governments to jointly pursue global green growth.” (GGGI, 2011: 30).

Policy planning as strategic action supplements the other strategic actions. The way policy planning is communicated, organized, financed and implemented illustrates two points. Firstly, the importance of setting up a hierarchy of policy-making structures: a vision and strategy on top, then a green growth plan and framework law and financing in place, and lastly implementation through PPP's and Best Practices. Secondly, through GGGI's international partnerships, communicated globally, Korea takes part in concrete policy planning exercises in developing countries, which enhances Korea's access to many kinds of capital and improves its global position. The Korean green growth (future) development model is applied, and often the GGGI, with backing from UNEP, OECD, and World Bank, is leading the green growth planning. GGGI has assisted in developing policy plans in several countries, for example Indonesia, China, Vietnam, Ethiopia, Rwanda and Costa Rica.

When looking into GGGI country projects, some general features stand out. Although taking the lead in developing the plans and analyzing potential policy areas for green growth transformation, it is significant and in line with the overall strategy of positioning Korea as a bridge-builder, that Korea involves partner countries in the process. Specifically, the GGGI asks representatives from the partner countries to be in charge of setting up the policy planning organization and processes, and to help identify policy areas of interest in the green transformation, in order to give the partner countries ownership of the policy planning and thus of the implementation. Developing countries experience that Korea takes them seriously. From the GGGI's perspective being a facilitator of planning and bridge-building rather than an executive organization, the strategy is to anchor the green growth policy planning at the highest possible political level in order to ensure support for the implementation. The GGGI's role is comparable to that of an external consultant and "neutral" broker. It draws on the experience of former McKinsey

consultants and delivers analyses of project risk management and identifies sources of both support and risk (Interview with Hans Jakob Eriksen, Director, GGGI Copenhagen regional office, 9 January 2013; Conversations with Howard Bamsey, Director-General, and Mattia Romani, Deputy Director-General, GGGI, Warsaw, 18 November 2013).

Table 3. Korea's strategic action and strategic moves in relation to green growth governance

Categories of strategic action	Strategic moves
Conditioning	<p><i>Seizing/creating the opportunity</i></p> <p><i>Launching many initiatives</i></p> <p><i>Asserting one's position(s)/capital</i></p> <p><i>Strong global presence</i></p> <p><i>Setting up information platforms (on/offline)</i></p>
Timing	<p><i>Delivering (on time)</i></p> <p><i>Timelining</i></p> <p><i>Historicizing</i></p> <p><i>Futuring</i></p>
Communicating	<p><i>Framing stories, values, identities</i></p> <p><i>Agenda setting</i></p> <p><i>Planting ideas</i></p> <p><i>Controlling emotions</i></p> <p><i>Hosting international meetings</i></p> <p><i>Delivering high-level speeches</i></p> <p><i>Creating and spreading commercial material</i></p> <p><i>Creating and spreading academic material</i></p> <p><i>Showcasing work through ceremonies</i></p>
Networking	<p><i>"Neutral" brokering</i></p> <p><i>Being open-minded and inclusive</i></p> <p><i>Coalition-building</i></p> <p><i>Isolating disruptive actors</i></p> <p><i>Establishing think tanks, international organizations, and networks</i></p> <p><i>Joining think tanks, international organizations, and networks</i></p> <p><i>Setting up local offices of own organizations in partner countries</i></p> <p><i>Signing memoranda of understanding with partners</i></p> <p><i>Recruiting people with international experience, network and skills</i></p>
Financing	<p><i>Allocating enough finances to be recognized as willing to invest</i></p> <p><i>Investing economically in one's own and others' international projects</i></p> <p><i>Securing investments from other actors</i></p> <p><i>Hosting financial organizations</i></p>
Policy planning	<p><i>Dedicated domestic policy planning as example to follow</i></p> <p><i>Supporting policy planning in partner countries</i></p> <p><i>Adapting policy planning to practical concerns of partner countries</i></p> <p><i>Constructing legal and institutional framework in a hierarchy of vision-strategy-plan</i></p> <p><i>Involving expert resources from international organizations like the OECD, the World Bank and the UNEP</i></p> <p><i>Involving local knowledge resources to secure legitimacy and support for implementation</i></p>

6. Conclusion

Supported by many international actors, the field of green growth governance has become increasingly institutionalized in the larger field of global environmental governance. Korea has initiated many of the new networks and research shows that it is the most connected actor in this green growth field (Blaxekjær, forthcoming). In short, Korea has “put into practice the creative diplomacy and behavior that is potentially the theoretical hallmark of middle power behavior” (Beeson and Higgott, 2014: 233). However, middle power theory has not explained this empirical phenomenon, nor how Korea is establishing itself as *global* middle power. Thus the aim of this article was to investigate how Korea has become a primary actor in global environmental governance. In order to answer this question, the article had to move beyond the image of Korea as a regionally limited middle power of secondary status, and supplement middle power theory’s behavioral approach with a Bourdieusian practice theory focusing on strategic action fields and strategic action. This new theoretical model enabled categorization of middle powers’ strategic action as *conditioning, timing, communicating, networking, financing, and policy planning*, the latter two added through inductive analysis. This theoretical innovation opened for the empirical analysis of the strategic action and the specific strategic moves undertaken by Korea in its efforts to establish green growth as a sub-field within the field of global environmental governance.

The key contributions of this article are as follows: It has explained, firstly, through what specific strategic moves Korea has become a primary actor in global environmental governance, a *Green Middle Power*. Secondly, it has demonstrated the usefulness of combining middle power theory’s behavioral approach with strategic action theory, which enables a better understanding of the issue areas and collective actors under study as strategic action fields. This combined *middle power strategic action* approach integrates both material and ideational content, and it is founded on strong empirical analyses of specific

strategic moves. This theoretical innovation should be applicable to many other cases in IR and it would help nuance our understanding of global governance and the primary role middle powers can play. It allows for a deepening of the explanatory ambitions of middle power theory, and enhances the capacity of middle power theory to inspire strategic policy development.

This productive approach raises questions for further research on Korea as a strategic action field. For example, how did green growth develop and change as a national and international political strategy across different Korean governments? What is at stake within Korea as strategic action field, and which actors have struggled, won and lost in the processes of defining and developing Korea as a green middle power? Because of Korea's prominent role in the field of global environmental governance, these questions will not only contribute to the understanding of Korea as a Green Middle Power, but also help us gain a better understanding of the global strategic action field of green growth governance.

Appendix: Overview of sources

Table 4. List of interviews.

Name and position of interviewee(s)	Place of interview	Time of interview
<i>Kristian Ruby</i> , Assistant to the European Union Climate Commissioner, Connie Hedegaard.	European Commission, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Dan Jørgensen</i> , Member of the European Parliament (Group of the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats), Vice-Chair ENVI, Committee on the Environment, Public Health and Food Safety.	European Parliament, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Annika Ahtonen</i> , Policy Analyst, European Policy Centre.	European Policy Centre, Brussels.	10 November 2011
<i>Lee Me Kyung</i> , Policy Advisor, Climate Change Office, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA)	COP17, Durban, South Africa	7 December 2011
<i>Marie-Lousie Wegter</i> , Head of Office, Global Green Growth Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. <i>Erik Næraa-Nicolajsen</i> , Deputy Head of Office, Environment, Climate and Energy, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. <i>Tomas Anker Christensen</i> , Head of Centre, Global Challenges, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen.	20 January 2012
<i>Park Chinjung</i> , Policy advisor, Korea's Presidential Committee on Green Growth.	COP18, Doha, Qatar	1 December 2012
<i>Yu Bok-hwan</i> , Secretary General of Korea's Presidential Committee on Green Growth PGGG Director (Email interview).	COP18, Doha, Qatar.	5 December 2012
<i>Helen Mountford</i> , Deputy Director, Environment Directorate OECD.	COP18, Doha, Qatar.	7 December 2012
<i>Hans Jakob Eriksen</i> , Director, GGGI Copenhagen regional office	Phone interview.	9 January 2013
<i>Lars Løkke Rasmussen</i> , former Danish Prime Minister, Chairman of GGGI since May 2012. (E-mail interview for background only).	Copenhagen, Denmark	29 April 2013
<i>Martin Lidegaard</i> , Denmark's Minister for Climate, Energy and Building.	Copenhagen, Denmark.	12 June 2013
<i>Kim Joy</i> , Programme Officer, Green Economy Initiative, Economics and Trade Branch, United Nations Environment Programme.	Phone interview.	19 December 2013

Table 5. List of conversations.

Name, position and event	Place of conversation	Time of conversation
<i>Eva Grambye</i> , Head of Office, Global Green Growth Secretariat, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark. Meeting with secretariat and political science students.	Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, Copenhagen.	1 November 2012
<i>Seungwon Lee</i> , Director for Development Cooperation Division Ministry of Strategy and Finance, Republic of Korea. Side event organized by Korea. (Including copy of powerpoint presentation from side event).	COP18, Doha, Qatar.	1 December 2012
<i>Gino Van Begin</i> , Secretary General, ICLEI – Local Governments for Sustainability. Following side event organized by Korea.	COP18, Doha, Qatar.	5 December 2012
<i>Yu Bok-hwan</i> , Secretary General of Korea’s Presidential Committee on Green Growth PCGG Director. Side event organized by Korea. (Including powerpoint presentation from side event with notes).	COP18, Doha, Qatar.	5 December 2012
<i>Howard Bamsey</i> , Director-General, GGGI. After “Interview from Warsaw UNFCCC Climate Studio TV” event.	COP19, Warsaw, Poland.	18 November 2013
<i>Mattia Romani</i> , Deputy Director-General, Green Growth Planning & Implementation, GGGI. After “Interview from Warsaw UNFCCC Climate Studio TV” event.	COP19, Warsaw, Poland.	18 November 2013

Table 6. Field observations.

Name of event	Place of event	Time of event
Global Green Growth Forum 2011, Plenary debate I, II, III, and IV.	Copenhagen, Denmark.	11-12 October 2011
Take Lead Conference, experts' workshop on communicating Green Growth.	Copenhagen, Denmark	12 October 2011
The Green race to Durban and Beyond: A debate on comparability, competitiveness and compatibility of climate actions around the world. Arranged by the Greens, European Free Alliance in the European Parliament.	European Parliament, Brussels, Belgium.	9 November 2011
The Durban Climate Change Conference. COP17/CMP7.	Durban, South Africa	28 November - 9 December 2011
The Doha Climate Change Conference. COP18/CMP8.	Doha, Qatar	30 November - 7 December 2012
Asian Development Bank's Launch of Asian Development Outlook 2013.	Copenhagen, Denmark	19 April 2013
STRING green growth working group meeting.	City of Hamburg, Germany.	23 April 2013
The Warsaw Climate Change Conference. COP19/CMP9.	Warsaw, Poland.	13-21 November 2013
Global Green Growth Forum 2014.	Copenhagen, Denmark.	20-21 October 2014
The Lima Climate Change Conference. COP20/CMP10.	Lima, Peru.	1-14 December 2014

Overview of sources in green growth database.

The material I have collected and included in what I refer to as my green growth database (if not including interviews and observations) consists of a large sample (more than 800 units) of digital material like reports, concept notes, posters, press releases, meeting invitations, meeting agendas, meeting minutes, summit declarations, conference invitations, conference material, photos and videos, news articles, figures and tables, websites and specific website pages (copied to pdf), and academic articles and blogposts. In addition I have obtained more than 200 units of physical material at events. This material consists of reports, papers, meetings invitations, meeting packages, and merchandise. From these sources I have created a historical timeline of events with dates, place, organisers, and main content/purpose. From this list I have created a database in excel which lists actors (and years of appearance), green growth networks, actors connections and actor memberships in networks. The database displays 370 actors in the years 2005 to 2013 (see Table 7 below). For an analysis of the emergence and spread of green growth see Blaxekjær (forthcoming).

Table 7. Type and number of actors in the green growth governance field (2005-2013).

Actor type	Number
City	35
Company	64
Development, finance and investment	42
Forum and network	43
Multilateral organisation	34
NGO	6
Region	8
Research and policy	42
State	96
Total	370

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8. Abstract

In this PhD dissertation, I ask the research question: *How have transscalar climate governance practices changed since COP15?* To answer this, I first contextualise the dissertation, firstly, by explaining my meta-theoretical approach of Engaged Scholarship, Narrative Theory, and Practice Theory which guide the dissertation as a whole. Secondly, I situate the dissertation in the broader academic field of global climate governance. I critically reflect on the dominant research narrative which I find to be based on a problematic model of epistemological and ontological iterations. Through my Narrative approach, I explore ambiguities and dilemmas in this research narrative, from which I then develop an alternative research narrative still using the epistemological and ontological narratives, but also inclusive of practice or a practical narrative. I argue that the Engaged Scholarship approach would be an excellent framework to develop such an alternative research narrative within. I then present my research design based on the Engaged Scholarship approach and explain how the main theoretical elements would fit within it, and then how the five papers would fit both theoretically with a range of concepts from the same family of theories, and empirically with the two themes of UNFCCC governance (paper 1-3) and green growth governance (paper 4-5). I specifically develop a transscalar, practice and narrative based governance perspective; *theoretically* by exploring transscalar governance from a Bourdieusian practice perspective; *empirically* by investigating different but relevant parts of the phenomenon, namely UN climate negotiations and the green growth policy field at different scales of analysis; and *practically* by bringing theoretical and empirical insights together by engaging policy, business, and society in dialogue to explore what practitioners understand as new climate governance and needed change after COP15.

The main *theoretical* story is that *practices* and *narratives* shape how we respond to climate change, and that practices of transscalar governance of climate change evolve over time interdependently in social relations and processes (paper 1) through *narrative practices* (paper 2) *communities of practice* (paper 3), in *strategic action fields* (paper 4 and 5), and through specific *strategic action and strategic moves* (paper 5). The main *empirical* story is that transscalar governance of climate change after COP15 has responded in many ways; and two of which I have explored are about a re-configuration of the UNFCCC field (papers 1-3) and the formation of a new field focused on green growth (papers 4-5). The main *practical* story is scholars are constantly involved in practical governance in both the UNFCCC and green growth field. Another part of this story is that I have become engaged in practical governance. I am continually engaging practitioners, and practitioners are increasingly engaging me. I take this as evidence that practitioners find my work usable, and I argue that my own work and knowledge has been strengthened by this engagement. Engaged scholarship is a reflexive and transdisciplinary way of thinking and practicing research. In a Bourdieusian sense, (the practice of) theorising should include practical knowledge, and practice should include theoretical knowledge in a much more explicit and reflexive way. It not only demands more of the scholar but also of the participating practitioners. However, this is the way forward for transscalar governance of climate change.

9. Resumé (in Danish)

I denne ph.d.-afhandling er forskningsspørgsmålet Hvordan har transskalare klima-governance praksisser ændret sig siden COP15? For at besvare dette spørgsmål har jeg først kontekstualiseret afhandlingen. Det har jeg gjort ved at forklare min meta-teoretiske tilgang baseret på Engaged Scholarship, Narrativ Teori og Praksis Teori, der guider hele afhandlingen. Dernæst har jeg placeret afhandlingen i det bredere akademiske felt inden for global klima-governance. Jeg reflekterer kritisk over det dominerende forskningsnarrative, som, jeg argumenterer for, er baseret på en problematisk model af epistemologisk og ontologisk iterationer. Gennem min narrative tilgang undersøger jeg tvetydigheder og dilemmaer i dette dominerende forskningsnarrativ. I forlængelse heraf udvikler jeg et alternativt forskningsnarrativ, der stadig er baseret på et epistemologisk og ontologisk narrativ, men nu også inkluderer et praktisk narrativ. Jeg argumenterer for, at Engaged Scholarship tilgangen er en god ramme, som mit alternative forskningsnarrative kan udvikles indenfor.

Jeg præsenterer efterfølgende mit forskningsdesign baseret på Engaged Scholarship og forklarer, hvordan de primære teoretiske elementer passer ind, samt hvordan de fem artikler, som afhandlingen bygger på, også passer ind både teoretisk med en række begreber fra samme familie af teorier og empirisk gennem analyser af FNs klimaforhandlinger (artikel 1, 2 og 3) samt nye grøn vækst netværk (artikel 4 og 5). Jeg udvikler en specifik governance tilgang baseret på begreberne transskalar, praksis og narrativ. Jeg anvender dette perspektiv *teoretisk* ved at undersøge transskalar governance i et Bourdieu-perspektiv, *empirisk* ved at undersøge forskellige men relevante dele af dette fænomen, dvs. FNs klimaforhandlinger og nye grøn vækst netværk som governance felter undersøgt i forskellig skalaer. Jeg anvender også perspektivet til *praktisk* at bringe disse teoretiske og empiriske indsigter sammen. Det gør jeg i min praktiske tilgang ved at engagere forskellige praktikere for igennem

dialog at undersøge, hvordan praktikere forstår klima-governance (i praksis) efter COP15.

Den primære *teoretiske* historie jeg fortæller gennem afhandlingen er, at praksisser og narrativer former, hvordan vi forstår og reagerer på klimaforandringerne, samt at transskalar governance af klimaforandringer i praksis udvikler sig over tid i samspil med *sociale relationer og processer* (artikel 1) gennem *narrative praksisser* (artikel 2), *praksisfællesskaber* (artikel 3), *strategiske handlingsfelter* (artikel 4 og 5) og gennem *strategisk handling og strategiske træk* (artikel 5). Den primære *empiriske* historie handler om, at transskalar governance af klimaforandringerne efter COP15 har ændret sig på mange måder, hvoraf jeg har undersøgt to. Disse omhandler en reorganisering af FN's klimaforhandlingsfelt (artikel 1, 2 og 3) samt formation af et nyt governance felt fokuseret på grøn vækst (artikel 4 og 5). Den primære *praktiske* historie handler om, at samfundsvidenskabelige forskere er dybt involverede i praktisk klima-governance i både FN's klimaforhandlinger og inden for grøn vækst. En del af historien er også, at jeg er blevet engageret som forsker i disse felter og dermed i praktisk governance – og at feltet og praktikere i stingende grad inviterer mig ind. Jeg tager dette som udtryk for, at praktikere kan bruge min forskning. Engaged Scholarship er en reflektiv og transdisciplinær måde at tænke og forske i praksis på. I et Bourdieu-perspektiv bør teoretisering som praksis også inkludere praktisk viden og omvendt, og dette i en meget mere eksplicit og reflekterende tilgang end det er tilfældet i dag. Det vil kræve langt mere af både forskere og praktikere, men er vejen frem for transskalar governance af klimaforandringerne.

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